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To Marta Repullo Grau, a capsigrany that flew to make this possible.
Ceremonia recurrente
El animal totemico con sus unas de luz,
los objetos cjue junta la oscuridad debajo de la cama,
el ritmo misterioso de tu respiracion, la sombra
que tu sudor dibuja en el olfato, el dia ya inminentemente.
Entonces me enderezo, todavia batido por las aguas del sueno,
Vuelvo de un continente a medias ciego
donde tambien estabas hi pero eras otra,
cuando te consulto con la boca y los dedos, recorro el horizonte de tus flancos
(dulcemente te enojas, quieres seguir durmiendo, me dices bruto y tonto,
te debates riendo, no te dejas tomar pero ya es tarde, un fuego
de piel y de azabache, las figuras del sueno)
el animal totemico a los pies de la hoguera
con sus unas de luz y sus alas de almizcle.
Y despues despertamos y es domingo y noviembre
Julio Cortazar
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ABSTRACT
A TUTELAZO LIMPIO: A STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR
IDENTITY AND RIGHTS IN COLOMBIA AND THE
DEMOBILIZING EFFECT OF THE LAW
September 2008
FARID SAMIR BENAVIDES VANEGAS
J.D., UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE COLOMBIA
M.A., UNIVERSIDAD DE BARCELONA
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor John Brigham
The dissertation is an analysis of the constitutive power of law and
its role in the subalternization of subjects in Colombia. This dissertation analyzes
the way law became central in the process of occidentalization of indigenous
peoples and in the constitution of the Colombian nation as an
inclusive/ exclusive imagined community. This dissertation is based on a
multilayered historical, textual analyses of archival documentation and
interviews to indigenous rights activists, former guerrilla members, and
members of the Colombian elites. This work begins with an analysis of the way
law was used during the colony to constitute an occidental identity and goes on
to analyze some 19 th century Colombia legal artifacts in order to show the logic
IX
of incorporation into modernity that repeats itself in different waves of
globalization. It analyzes the incorporation of indigenous rights in the 1991
Constitution, its implementation by the Colombian Constitutional Court and its
role in constituting a liberal identity as part of neoliberal governmental ity. It also
analyzes the processes of resistance of indigenous peoples and the way their
claims are framed in legal terms in order to be heard by the national state.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation addresses the question of the coloniality of power, the
pattern of global power that classifies the world population around the category
of race and that is, according to Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano, "a mental
construction that expresses the basic experience of colonial domination and
pervades the more important dimensions of global power, including its specific
rationality: Eurocentrism" (Quijano, 2000). This pattern of global power has a
colonial origin but it does not end with the 19th century political independence.
On the contrary, the coloniality of power has proven to be present in the process
of nation building in Latin America, in the indigenista era in the early 20th
century, and in the inclusion of indigenous rights in the Latin American
constitutional movement of the late 20 th century.
The neoliberal model of power that is predominant today has its roots in
the constitution of the Occident at the beginning of modernity and in the
constitution of Indigenous peoples and peoples from Africa as subaltern subjects.
In this dissertation I deal with the question of the role that law has played in the
constitution of subaltern identities, a global pattern that I have labeled as the
legal coloniality of power. I analyze the long history of the legal production of
subjectivities since the beginning of the Spanish presence in the Americas to the
passing of the 1991 Constitution, in order to show how liberal multiculturalism
in Colombia is part of that global pattern that is the coloniality of power.
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I divide up my analysis in two parts in order to support the main
argument of this text: In the first part, I show the role law has played in the
constitution of an occidental identity, by analyzing the constitution of the Indian 1
as a subaltern subject during the colony; the process of inclusion/ exclusion after
independence; and the way criminal law and constitutional law have been used
to produce subaltern subjectivities. In the second part of the dissertation, I show
how law has been used in subalterns' battles and how it has led in some cases to
the demobilization of their movement. I argue that law is a contested field that
can be part of constitutive practices but that, at the same time, it can be a useful
instrument in subalterns' resistance. My main goal is to dispute the traditional
idea of law as a peaceful domain and to show that law is violence: either
epistemic violence or emancipatory violence.
My research is not about indigenous rights or indigenous struggles as
such, even though I focused on the long history of indigenous struggles for rights
and identity. My interest in the indigenous movement emerges from the
importance indigenous rights achieved during the 1990s and law's importance in
those struggles. During this period, Indigenous fights were focused on obtaining
legal recognition and on winning legal cases. My interest in the indigenous
movement came out of my perception that indigenous struggles changed
because of the constitutional transformation of 1991. In this dissertation that
under neoliberal forms of governmentality law becomes a tool that demobilizes
1
I use the word Indian in italics, in order to highlight its constructed character. The fact that I do
not do it with other categories does not mean that I think they are not constructed
?
social movements by taking their claims as constitutional or legal claims and,
therefore, as claims that can only be solved in a Court of law.
The 1991 Constitution includes, for the first time in Colombian
constitutional history, indigenous rights as fundamental and human rights. One
could view this inclusion as a progressive move of the Colombian government
and as a step further in the construction of a post-liberal society. However, the
analysis of the development of the 1991 Constitution shows otherwise. In this
dissertation 1 analyze the path that led to the 1991 Constitution in order to put
indigenous rights within a broader framework: that of the production of
occidental and liberal subjectivities.
Analyses of indigenous rights in Colombia are scarce, and they focused
mostly on their recognition in the 1991 Constitution. This does not mean that
before 1991 there were not any analysis of indigenous communities in the
literature, but they were mostly anthropological works that analyzed indigenous
communities without paying attention to the role law played in the construction
of their identities or in their mobilizations. However, in the indigenous tradition
the role of law is important as the cases of Juan Tame and Qu intin Lame show
(Rappaport, 1990). Thus I focused on the literature regarding the 1991
Constitution and found out that the story told in those accounts is one from the
elites' point of view, stressing the official history of the process that led to the
1991 Constituent Assembly, but leaving in the dark other forms of social
mobilization. In my research I pay attention to indigenous mobilization, in
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particular the movement in Cauca and the indigenous Movimiento Armado
Manuel Quintin Lame, and to guerrilla warfare, in order to show the importance
of violence and mobilization in the process of resistance to neoliberal
governmentality. I do not include in my analysis other social groups, like the
Movement for Peace and the role played by NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s, not
because I think they are not important but because my main goal is the legal
constitution of subaltern identities and the processes of resistance that one
particular group exercises against that process. Other subaltern subjects like
women, people of African descent, and Roma people are not analyzed here,
though I hope to have set the bases for further analysis on this topic.2
Research Questions
In the last 15 years, there has been an increasing preoccupation among
scholars and activists to study the question of indigenous rights in Colombia. In
their analysis, they pay attention to the critical juncture originated in the
radicalization of guerrillas and drug traffickers' terrorism in Colombia during
the 1980s to argue that the inclusion of some remedies and of indigenous and
afro descendants' rights in the 1991 Constitution was the answer elites gave to
that crisis (Dugas, 1993; Van Cott, 2000; Gross, 1993). From a point of view of
theories of transition to democracy, they analyzed the process that led to the 1991
2 In the case of people of African descent, for instance, their rights were not included in the
Constitution in the same way as indigenous rights. Indigenous representatives fought hard to
include rights for blacks in the 1991 Constitution, but it was only after 1991 that those rights were
developed in the law. See Arocha (1998) on the history of black mobilization and the path that
led to Law 70/1993.
4
Colombian Constitution (Dugas, 1997, 2001), the consolidation of indigenous
rights in the Constitutional discourse (Van Cott, 2000), and the constitution of
indigenous political parties at the national level (Laurent, 2005).
In the literature on indigenous rights in Colombia, the movement of
indigenous peoples of the region of Cauca in the South of Colombia is the
primary focus of attention (Findji, 1985; Rappaport, 2005; Rappaport 2000;
Espinosa, 2004). The Nasa (formerly Paez) and the Guambianos peoples are
central in these accounts, as they were the ones who initiated a struggle for land
and rights in Colombia in the early 1970s (CRIC, 1981). Due to the consolidation
of their struggles around organizations like the Consejo Regional Indigena del Cauca
CRIC, the Organization Nacional Indigena de Colombia ONIC and Autoridades
Indigenas de Colombia AIC, it is not surprising that some scholars have used them
as their central case. As a result, constitutional battles, political parties, and
interactions with the government are analyzed taking into account mostly the
struggles at the national level and with the national government (Findji, 1992).
The struggles of the 1970s and the local fights for identity and social equality, the
historical trajectory of capitalism, the constitution of social classes, and the
constitution of indigenous peoples as liberal subjects are not taken into account
in these studies. Some anthropologists (Jackson, 1991; Jackson, 2002b; Ramirez,
2002; Rappaport, 2000; Espinosa, 2004) have focused on the identities of
indigenous peoples at the local level, but the relationship between the local and
the national/ global is missed in their picture.
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Local organizations in regions where industrialization succeeded in the
creation of a working and peasant class are the least studied in the history of
indigenous rights in Colombia. Their struggles for identity and rights are lost in
the history about national politics and the inclusion of rights in the constitution.
We know little of smaller organizations like the Organization Regional Indigena del
Valle del Cauca ORIVAC, their struggles for identity and rights in towns like
Florida (now a site of disputes between guerrillas and the government), and their
relations with the local government. We also know little of how indigenous
organizations have used law to constitute their claims at the local and at the
national level and how legal liberalism affects their identities and their struggles.
This research will show how national policies are part of the constitution
of a liberal identity but at the same time it will show that indigenous peoples
resist that process through their struggles. The literature on indigenous rights
pay little attention to the relationship between capitalism, the model of
development and the law, and the way this relation would explain the function
these rights play in the state and the reasons for their implementation or lack
thereof (Chantal Barre, 1983).
My research focuses on the following questions:
1. What is the role law plays in the constitution of occidental and
liberal identities?
2. What are the effects of legal liberalism in Colombia?
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3 . What are the constitutional struggles of indigenous local
organizations like ORIVAC in Valle del Cauca?
4. How is violence related to legal identities and legal resistance?
5. Why in a country like Colombia were indigenous rights
incorporated?
These research objectives were achieved through several interviews to
leaders of the indigenous movements and organizations in Colombia, with
emphasis on Valle del Cauca (ORIVAC). They were complemented with
interviews to leaders of guerrilla forces and other delegates to the Constituent
Assembly and with archival work in Bogota and Cali.
Indigenous Rights in Colombia
On July 4 th 1991 the Colombian Constituent Assembly passed a new
Constitution that replaced the old 1886 Constitution (Cepeda, 1991; Cepeda,
1993). After hard and fierce debates, the new Constitution included indigenous
rights, like the right to special territories and jurisdiction and Afro-descendants'
rights, but in the latter only rural blacks had the right to special treatment
(Sanchez, 2004). Given the inclusion of these rights and the inclusion of new
political forces in the system, some scholars have considered that the new
Constitution represents a new social pact for the Colombian nation (Dugas, 1991,
1997; Cepeda, 1991; Tovar, 2000; Borrero, 2003; Van Cott, 2000, Van Cott, 2000b).
In the traditional accounts of this process the new Constitution is seen as an
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internal and positive process, because it brought about a sort of moral progress
and economic development.
In studies about Constitutional reform in Colombia there is an emphasis
on the fact that Colombia has become a multicultural or pluriethnic state
(Hernandez, 2001; ONU, 2002; Borrero, 2003). The "new social contract"
included groups until then forgotten in the Colombia nation. These studies
focus in the process that led to the recent incorporation of indigenous rights, and
their implementation by the Constitutional Court. Through an analysis of
national constitutional cases, these studies show that democratization and
indigenous rights are a reality in Colombia. The research on indigenous rights
analyze these cases from a Constitutional or international law point of view, but
do not pay attention to the impact these cases have at the local level or on how
judges and activists use them to develop their local agendas. Some activists have
focused on the impact that some policies, like the Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas FTA A, will have on indigenous peoples. However, scholarship on the
relationship between the model of development and the question of indigenous
rights is almost non-existent or too old to be useful in current analysis about
globalization, neoliberal governmentality, and indigenous rights (Garcia, 1952;
Izquierdo, 1978; and Chantal-Barre, 1983)
While existing research on indigenous rights in Colombia has provided
valuable information and has done interesting analyses, it nonetheless contains a
number of limitations, namely: The information we have on indigenous rights
s
comes from struggles at the national level; it focuses on indigenous organizations
that have access to the national governments; and it does not pay attention to the
impact of national policies at the local level. On the other hand, research on
indigenous rights do not take into account the trajectory of capitalism in
Colombia and the way indigenous rights and the law have been used to
constitute indigenous peoples as workers or as liberal subjects, with the
corresponding effect on the use of their lands and on the way they lead their
social struggles (Garcia, 1952; Friede, 1975; Benitez, 1988; Urban and Sherzer,
1991, Wilson, 1997; Bonilla, 2006).
Analyzing the Legal Coloniality of Power
In Colombia there are approximately 800.000 indigenous persons,
grouped in 81 indigenous communities. Some of these groups have managed to
survive thanks to their own legal, cultural, and political organizations. Others
have recovered their indigenous identity as a result of the political struggles of
the 1970s, led by CRIC in the region of Cauca. The process of incorporation of
Colombia in the world-system in the 19th century led to a series of reforms that
directly affected indigenous peoples and Afro descendants. After independence,
Simon Bolivar decided to free indigenous peoples from their condition of
serfdom and to grant them their condition as free individuals. With the first
liberal Republic in the mid 1800s, indigenous peoples were seen as individuals
and as subjects with the right to private property and the right to enter in private
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contracts. They were deprived of their lands and treated as liberal citizens, that
is, as citizens who were equal before the law but who in practice lacked all
protection by the law. The Nation state made them owners of their own lands
and in doing so it left them without protection from the pressures of capitalist
entrepreneurs. As a result, indigenous peoples lost their lands and were forced
to work in a system known as terrnjerin, which was a system that forced them to
work in the same lands that used to be their property (Chantal-Barre, 1983;
Muelas, 2005). Law was important in the consolidation of this reform, creating
the possibilities for the incorporation of indigenous lands into the world market
(Bonilla, 1992; Alta, 1998; Diaz Videla, 1993; Diaz Videla, 1994). As a result, in
some regions of Colombia indigenous peoples disappeared and became rural
workers or peasants. Valle del Cauca is one of the regions where this process
was almost completed (Colmenares, 1976; Colmenares, 1979).
In the 18 th century, Valle del Cauca 's economy gravitated around the
hacienda and the gold mines. Afrodescendants and indigenous peoples shared a
similar fate, although indigenous peoples had some rights recognized in the law
and traditionally granted to them by the laws of the state of Cauca (Colmenares,
1991). After the consolidation of the industrialization of this region, Indians and
blacks became workers and peasants, their former identities disappeared -with
the exception of the Embera-Chami, Eperara-Siapidara and Wounaan whose
presence in the jungle allowed them to remain apart from this process- and all of
them became integrated into the labor market (Mejia Prado 1993; Mejia Prado,
2002; Londono Rosero, 1996). The Nasa Paez, the community this research will
focus on Chapter 7, disappeared as an indigenous group in Valle del Cauca and
most of their members lost their traditions and customs. However, after 1980s,
the Nasa Paez began a process of recovery of their indigenous identity and a long
struggle for their rights. Nowadays, indigenous peoples of Valle del Cauca are
organized around the ORIVAC, and their population is about 24,000 persons
(Secretaria de Cultura, 2003).
Previous research has focused on the history of indigenous peoples of
Valle del Cauca. Some scholars have analyzed their conceptions of health
(Caceres, 1996), their conceptions of authority (Bolanos, 1997) or their views of
the process of colonization (Rappaport, 2000). However, little attention has been
paid to the recent history of the indigenous organizing process and their impact
in the constitution of an indigenous identity in Valle del Cauca. Law and rights
are part of these analyses, but scholars working on this line of inquiry pay
exclusive attention to constitutional cases decided by the Constitutional Court
and thereby to the struggles at the national level. Local histories are left aside
and lost in the discussion about the nation state (Mignolo, 2001). The importance
of global designs, that is to say, the way constitutional law was constituted in the
liberal project of the 19th century, and the importance of the ideas of Domingo
Faustino Sarmiento (the Argentinean leader who developed policies to whiten
the Argentinean nation in the 19 th century) in the constitutional discourse of
Colombia in the first liberal Republic (1832-1886) are left without consideration.
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At the same time, the importance of constitutionalism in the third liberal
Republic (1970 - to date) is not analyzed and it is rather seen as a normal result of
globalization. How these global designs affect local histories remains without
examination.
I propose a study that combines a historical analysis of the role law play in
the subalternization of indigenous peoples and an analysis of constitutional cases
that are generally seen as progressive. I propose this study in order to show the
long history of the legal coloniality of power. By using an approach of the long
duree, I want to date the discussion on indigenous rights at the beginning of
modernity and specifically at the beginning of the conquest of the Americas
(Bonilla, 1992). This is the approach used by indigenous peoples in their
discussion about their claims. According to indigenous leader Ampan Karacka,
the process of constitution of identity started when the Europeans came and
created nation states, established constitutions that did not recognize plurality,
imposed their languages, leaving the languages of the indigenous peoples as
dialects, usurped indigenous lands calling them bnldios (abandoned and unused
lands that belong to the state), imposed their religions and cultures, and wrote
history from their own point of view to pursue their own economic and political
interests (Karacka in Alta, 1998, 48). By paying attention to the trajectory of
indigenous rights and its close relation to the model of development being
applied in the region I aim at explaining the transformations in indigenous rights
throughout the Republic, without appealing to a discourse based on the bom fide
of the elites.
One of the institutions created by the 1991 Constitution was the
Constitutional Court, a body of nine Justices whose main task is defending the
constitution through the accion de constitucionalidad and defending people's
human rights, through the accion de tutela. Through the tutelas the Court
developed the understanding of human rights and the interpretation lower
courts should give to them. In this process, the Court developed those special
rights included in the Constitution that benefited indigenous peoples. The
theoretical framework used by the Court was one based on liberal
multiculturalism, especially the works of Canadian philosophers Will Kymlicka's
and Charles Taylor's (Borrero, 2003). Through several decisions the Court has
set the limits of special rights in a liberal democracy, as they understand it in
Colombia. In these decisions the Court, using Kymlicka's ideas, has written that
the limits of indigenous rights are given by the universal discourse of human
rights, that is, those rights contained in the Universal Declaration of 1948 and
other instruments that established the rights of the civilized people of the world
(Sanchez, 2004). This dissertation will analyze the similarities between the
discourse of the colony, where it was said that indigenous peoples had the right
to their own culture and system of justice, as long as it respected the values of
Christian civilization, and the universal character the Court finds in the modern
discourse of human rights. I wish to explore the persistence of colonial
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discourses and practices in modern Colombian constitutionalism. Through the
use of concepts like the colonial difference and the coloniality of power (Mignolo,
2001; Quijano, 2002), I show the persistence of a constitutive design in the
colonial, liberal, developmental, and globalization projects. Using a perspective
of the long duree, 1 show how modern constitutionalism is connected to the
colonial project and how the legal coloniality of power has developed since the
beginning of the Spanish presence in the Americas (Mignolo, 2003).
The first part of this dissertation will analyze two main avenues of
inquiry: on the one hand, it will show the way indigenous identity was
constituted at the beginning of modernity and in the discourse of justification of
the conquest. I plan to analyze the major texts for the justification and for the
critique of the conquest in order to show how the Indian identity was produced.
On the other hand, I will show the way indigenous peoples and rights were
constituted after 19 th century Colombian Independence. I aim to analyze the
major constitutional texts in the first liberal Republic in order to set the bases to
understand the way subaltern subjectivities in the 19 th century were produced.
A second phase of research focused on the study of the path towards the
1991 Constitution, in order to see how indigenous politics worked at the time
and to see what made possible the inclusion of indigenous rights in the
Constitution. This part of the research was based on interviews to former
delegates to the Constituent Assembly and to the most important actors in the
establishment of the Constitution. It will give a more accurate picture of the
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process and it will show the indigenous and guerrilla mobilization that led to the
introduction of indigenous rights. This part will connect with the history of
indigenous struggles in Colombia and will show why and how law became an
important element in those struggles.
This dissertation aims at contributing to the literature on law and society
by introducing elements that traditionally are left without consideration, like the
importance of a world-system perspective, the need to incorporate the notion of
coloniality of power in the study about the law as constitutive discourse, and the
need to take into account a long duree approach to put legal and social struggles
within a broader framework. This text sees the colonial constitutive project as a
project to create a field of knowledge and a field of social struggles wherein
indigenous struggles are accepted but only as legal struggles, that is, a neoliberal
form of governmental ity that allows questions to the system but within the
framing provided by it, converting them in permitted Indians (indios permitidos),
that is, indigenous persons that are functional to neoliberal governmentality
(Hale, 2004).
My approach is historical. I do not see law as a neutral tool that rules and
orders society. On the contrary, 1 understand law as a productive force that
generates knowledge and practices that shape the world in which we live and I
think that legal analyses must take into account the historical trajectory of the
law and its relation to colonialism and modernity. Since my account aims at
explaining the legal coloniality of power, showing the logic of occidentalization
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in different moments of Colombian legal history since the discovery of the
Americas to the 1991 Constitution, my account is very nuanced and at times full
of details. But I consider this approach necessary in order to know the strategies
used in the law to constitute subaltern identities and to take into account the role
law plays in constituting race at different times during modernity.
In the following pages I will analyze the long history of the legal
constitution of subaltern identities in Colombia. Each chapter analyzes different
aspects of this history, but all of them develop one part of my main argument,
that is, how the legal coloniality of power works in Colombia. The second part
shows processes of resistance and the fact that law is not a peaceful domain but a
contested field that can be used in constitutive and emancipatory ways.
The Colonial Encounter: Civilization and Barbarism
1492 marks the time when the colonial encounter took place in the
Americas. As it will be shown in Chapter 2, the colonial encounter meant the
elimination of one culture and the transformation of another one. Law became
central in the transformation of identities in the new world. Indigenous peoples
were conflated and their identity as Nasa people, Pijao People, Quimbaya
people, and so on so forth, was lost and in its stead they got the identity of an
Indian. The Indian was created in the law and in the doctrinal discussion about
the nature of the Indian and about the justification of the Spanish conquest.
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The Conquest was not just a physical act of violence against the
indigenous peoples. Domination came not only with the use of military force.
Spaniards brought with them a worldview that saw the Americas as a place that
had to be within the European imaginary. A discourse that divided the world
between civilized men and savages was at the base of the first accounts about the
Americas. Law necessarily reflects that imaginary, and for that reason it is
important to analyze the legal artifacts that were used during the colony to
control the Indian. Indigenous peoples were seen in different ways, from the
noble savage to children in need of protection. But the first encounter is full of
accounts about the nature of those human beings that were entering in the
imaginary of the conquerors. European ideas about civilization, like manners
and clothing, were imposed on the Indians and in that way they were
transformed as subjects of the King. But one of the most important aspects that
Spaniards highlighted was the fact that indigenous peoples lacked European
law, that is, they lacked the legal structure and artifacts that Europeans knew and
used in Europe. In order to civilize these peoples they decided to bring a legal
structure that was similar to European law, but that recognized the fact that it
was a law to be applied to savages. The Leyes the Indias is a first attempt to
constitute the Indian through the law.
But the Spanish Crown was unsure about the nature of the Indian and the
legitimacy of the Conquest. Bartolome de las Casas and Juan Gines de
Sepulveda, based on the ideas of Aristotle and Francisco de Vitoria, discussed the
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nature of the Conquest and the inhabitants that Spaniards encountered when
they arrived to the territory of the Americas. But the discussion was not about
protection of the Indians
,
but rather about a process of epistemic violence that
began with the colonial encounter. Names, places, identities, subjectivities, all of
them were changed in order to conform to the Spanish imaginary. It is
interesting that the debate was not actually decided and that both thinkers could
claim a victory in the discussion. This just shows that the nature of the Indian
was finally decided, it was a subject of the Spanish crown, whether as free
individual, in the feudal sense; or as a serf, in the Aristotelian sense. The final
incorporation of the Indian in the law can be seen in the testaments given by them
during the conquest, even though some of them lacked properties to leave to
their daughters and sons. The testaments mark the legal incorporation of the
epistemic violence exercised against the Indians, because legal western
subjectivities are replacing old ones, those they had before the colonial
encounter. The encounter meant two universes trying to establish a dialogue
between them, but the inability of Spaniards to understand the Indians' universe
was resolved by simply deleting the latter. The new meanings they were seeing,
the new people they were meeting, all of them were seen with the view of the
tourist: stressing the exotic, trying to put what they saw within the frames of the
colonial mind. As a result, two new peoples emerged in the territory of the
Americas: the Indian and the European.
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The des/ encubrimiento and the Conquest brought about a profound
transformation of European's and Indigenous peoples' worldviews, but the fact
that Europeans saw the world with a modern mentality, that is with the idea that
nature had to be dominated and tortured if necessary in order to learn all its
secrets, determined the fate of indigenous peoples as subalterns and as unequals
in an intercultural dialogue. As Barona has written, "in the space of the
mentalities and the everyday life the enterprise expressed the European man's
superiority with regard to the subjects they dominated, through a moral
obligation for the poles in the dispute, and it imposed a cultural and social
hegemony wherein the roles and the actors could not be other than those"
(Barona, 1993: 6).
19 th Century Political Independence and the Constitution of the
Colombia Nation
Benedict Anderson held that Latin American nations developed a project
of nation building earlier than Europe, and in that way he criticizes those who
hold that Latin America imported the model from Europe (Anderson, 2003). But,
as I will show in Chapter 3, the Latin American nation that Anderson describes is
not an all-inclusive imagined community. On the contrary, it is a nation of men
who saw themselves as Spaniards in America, and later on, when the Courts in
Cadiz did not guarantee the promised equality, they perceived themselves as an
independent nation, a nation of Latin Americans, but not a nation of Indians or
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Blacks. Indigenous peoples and people of African descent were included but in a
subaltern position, in a dialectic that I have labeled the dialectic of
inclusion/ exclusion.
Unlike Argentina and Mexico, Colombia elites came mostly from the legal
profession. In the New Granada there was not military tradition, and for that
reason the unification of the country and the process of nation building were not
dependent upon civil wars and military power (Perez, 2007). In Colombia there
was a combination of civil wars and elections, but at the end it was not the maims
military the one that began the process of nation building. Law and the legal
profession became important factors in this process (Posada, 1996).
Given the fact that elites came mainly from the legal profession, a national
culture was supported in written texts, and in that way law and legal artifacts
represented the idea of an imagined community as it was imagined by white
elites. The real existence of the nation did not necessarily coincide with their
imagination, but law show the nation as it was imagined, regardless of the fact
that the project of nation building could fail because of fragmented sovereignty,
as it happened with the differences between the nation as imagined by Andean
elites and the nation as it was imagined by Caribbean elites in Cartagena de
Indias (Munera, 1998; Munera, 2005).3
3 The fact that most of the population was illiterate made difficult to spread ideas via newspapers
of novels, as it happened in other countries like Mexico, Argentina, or England. In New Granada,
newspapers played no role in the dissemination of ideas amongst the population. Surprisingly,
newspapers emerged after independence and most of them lasted only few issues, mainly
because of the illiterate character of the population. One aspect that is not analyzed in this
dissertation, but that is important in the process of nation building is rumor As Earle has
written: "Eor elites and non-elites alike, the non written world of conversation and hearsay was a
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The process of nation building was an inclusive/ exclusive one, that is, one
where indigenous peoples were part of a symbolic process that imagined them as
equals before the law and that treated them as unequal citizens without the right
to be recognized as indigenous nations, an therefore without the possibility of
having special rights. The Republic, under Santander, had a view of the nation
as being white and mestizn, and with the need of incorporating Colombian
economy into the world market. According to Colombian white elites, to have
progress and civilization there was the need to have a different kind of subjects,
because the "races" that inhabited the country were unable to be civilized and to
lead the path to progress. In order to civilize the country, a process of deletion of
memory similar to the colonial one took place. Legal artifacts were created to
eliminate resguardos and to convert Indians into citizens and into individual
owners. The results were the elimination of indigenous communities and their
transformation into peasants and terrajeros. The political discourse before
Independence remained the same after the struggles for independence, leaving
indigenous peoples as colonial subjects. Pedro Fermin de Vargas, writing
around the 1790s, held:
rich source of news and information. Rumor and counter-rumor circulated across large areas via
gossip networks and chisperia" (Earle, 1997: 175). But rumor as the main source for news had
trust problems, because the person giving the news had to be someone known and trusted by the
recipient of the news, and, anyways, sometimes rumors were spread just to confuse the enemy.
Rumor then created a network of information and disinformation but also a sense of unity and
belonging. Unlike traditional perceptions, rumor was not spread only by women but also by
men, representing a different approach to the public sphere, but a different one from the English
public sphere described by Elabermas (Habermas, 1989).
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For the increase of our agriculture, it would be equally necessary to
Hispanicize our Indians. Their general indolence, their stupidity, and the
insensibility that they show to all that moves and inspires other men,
make one think that they come from a degenerate race that worsens as it
becomes more distant from its origin...We know from repeated
experience that, among animals, races improve crossing them, and it even
can be said that this observation has been made equally among the people
of whom we speak, since the intermediary castes that come from the
mixture of Indians and whites are stepping stones. In consequence. . . it
would be very desirable that the Indians be extinguished, fusing them with
the whites, declaring them free of the tribute and other fiscal burdens
peculiar to them, and giving them property rights to their land. Greed for
their property will lead many whites and mestizos to marry Indian
women... (Fermin de Vargas quoted by Safford, 1991: 8).
Since the beginning of the Republic, we find different discourses about the
nation in Colombia. However, elites' discourses are emphasizing the stupidity of
the Indians and the need to have them under control. Liberalism and liberal
policies were seen as the mark of civilization. In that sense, the elimination of
resgnardos and the division of their lands represented, for white elites in Cauca, a
step forward in the civilizing process (Safford, 1991: 16). These economic policies
were marked by deep racism and with the intention to assimilate Indians into
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peasants and take their lands away, all this through the use of law. Manuel
Ancizar, one of the members of the white elites in Bogota, wrote about this
process of assimilation:
...the indigenous race forms the smaller number of inhabitants, it being
admirable how rapidly it has crossed with and been absorbed by the
European, since half a century ago the province of Tunja represented a
compact mass of Indians and very few Spanish families. Today one notes
in the new generation the progressive improvement of the castes: the
children are white, blond, of fine and intelligent features and with better
built bodies than their elders (Safford, 1991: 28).
Indigenous peoples were the objects of policies designed to obtain their
integration into a society that perceived itself as white. These policies involved
symbolic transformations and material deprivation. In the case of Afro
Colombians, economic integration was part of the same agenda but at a lower
level, mainly because they lacked land to be taken away and because the
symbolic process was perceived as being successful.
Criminal Law as a Constitutive Strategy.
Colombian 19th century was characterized by a discourse of civilization.
The process of constitution of the nation began after independence, with a desire
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of the elites to imagine a homogenous nation wherein they had the same colonial
privileges, but this time independent from Spain and, in general, from any other
foreign power. Law was important in the whole process not only because it
reflected the ideology of those in power, who in their majority belonged to the
legal profession, but also because it condensed the way Andean elites wished to
imagine the nation. Colombia was a nation of territories, but the center was in
Bogota, where Andean elites lived since colonial times. Constitutional law was
the main legal artifact elites used to configure the new nation. During the 19 th
century we find many constitutions that changed the structure of the state from a
unitary republic to a confederation in the 1850s, to a federal government in 1863,
to finally a unitary Republic under the Nunez' government in 1886.
After 1886 the process of consolidation of the Colombian nation was
taking its final shape. Indigenous peoples were subject to another kind of
legislation that considered them as savages or semi-savages not worthy of being
citizens and object of paternalistic programs, like the religious missions. Those
indigenous persons who were considered civilized were treated as if they were
children, and therefore for them there was a special treatment but within the
confines of the white jurisdiction.
The 20th century witnessed some reforms to the 1886 Constitution. But the
main instrument of reforms, at least until 1991, was criminal law. Criminal law
allows us to see the kind of discourse that underlies some of the reforms to the
structure of the state and gives us a glimpse to the kind of strategies displayed to
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control those who are not included in the nation. The case of indigenous peoples
is again enlightening because it shows that they were not included in the nation
as equal citizens and that several strategies were developed to keep them in
check. Criminologists have analyzed the recent transformations in the criminal
justice system and they conclude writing that we are entering a new epoch, one
wherein forms of control change. Using Foucault's ideas this new trend has been
called neoliberal governmentality, which is a mentality of government where
subjects are administered and constituted with the use of the law. However,
what the other chapters of this dissertation show is that law has been used as a
modern legal artifact that constitutes subjects and fields, that is, from the very
beginning of modernity in the Americas law has been part of strategies used to
constitute subjects in order to guarantee better ways of domination.
In Latin America, criminology and criminal law followed the path
designed in Europe, in particular in Spain, Italy and Germany. After
independence, Latin American countries were put in the position to decide about
the kind of law that they needed to face the future as independent countries. The
choices the bourgeoisie had where the following: Leyes de Indias, Medieval
Spanish Law, and the Napoleon Code. Given the need to ensure the rights of the
nascent bourgeoisie and the commodification of indigenous lands, the Napoleon
code appeared as the right choice for private law. But at the same time it was
necessary to ensure in some way the rights of the old aristocracy, in order to
avoid internal conflict and make the transition to independent life. For that
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reason in private law, especially designed by Andres Bello and based on
European models, we find possessive individualism shoulder to shoulder with
the rights of inheritance that mirror the model applied during the colony
(Esquirol, 1997; McPherson, 1962).
However, criminal law was not subject to any change during the period
after independence, except for some especial protections of property and
individual rights. At the end of the 19th century there was a process of
codification of criminal law, at the same time that in Europe we see the birth of
criminological thought that departs from the classic conception of criminal law
(Del Olmo, 1985). The Classical School of Criminal Law saw individuals as
rational beings that committed crimes as a result of a rational calculation
between costs and benefits (Beccaria, 1985; Becker, 1974). By the end of the 19*
century, the Italian code of Zanardelli was adopted and applied throughout the
region. The structure of this code made no distinction between criminals and
non-criminals. As in Europe, it saw crime as the result of a rational decision
based on a careful balance of costs and benefits. It seems strange that, after this
conception of criminal law, Latin American states, and in particular Colombia,
adopted a criminal code and criminological thought that was very different from
the classic school of thought. However this apparent contradiction is explained
when we see that criminal law was destined only to members of the bourgeoisie.
Liberalism and the idea of open markets to foreign capital were the dominant
ideas during Colombian 19 th century. The state building process had not yet
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been completed and for that reason there were fights between members of the
bourgeoisie. Criminal law mirrored the conception of the political: the
criminal/ political opponent was not seen as a foe but as an enemy, that is to say,
their rationality was recognized and so was it the possibility of pacts. Criminal
law and the law about indigenous peoples assumed the rationality and the
possibility of indigenous peoples to be modernized and the possibility of being
assimilated as workers in the process of civilization of the country (Garcia, 1952).
Once the nation-building process was almost complete, at least in the
elites' minds, and the Colombian state had to face the other within its territory,
the role of criminal law and the CSJ changed (Salvatore et al, 1996; Salvatore et al,
2001; Scarzanella, 2003). Criminology became central in this period, because it
helped in the modernization of indigenous peoples. But criminal law and
criminology were used to constitute indigenous peoples and mestizos as modern
subjects. This means that criminal law was not part of a process of simple
proletarianization of already constituted modern subjects, but rather a process
whereby indigenous peoples -and immigrants in Argentina- were constituted as
modern subjects (Rusche & Kircheimer, 1939). According to positivism, the
criminal was a subject who was irrational and who was essentially different from
mainstream society. This conception of criminal law was part of the process of
constitution of indigenous peoples as different, less than humans, and in need of
special treatment and protection. This means that their incorporation into the
Colombian nation was limited, because they did not have the modern rationality
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that was required to be considered part of the nation, in itself seen as white and
male.
Human Rights, Resistance and Law's Demobilizing Effect
International relations changed after the end of WWII. The traditional
state-centered order and the idea of absolute sovereignty, known as the
Westphalia Peace, came to an end and a new world order began with the
consolidation of American hegemony. The Wilsonian idea of the right to self-
determination and the autonomy of the peoples led to a process that transformed
completely international relations and international law.
After the end of the war, legal production at the international level has
dramatically increased with a series of international documents like the
following: The 1945 UN Chart, that prohibits the use of war as an instrument to
solve conf licts between states; the four Geneva Conventions passed in 1949,
which brought a new regulation in the laws of war and the protection of
combatants and non combatants, with the idea of reducing the effects of war in
the population; the 1948 Genocide Convention, that coins the term genocide and
creates an international court to deal with the gravest crimes; the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; the 1977 Additional Protocols; the 1998
International Criminal Court Statute, to name just a few. All these documents
are binding for the states and they limit their sovereignty, as some of them have
jus cogens status, that is to say, they are binding even against the will of the states.
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Sovereignty is not absolute anymore. States are limited by international
law, and states in their actions have to act respecting it. War ceases to be a
legitimate way to solve conflicts. At the same time, state power to define public
policies within its territory became limited. The law of the land is now produced
elsewhere; law has lost its territoriality and its national character. Public policies
regarding human rights or international humanitarian law are not produced at
the national level, but they respond to pressures from abroad. In Colombia, all
the legislation regarding human rights and humanitarian law has been
“imported” thanks to the pressures exercised by the International Committee of
the Red Cross ICRC, by the U.N. High Commisioner of Human Rights, by
international NGOs, and even by other states via international cooperation.
International Human Rights Law has been presented as if it was universal
and as containing universal values. However, the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights is just a collection of fundamental rights found in the American
Constitution and some European constitutions. That is, human rights are as
contextual as the rights recognized in non-western countries. But by presenting
them as universal, human rights create a global identity, that is, an occidental
identity wherein the subject is seen as a subject of rights. Multiculturalism
emerges as a way to deal with the tension between universal and contextual
rights. However, multiculturalism is just another way of bringing the global into
the local. Instead of recognizing the need of intercultural dialogue.
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multiculturalism assumes the idea of a dominant culture and tries to negotiate
how to accommodate the minority culture within the nation.
The 1991 Constitution incorporated a neoliberal multicultural idea of
rights, where the myth of an all-inclusive society was promoted. However, given
the fact that Colombia is a pluriethnic country, with a long history of
colonization and exploitation of indigenous peoples and Africans, the
Constitution had to deal with that reality. But the tension between universalism
and contextualism was never solved in the constitution. It was the job of the
Constitutional Court to solve this conflict. The Court did it by repeating the logic
that marks Colombian modernity: one of integration and assimilation, which
forces indigenous peoples to become occidental subjects and to adapt their
practices to the universal idea of human rights. The cases analyzed in Chapter 5
are representative of the way the Court and Colombian national law understand
indigenous rights. The Court understands them as rights of indigenous peoples
but as limited by the idea of universal human rights, that is, the Court gives the
traditional liberal response to the emergence of the other, holding that
indigenous rights can be recognized but that in cases of irresolvable tension
universal human rights have priority.
Indigenous peoples have rejected the idea of their rights as minority
rights, that is, as group rights. They have promoted the idea of the recognition of
their rights as peoples' rights. In that sense, they claim to have a different
historical trajectory from the majority of the population and as such they claim to
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have special rights. The 1991 Constitution recognizes some of those rights but
always within the limits set by "western civilization". Human Rights have been
part of a process of occidentalization that constitutes a form of epistemic
violence, because it presents the western local as if it was universal. The fact that
after more than 15 years the government has been unable to regulate the
indigenous jurisdiction shows the difficulty of recognizing the special character
of indigenous rights. A liberal framework will always exercise symbolic violence
against them and at the end it will lead indigenous peoples to lose their
traditional struggles and to become subjects of law who process all their claims
through the use of the Courts and the law.
After the 1991 Constitution social movements began a process that ended
up in using the Constitution and the Courts to defend their rights. Before 1991,
social mobilization involved guerrilla warfare of legal strategies oriented to
denounce the government at the international arena. However, most
organizations saw human rights as a bourgeois instrument and as no being of
any use in their struggles. But with the 1991 Constitution a sort of legal
liberalism developed in the country and movements decided to use legal
strategies to defend their rights. During the first term of the Court we saw an
astonishing production of cases trying to set the limits and reach of the new
rights recognized in the Constitution. However, groups like CRIC lost their
strength and most of their fights became legal fights, demobilizing the movement
and leading to a politics of constitutional law, where activists' final goal was to
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obtain a declaration from the Court. The effect was that the movement dropped
all their old strategies, their leaders became national leaders, up to a point that
leaders like Jesus Pinacue, former leader of CRIC, does not represent the
indigenous movement and now he is elected as Senator representing the whole
nation. 4 But groups like ORIVAC and other indigenous organizations
understand that the law is just one of their instruments, and that the idea of
strategic litigation, promoted by American funded NGOs like Dejusticia and
Comision Colombiann de Juristas, will only lead to their demobilization, and they
understand that if they want to defend their rights they need to be open to other
forms of political mobilization, not necessarily illegal, but out of the confines of
the law.
This dissertation ends with the path that led to the 1991 Constitution and
the transformations brought about by constitutional law in indigenous
mobilization. Indigenous peoples have understood the demobilizing effect of the
law, and in the last five years they have developed other strategies that escape
from the constitutive and demobilizing power of law: marches, peace guards,
decolonial education, are part of a wide array of strategies indigenous people
have to resist colonization and neoliberal governmentality. My research will
show these strategies, as a sort of hopeful conclusion in social struggles in
Colombia.
4 In 2005 the community tried him for abandoning of his duties as an indigenous leader.
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CHAPTER I
AN EXCLUSIVE/INCLUSIVE SOCIAL PACT
Introduction
This chapter sets the theoretical bases for my analysis of the legal
coloniality of power. First of all, I wish to introduce traditional accounts of the
path that led to the 1991 Constitution in order to show the limits I find in the
literature on indigenous rights in Colombia and on the transformation that took
place in 1991. I wish to focus on the scholarship on constitutional reform in
Colombia and the importance some authors give to the student movement. This
movement interests me because in these traditional accounts the weight for the
transformation is given to the elites and when social mobilization is recognized it
is the student movement the one that takes all the credit for the 1991
constitutional transformation. Second of all, I will show that these accounts
privilege an idea of law as a peaceful domain, therefore as a space free of
confrontations between social groups and where meaning and legal practice are
without dispute. This view logically leads to an idea of law and of the 1991
Constitution and the emergence of indigenous rights as the result of an
agreement between elites and a friendly liquidation of the past, that is, a legal
revolution by peaceful means.
As I will show, these traditional accounts see the 1991 Constitution as a
multicultural constitution that includes traditionally excluded subjects and that
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solves a long history of oblivion and invisibilization. 1 will show that the
theoretical approach taken in these studies leads them to state that the 1991
Constitution is a multicultural pact that guarantees indigenous peoples and
people of African descent the right to be within the nation and, therefore, full
access to the rights associated with citizenship. My approach will show that in
the analysis of indigenous rights we need to take into account the long history of
the incorporation of indigenous peoples as occidental subjects in order to
understand the reasons that support the inclusion of indigenous rights in 1991
and the seeming contradiction between an all-inclusive rhetoric and an
exclusionary practice.
I will base my analysis on Foucault's ideas of neoliberal governmentality,
in order to show the role law plays in the production of subjectivities and the role
it plays in the demobilization of social struggles. However, my contribution to
the literature on law and society is that law cannot be understood simply from a
local or national perspective because discourses and ideas travel all around the
world and are part of attempts to constitute world hegemony. The idea of the
coloniality of power will be central in my argument, in order to show how law is
part of the constitution of a Eurocentric global pattern of power. I find in the
literature on post colonial and decolonial theory a lack of deep analysis of law
and legal artifacts, the fact that I focus on Latin America, and not on postcolonial
India or postcolonial Africa, will add interesting insights of the role law plays in
postcolonial dependent societies.
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I combine governmentality theories with post/ decolonial theories in order
to account for the specificity of Latin American history. I do not present cases of
indigenous decisions or indigenous legal decolonial practices, mainly because I
think that to present decolonial practice in Latin America demands a different
kind of dissertation. I do however spend two chapters in the analysis of
emancipatory practices in which the law is part of the struggles of indigenous
peoples and guerrilla forces. I would not call those practices decolonial in
themselves, because they are more complex than simply colonial or decolonial.
At the end of this dissertation I hope to have provided enough reasons to see that
complexity.
The Path to the 1991 Constitution
On July 4 th 1991, after 150 days of exhausting discussion, the Colombian
Constituent Assembly passed a new Constitution. The path that led to this
document was not easy and was full of shocks and contradictions. The
Assembly was the result of a peace process with several guerrilla groups and had
representatives of many political factions, each one of them trying to shape
institutions in a way that protected and promoted their interests. Constitutional
discourse was common language at the time. On the side of the Academy,
people were discussing whether Colombians should have a traditional kind of
constitutionalism, where the Supreme Court dealt with constitutional cases and
where Congress had more room in the lawmaking process, given that rights had
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legal and not constitutional status (Sachica, 1987; Vidal Perdomo, 1985; on the
South African case see Klug, 2000). On the side of political parties, they were
discussing about a way to guarantee peace, end corruption, and deal with the
new political forces that were emerging in the political spectrum.
The Assembly was the result of a long process and of a combination of
social mobilization, elite's choices, and violent opposition. To some scholars
(Dugas, 1993), the Assembly was the result of political mobilization amongst the
youth. According to his analysis, university students decided to mobilize in
order to show their concern with political corruption, guerrilla warfare and drug
traffic, grave problems that were affecting the country's stability. Student
organized and created a movement labeled the Seventh Ballot (Septima
Papeleta), because they proposed to introduce a seventh ballot in the elections in
order to ask the people whether they wanted to have a new Constitution that
reorganized the Colombian political system (Dugas, 2001). It is a known fact that
these ballots where not counted by the electoral authorities, mainly because they
did not have the legal power to do it. Up to this point it is unknown whether
people really wanted to have a new Constitution or a new political system.
However, the fact of the existence of a movement like this amongst the youth
gave symbolic power to the government and gave it the necessary support to
dare to propose a radical transformation of the political system.
Based on this support and given the fact that the political system was at a
point where it needed to make radical changes in order to survive, the elites had
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to decide whether to open the political system or to continue with the traditional
one and face the possibility of a collapse. That is why the election of Cesar
Gaviria' s opened the path towards a Constitutional Assembly. After winning
the presidential elections in 1990, Cesar Gaviria created a team of young lawyers
to draft a project of constitution to submit to a Constitutional Assembly. The
influence of American constitutionalism is evident not only in the structure of the
Constitution, but mainly in the import of some strategies like public interest
lawyering and strategic litigation.5 The elites were in tune with the students in
the need to reform the country and to have a new and more open political
system, but always within the framework of a capitalist society and a liberal
conception of rights.
In order to understand the kind of openness for the political system and
the kind of political negotiations the elites and the student movement were able
to make, as well as the groups with whom they were willing to negotiate, it is
important to see the kind of country they were imagining. The 1980s was a
decade when guerrillas developed all their power to get the government to
negotiate. However not all the guerrillas had the same power and not all them
were willing to negotiate. But three of them had enough power to create the
conditions under which a negotiation was possible. Communist peasant
guerrilla Fuerzns Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia FARC, the oldest guerrilla in
Colombia, was part of the peace process during Belisario Betancur's
5 This team was led by American educated lawyer Manuel Jose Cepeda, the son of Fernando
Cepeda's, Gaviria s Minister of Internal Affairs.
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administration (1982 - 1986) but due to the assassination of more than one
thousand members of Union Patriotica UP, the political party created after the
peace process, they decided not to take part in more peace talks or at least they
were less willing to do so. The Ejercito de Liberacidn National ELN took part in the
negotiations but only a faction was willing to participate in a peace process
under conditions that did not involve a radical transformation of the country.
The Movimiento 19 de Abnl de 1970 M-19 was the best and the worst candidate for
a peace process. The bloody taking and counter taking of the Palace of Justice in
1985 and the kidnapping of conservative leader Alvaro Gomez Hurtado in 1988
made them the worst candidate for a peace process. But this radical opposition
to the elites hides one fact that was crucial in the transformations that were going
to come: M-19 was not a communist guerrilla and as such its interests were more
along the lines of more openness for the political system without putting into
question the capitalist character of the Colombian economy (Interview with
Rosemberg Pabon Pabon. Cali, July 14th and August 22nd 2005). The best
candidate for a peace process and one with a likelihood of success was precisely
this guerrilla. As a result of the peace process, M-19 signed a peace agreement
with the government and participated in the 1990 elections for the Presidency.
The elections were bloody and ended up with the assassination of Jaime Pardo
Leal and Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, Union Patriotica UP's presidential Candidates;
Luis Carlos Galan, Liberal Party candidate; and Carlos Pizarro Leongomez, M-19
presidential candidate. It is worth to mention that this assassination put the
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process in danger, because Pizarro had left a commando ready to reorganize in
case anything went wrong. After Pizarro's assassination, some members of the
group who knew the existence of the Commando expected to start war all over
again. However, Pizarro's successor, Antonio Navarro Wolff, was smart enough
to respect his and the group's commitment to the peace process (Interview with
Otty Patino. Medellin, September 11th 2005). After some time they
decommissioned all their guns and decided to fully reincorporate into civil life.
This response to violence brought about huge approval amongst the Colombian
population, especially the youth, who were going to vote for the first time and
the urban population, who saw M-19 as a sort of University guerrilla.6
Once the elections took place, the liberal Party obtained the majority of the
votes, but it was not a unified party, and for that reason M-19, second in the race,
was considered the political force to take into account. The following are the
results of that election:
Table 1: Colombian Elections for the 1990 Constitutional Assembly
Political Party Votes %
Partido Liberal 1,055.033 28.38
M-19 950.174 26.82
Movimiento de Salvacion Nacional
MSN
554.030 15.68
Partido Social Conservador 388.842 10.96
Union Patriotica UP 82.728 2.33
Other groups and Movements 509.520 14.30
Votes against the Assembly 71.836 1.53
Total 3,613.45
6 It is worth to mention that Pizarro was known as the Cutie Comandante because of his good
looks. In the private universities many expressed their intentions to vote for Pizarro, given that
he was a former student of Universidad Javeriana, one of the most elitist universities in Bogota.
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Source. Base de Datos Politicos de las Americas. (1999) Colombia: Elecciones
para Asamblea Constitucional de 1990. [Internet], Georgetown University y
Organizacion de Estados Americanos. In:
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Col/coelasa.html. 16 de agosto 2000 .
Last visit: August 16th 2007.
The Assembly gathered to discuss their internal rules, but their first act,
and one very meaningful because of the powers it entails, was to declare
themselves a Constituent Assembly, which means that they had the power to
transform the whole structure of the political system and passed a whole new
constitution, and not just to reform the 1886 Constitution, as Gaviria's
administration had intended. When they had to decide about the president of
the Assembly there was consensus that a collegiate presidency was the right
choice. The Liberal Party and M-19 had the majority of votes and it was almost
clear to everyone that MSN should have the third presidency, but it was not that
clear to Misael Pastrana, a former president (1970-1974), leader of the
Conservative Party and a very symbolic representative of the old order that was
going to be changed. 7 The process to draft the text of the Constitution was a
rocky one, full of confrontations, attempts to leave the Assembly, heated
discussions, up to a level that the day that the Constitutions was supposed to be
ready, the members of the Assembly did not know the final text of the
Constitution they had approved and hence had to sign a blank book. Only days
7 Misael Pastrana Borrero was elected president on April 19th 1970. These elections are
considered to be fraudulent against former dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla and his political party,
ANAPO. M-19 is the result of the disappointment with democracy that came out of that election
See Infra Chapter 6.
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later, the final text was ready to be known by both Colombians and the members
of the Assembly.
On July 5 th 1991, Colombian newspapers published a picture of the final
moment of the Assembly. In that picture the three presidents of the Assembly,
Antonio Navarro Wolff, representing M-19; Horacio Serpa Uribe, representing
the Liberal Party; and Alvaro Gomez Hurtado, representing the Movement for
National Salvation MSN, could be seen raising their hands together and showing
the new social pact that was created as a result of social mobilization, elite's
choices and guerrilla warfare. The picture is interesting not only because of what
is showing but mainly because of what is missing. It is showing the kind of
social pact that has been present in Colombia since the times of Independence.
Despite political differences amongst the three presidents of the Assembly, they
do represent the same ethnic group: Hispanic Colombians. Indigenous peoples
and Afro Colombians were not only missing from the picture but had been
missing from the Colombian Nation. In this case, social mobilization is
important too: Indigenous peoples had been fighting for their rights since
colonial times, and since then, the mestizo government developed different
strategies to control them and to incorporate them in the polity, be it the Spanish
hierarchy of power or the Colombian nation. 8
8 The use of the army was important during the colony for the incorporation of indigenous
peoples in the polity. That is how Spain tried to deal with different racial groups in colonial Latin
America. However, white creoles were not ready for this openness, as the case of Sebastian
Miranda, Francisco Miranda's father, shows. Bohorquez (2006).
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According to some scholars. Indigenous peoples and Afrocolombians
were the happiest in the Assembly because their claims were going to be finally
heard and they were going to become part of the nation and have citizenship
rights as any other Colombian person. It does not matter to these scholars that
the rules concerning indigenous rights were the ones that went through hard
times to be approved. Indeed, the right of indigenous peoples to have autonomy
and a right to a special territory passed with just the necessary amount of votes,
and rights for black communities could only be approved because of the
adamant position of the indigenous representatives and because they were
included in a transitory article to be developed by the legislature (Cepeda, n.d.).
To scholars like Donna Lee Van Cott, the fact that this very important
transformation in the constitutional system of a country like Colombia, in war for
more than fifty years, was achieved through the law and not through a
revolution or through violent means, is very telling. To her, this is a friendly
liquidation of the past, similar only to Bolivia, where a constitutional reform
included indigenous rights in the Bolivian Constitution (Van Cott, 2000, 77).
According to her, the reform of the Constitution was the result of a threefold
crisis: representation, participation, and legitimation, a crisis that the new
Constitution was meant to resolve. In the traditional accounts of this process the
new Constitution is seen as an internal process and as positive one, because it
would bring about a sort of moral progress and for that reason some economic
development.
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Analyses of the Constitutional reform in Colombia agree on the fact that
Colombia has become a multicultural or pluriethnic state (Hernandez, 2001;
Borrero, 2003). According to these scholars, the new social contract included
those members of the demobilized guerrillas who decided to work for peace and
those members of until then forgotten groups in the Colombia nation. But some
questions arise when we see this seemingly happy process: why did the
government decide to include indigenous rights and black rights in the
Constitution? Why were there delegates of the indigenous groups and not
delegates of the black communities? Was it a crisis of representation,
participation and legitimation, and was that crisis solved? Whv after so many
years, the government has been unable to pass the law that regulates the
relationships between the indigenous peoples and the state authorities? What
has happened to social mobilization after the passing of the new constitution?
Can the law have a demobilizing effect in the claims of social movements?
Van Cott writes that this process meant to resolve a political crisis with the
use of the law. This approach assumes the good will of Colombian elites but it
does not explain the reasons why they became important only in the 1980s or
why now constitutional law is seen as the main tool to advance those rights. The
idea of a friendly liquidation of the past assumes that law is a peaceful domain
and that it cannot mean violence at all. However, if we take an approach of the
long duree, we can see some historical trajectories that can explain better this
incorporation of rights. At the same time, if we analyze the rules that were
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incorporated into the Constitution and the decisions of the Colombian
Constitutional Court we will see how friendly that liquidation was and whose
past was to be liquidated in this process. Analyzing the celebration of difference
that is common coin in today's political discussion, Colombian philosopher
Santiago Castro Gomez wonders whether the new structure of power means a
new configuration of global power relations, which Anibal Quijano has labeled
the coloniality of power (Castro Gomez, 2004). On the other hand, Argentinean
semiotician Walter Mignolo warns us about the differences between American
multiculturalism, where white people become part of a white polity, and Latin
American multi/ pluricultural societies (Mignolo, 2000 and Mignolo, 2001a),
where historical trajectories show the unequal incorporation of the Other in the
polities. In this dissertation I wish to show the interconnections between criminal
law and constitutional law, and show how difference can be celebrated in
constitutional and at the same time how the other that is constituted in the law is
subject of governmental practices in criminal law (Morrison, 2006).9
But this attempt to constitute subjects as liberal subjects has not been done
without resistance. At the national level, indigenous peoples have appealed to
the Constitution and a universal idea of human rights. They have used
transnational advocacy and local lawyers to further their claims. Sometimes they
have been successful in their struggles and obtained recognition from national
Courts, other times they have failed. What interests me about this process is the
9 Oscar Andres Lopez shows the role labor law has played in the constitution of a modern
identity. See Oscar Andres Lopez (2008).
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discourse in which claims are being framed. National lawyers use group rights
arguments, whereas transnational advocates frame those claims in terms of the
rights to culture. At the local level, in a sort of local constitutionalism (Brigham,
1996), we see that claims and judicial responses are different. The struggle has
been difficult and full of obstacles; as one lawyer put it in one interview,
referring to the need to use judicial remedies to force the state to honor its
obligations, the struggle has been done and won "a tutelazo limpio", that is with
a strategic use of the law and of judicial remedies (Interview to Wilson Lopez,
Cali, 07-13-2005).
Constitutional Reform in Colombia
1992 has become an important date to understand the transformations that
occurred in Latin America in the last 20 years. As it is known, that year Latin
American governments were supposed to celebrate 500 years of the discovery of
America. But from the very beginning the purpose of the celebration came under
heated discussion. Some intellectuals talked about the encounter of two worlds,
others about a colonial encounter, and others about a crucial date to understand
the centrality of Europe in the world system (Arciniegas, 2001; Fornet, 2004;
Dussel, 1994). Since the time Latin American governments began to prepare the
celebration of that event, indigenous peoples' and afrodescendants' resistance in
the Americas had a sort of rebirth. The fact that governments and intellectuals
were talking about this event, gave indigenous peoples and afrodescendants the
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opportunity to bring to light the deficit of interculturality existing in the region.
Mobilization showed that they were willing to claim their place as subjects and
not objects of history (Fornet, 2004: 25).
Indigenous mobilization increased during the last two decades, and one
central element in all the discussion was the idea of rights. 1992 gave indigenous
peoples an important opportunity to talk about these issues in a new language,
not one of armed struggle, as in the case of the Movimiento Armado Manuel
Quintin Lame MAMQL in Colombia, but in a language of legal resistance, that is,
one in which the law was the main object of discussion. The constitutional
reform that took place in 1991 was the result of several factors that coincided to
make the Constitution what it is today. In this section I want to show traditional
explanations of the reform and see how they account for what we can call the
challenge of the emergence of the indigenous question.
Colombia became an independent Republic in 1819 and since then has had
different political systems. In the 19th century, after different wars between
liberal and conservatives, Rafael Nunez became president of Colombia and one
of his first acts as President was to change the 1863 Constitution, a liberal
constitution that was not of the liking of conservatives. In 1886 the new
constitution was approved and a catholic and conservative system was
established. The 1886 Constitutions was reformed several times in order to adapt
it to the changing circumstances. But one of the most important reforms was the
one passed in 1957 as a result of the peace negotiations between liberal and
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conservatives and the transition to democracy. As it is known, liberals and
conservatives fought for power in the 1950s; this period of civil war, known as La
Violencia, brought about more than 300.000 deaths and Gustavo Rojas Pinilla's
dictatorship (1953 - 1957). In order to avoid future confrontations, liberals and
conservatives decided to share power and established a closed political system
known as Frente National. This transition ended violence amongst liberal and
conservatives but it opened the door for new ways of violence (Medina, 2003;
Pardo, 2004).
In the 1970s new guerrillas and social movements emerged, criticizing the
fact that the political system did not have room for new political forces and that
even a presidential candidate that came from the elites (former dictator Gustavo
Rojas Pinilla) was a victim of electoral fraud in 1970 (Ayala, 1995; Ayala, 1996).
During the seventies social mobilization increased, in 1977 there was a national
strike, and guerrillas were having more and more media exposure with acts like
the taking of the Dominican Embassy and the attack to steal more than 5000 guns
from the most watched military barrack in Colombia. Repression and fake
amnesties just increased political confrontation and the war. In 1985, M-19 took
the Palace of Justice and in 1988 as a result of the falling of the Soviet Block
several guerrilla groups were forced to look for new ways of financing their war,
and they found them in narcotraffic (Villamizar 1994; Villamizar, 1995;
Penaranda, 2007).
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The 1980s and the early 1990s were marked by a struggle against
narcotraffickers and against Pablo Escobar's power, then leader of the Medellin
Cartel. The war that Escobar launched against the government showed the
weakness and corruption of the Colombian state, and several movements called
for a change in the constitution, because it was assumed that the main cause of
the conflict was the lack of constitutional and legal instruments to win the war
(Orozo Abad, 1992). The result of all this process was the 1991 Constitution.
How was this process explained in the literature? Are the mainstream
explanations accounting for the several changes that the Colombian state had?
Hugo Escobar Sierra, a former minister of justice, explaining the reasons
that led to the 1991 Constitution wrote that the main purpose for many years was
to change article 13 of the 1957 Referendum that prohibited any change that was
not done by Congress and with the procedure established in the constitution.
President Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) and former president Misael Pastrana (1970
- 1974) signed a so-called treaty to reform the constitution, but this pact did not
have any success. Escobar Sierra shows that the so called Barco reform failed
because some of the members of Congress, with links to the Medellin and Cali
cartels, tried to include in the text of the Constitution a prohibition of extraditing
Colombian citizens, and in its stead the obligation to try them in Colombia,
provided that the act was a crime in both countries (Principle of double
incrimination). However, President Virgilio Barco (1986 - 1990) decided to
withdraw his project of reform for fear of retaliations by the United States. In the
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elections to renew membership in Congress it was included a ballot that later on
was known as the seventh ballot (Escobar, 1991). Escobar recalls the story of the
seventh ballot (March 1990) and its constitutional success as a way of explaining
the creation of the Constitutional Assembly. In the elections of May 27th 1990 it
was included another ballot for a plebiscite to reform the constitution. This
ballot asked Colombians about their vote to strengthen participatory democracy
and to vote for a Constitutional Assembly that had the power to reform the 1886
Constitution. It is important to take into account that the Assembly had the
mandate to reform the Constitution and not to pass a new one. Decree 927 of
1990 authorized the electoral authorities to count the votes for the Assembly, and
the following were the results:
Table 2: Results for the 1990 Constitutional Assembly
Yes 5.236.863
No 230.080
Blank 363.656
Annuled 60.518
Source Escobar Sierra (1991).
The Supreme Court found the decree in accord with the Constitution and
decided that the President had the power to promote a constitutional
transformation as part of the peace agreements with guerrillas. Following that
rationale, the government declared the state of exception and convoked a
Constitutional Assembly. At that time the law, and particularly constitutional
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law, was seen as a way to end violence in Colombia, and this is the main reason
why the Court allowed this irregular reform to the Constitution. According to
the Supreme Court, then in charge of deciding constitutional cases, the Assembly
represented the Colombian nation and they had to vote consulting not those who
voted for them but justice and common good. Members of the Assembly had to
have a profession unless they represented indigenous peoples or students, that
is, that for other sectors the kind of representation they could have was mediated
by the fact of this education and therefore based on a history of exclusion.
Finally, the Court found that the Assembly did not have any limit in the drafting
of the Constitution because they represented the nation -not the people- and the
former was the primary constituent.
Escobar Sierra's account of the process of drafting a new constitution tells
the story as one of progress and success. He does not take into account the
student movement and does not criticize the limitation imposed to social groups
like Afrodescendants. To him, the change was the result of many agreements,
but he does not analyze the exclusions and inclusions, and does not take into
account the use of constitutional law as a peace agreement. Furthermore, he
does not explain the fact that indigenous peoples were included and
Afrodescendants were not; or the kind of movements that were helpful in
creating a mood for constitutional change. The story that is told wants to show a
normal change based on the good will of elites, and on agreements between the
opposition and the government. Donna Lee Van Cott and John Dugas replicate
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that view from the elites' perspective, and even though they show some
mobilization they fail to see the kind of mobilization that occurred and how it
was instrumental in the process that led to the new Constitution.
The Barco-Pastrana Treaty and the Student Movement
At the end of the 1990s, Colombia was under a war declared by the
Medellin Cartel and in the middle of the bloodiest presidential elections, with
three candidates killed either by the Cartel or by unknown forces. With the
death of liberal presidential candidate, Luis Carlos Galan, people were feeling
that the government had lost all control of the country. After Galan's
assassination on August 18 th 1989, an estimated of 15000 or 20000 students from
Universities in Bogota took part in a silent march to his grave. According to John
Dugas, students called for a change in political institutions and announced the
creation of a student movement that was to work to provide answers to the
country's crisis (Dugas, 2001: 808). In Dugas' account we see the depiction of the
student's work as a movement and an analysis that assumed that most -if not all-
ot the students and universities in Colombia and Bogota participated in this so-
called movement.
To Dugas the most important aspect of the student movement is the fact
that it set the mood to talk about a new Constitution. His account takes notice of
the advertisement that the students published in the Colombian newspaper El
Tiempo to generate public support to his proposal of creating a National
51
Constituent Assembly with powers to change the constitution and to create a
legal framework that could lead the country to peace. The "student movement"
worked to include a seventh ballot in the March 1990 elections, but these votes
were not counted because they were not legally included in the ballots. Dugas
shows that the movement was successful in gaining momentum for the idea of
an Assembly, but he adds that it was the kind of organization and the
dependency on the Media that caused the demise of the movement.
The idea of the student movement is one of the myths behind the passing
of the new constitution. However, those who support this myth do not take into
account, as I shall show it in this dissertation, that the idea of a new Constitution
was an old one, as a matter of fact there was an attempt in 1979, and that it was
an idea defended by M-19, especially Jaime Bateman Cayon, and that it was
bought by Alvaro Gomez Hurtado, kidnapped and released bv Ml 9, one of the
most important supporters of the student movement, with his newspaper El
Siglo.* Dugas' explanation cannot account for the final content of the
Constitution, especially because the movement dissolved before the Assembly
started its works and had no influence in the final content of the 1991
Constitution. From all the representatives, only one, Fabio Villa, with the AD
M19, defended a student agenda. The other one, Fernando Carrillo, acted
independently from the students and supported Cesar Gaviria's administration,
becoming his Minister of Justice and later on an official in the Interamerican
One of the leaders of the movement, Juan Gabriel Gomez, from Universidad Externado de
Colombia, was one the leaders of the organization Todavin podemos salvar a Colombia and nephew
of Alvaro Gomez Hurtado's.
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Development Bank, However, one important result from this process was the
leaders it created, because some of the members of the movement became later
on central actors of a liberal left that used the law as their main tool to obtain a
social change that did not put into question the capitalist structure of Colombian
economy. Students, in their manifestos, supported legal transformations and
democratic institutions, becoming ideal allies for the government, in the same
way M19 was, as I showed earlier (Dugas, 2001: 829). 10
Dugas does not take into account the fact that at the time these students
from private elitist universities were organizing, the Barco administration was
trving to introduce a neoliberal reform that had as its main goals the idea of
institutional transformation, American legal remedies, barriers to prevent and
punish corruption, and in general the same agenda that the students defended.
Indigenous and Afrodescendants' rights were not included in the students'
proposals, but a draft of some sort of indigenous rights was included in the Barco
project. Why a neoliberal reform would include such a kind of rights? Dugas
fails to explain the reasons for this inclusion both in the Barco reform and the
1991 Constitution.
Dugas holds that the 1991 Constitution was a new social pact that was the
result of the elites' will to end violence in Colombia and to end its legitimation
crisis. The reform was an attempt to modernize the institutional structure of the
10 Dugas states that the silent march was unkown in Colombia and that the movement dissolved
for the lack of previous experiences of student mobilization. Dugas fails to take into account the
silent march led by Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in 1948 and the student movements that existed in
Colombia since the times of Rojas Pinilla's dictatorship (See Villamizar, 1995 and Trujillo, 1987).
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country in order to adapt it to the economic transformations that were occurring
in the world since the 1970s, that is, this reform was a way to adapt Colombian
institutional structure to the demands of globalization (Gabriel Murillo in Dugas,
1993). Based on this account, the 1991 reform was the result of a crisis of
legitimacy and of the economic development model that led elites to work to
have a more inclusive social pact and a more open economy.
According to Dugas, the elites found a way to solve the crisis through a
political pact between the liberal and conservative parties. This pact was known
as the Barco-Pastrana treaty because these leaders wanted to show the kind of
agreement to end political violence. This agreement had five points that were
important for the elites: 1) Peace 2) Deepening of democracy 3) Extension of
rights 4) Elimination of corruption 5) Modernization of the state. This political
pact was interpreted as an agreement between the most important political actors
in the state in order to have a viable democracy. From this point of view, the
Barco-Pastrana treaty was an elitist way to end the national front and to have a
more open political system. This new pact was supposed to be more inclusive in
order to have political parties and all the actors in civil society in the drafting of
the new Constitution. The agreement and the Barco reform failed because of the
pressures of the Medellin Cartel, especially in the prohibition of extradition of
Colombians.
However, this story does not take into account the peace process with M-
19, the importance that Jaime Bateman gave to what he called the "sancocho
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nacional"/ and the history of the Colombian conflict. Dugas sees the Assembly
as a solution to the closure of the National Front, that is, a problem of political
openness, regardless of others kinds of exclusions. Rosemberg Pabon, also
known as Comandante Uno and the person who led the group that took the
Dominican Embassy, said in one interview that M-19, and the Constitutional
Assembly, failed to read correctly Colombian reality, because they thought that
the main problem in Colombia was just the openness of the system. The fact that
after 16 years of the Constitution Colombia still has two guerrillas fighting the
government show that the problem was deeper and that a new law was not
going to end the conflict (Interview with Rosemberg Pabon Pabon. Cali, July
14th and August 22nd 2005).
A Friendly Liquidation of the Past
Donna Lee Van Cott and Daniel Bonilla celebrate the fact that Colombia
has a multicultural constitution, and one in which the rights of indigenous
peoples and Afrodescendants are respected and protected. From a liberal
perspective, these two authors show an account of the process of drafting the
1991 constitution as a pact between the elites wherein they decided to open the
political system in order to avoid violence and to give priority to peaceful
resolution of conflicts through the law.
* Jaime Bateman talked about a constitutional assembly where every political force was present,
the same way as sancocho, a soup, have all the ingredients one can imagine.
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Van Cott analyzed the history of the 1991 Constitution as one in which
indigenous peoples and Afrodescendants finally found incorporation into the
nation. She takes into account, even though it is not part of her main story, the
history of 19 th century Colombia, where criollos established a racial hierarchy,
with indigenous peoples at the bottom of the ladder. 11 According to Van Cott
the 1991 constitutional reform was an improvement in that history of exclusion,
because indigenous peoples and Afrodescendants had access to more rights and
to more protections within the law.
Van Cott states that Colombia had a threefold crisis: "a representation
crisis, generated by non-representative political parties that monopolized access
to the state; a participation crisis, owing to the absence of means for most citizens
to participate in decision-making; and a legitimation crisis, arising from
discriminatory access to the protection of the law and equal membership in the
nation, and to the absence of effective bases of legitimation to unite and guide the
political community" (Van Cott, 2000: 1).
Van Cott writes that the crisis was an old one that reached unknown
levels in the 1990s. Political elites and civil society organizations were calling
from a constitutional reform. This environment of reformism gave indigenous
peoples the opportunity to frame their old claims in constitutional language, in a
way that it found an audience in the elites. According to Van Cott, a good way
to analyze this transformation is through the idea of frames. In a way,
indigenous peoples' frames coincided with the elites' ones and for that reason
11 For a story of the construction of race in the colony, see Santiago Castro Gomez (2005).
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there was a sort of meeting point to include indigenous rights in the text of the
Constitution. To Van Cott, international law gave a sound frame that elites could
not reject and one in which indigenous peoples could see their rights respected.
Van Cott proposes to understand this kind of transition to democracy as one of
“constitutional transformation", that is, one in which law becomes a tool for
social change and later on becomes habitus, in Bourdieu's sense, which compels
citizens to obey the law and which is out of acceptance of its principles rather
than out of fear of punishment (Van Cott, 2000: 6).
To Van Cott, the 1991 Constitution recognizes the failure of the Creole
nation-building project and begins a new project based on the protection of
ethnic and cultural diversity. In the 1991 Constitution all three kinds of collective
rights are recognized, that is to say, rights to self-government, special
representation rights, and poly-ethnic rights. Indigenous rights represented a
challenge to this wave of constitutionalism, because indigenous peoples did not
see themselves as a group of individuals coming together to take part in the
nation, but as already made up sovereign groups that act as groups. This post-
liberal challenge is responded, according to Van Cott, with a multicultural
constitution. Quoting Habermas, Van Cott writes that, "the construction of a
national identity and unity around diversity opens a new era of "post-
nationalist" constitutionalism. Post-nationalist constitutions reject universalistic
notions of citizenship based exclusively on uniformly applied individual rights
and emphasize multiple forms of citizenship through a variety of institutions and
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autonomous domains of sovereignty that maximize the effective participation of
diverse groups" (Van Cott, 2000: 10). This transformation is the result of
demographic changes, the collapse of state socialism and the emergence of ethnic
claims, and of the fact that market capitalism has given rise to demands from
indigenous groups. Van Cott sees the situation of Latin America as one wherein
the premodern, the modern, and the postmodern coexist, and attributes most of
the problems of representation and legitimation to this particular configuration.
Given this situation, according to Van Cott, elites promoted a change, supported
by social movements, a change that she has labeled, using Alfonso Lopez
Pumarejo's words, a friendly liquidation of the past, in a clear reference to a
revolution by peaceful means.
Van Cott analysis is very interesting because she places the reform in one
of transition to democracy, adding a fourth category that is constitutional
transformation. I agree with her that this is a sort of transition to democracy,
however she explains the reform and the inclusion of indigenous rights based
solely on the elites' good will and the need to have a more inclusive pact that
took into account the claims of new subjects in the public sphere. Her story fails
in taking into account the importance of guerrilla warfare to open the political
system, on the one hand, and the emergence of transnational organizing and
mobilization that 1992 provoked in the indigenous organizations all around
Latin America, on the other.
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Her view of the 1991 Constitution is one framed in terms of progress,
where both indigenous peoples and elites suddenly found the way to have a
more radical transformation. Her category of constitutional transformation is
just an extrapolation of the American civil rights movement and its use of the
law to have social change. But in her account she fails to analyze the long duree
of indigenous mobilization, starting in the colony, and continued with the
struggles of Quintin Lame in the 1920s, the CRIC in the 1970s, and the
Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame, in the 1980s. German Scholar Carl Schmitt has
shown the fallacy in considering the Constitution a different kind of document
from the law. It is a mystification of the fact that both the constituent assembly
and Congress are legislative bodies of the state, and that the majorities working
at one level do not have any difference from the majorities at another level
(Schmitt, 1971). Against Schmitt, we have to recognize that a constitution sets
limits to the action of the state, but a government with the right majority, as the
current Uribe's administration, can modify the constitution at its will and make
those constitutional limits meaningless.
Multicultural constitutionalism places indigenous rights in a situation of
accepting the limits of universalism or assuming not being able to be recognized
in the public sphere. Van Cott celebrates the inclusion given by multicultural
constitutionalism, but she misses the long history of Colombian social struggles.
In this dissertation I aim at showing the logic behind the recognition of
indigenous rights and the struggles of indigenous peoples. Using
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Postcolonial/ Decolonial theory I wish to tell a different story of the
constitutional transformation in 1991. In my account indigenous rights are
recognized within the framework of global capitalism and what, using Anibal
Quijano's ideas, I have called the legal coloniality ofpower. I wish to show the
logic in the incorporation of Colombia in the world-system with the discovery of
America (Dussel, 1994), in order to show that the recognition of indigenous
rights is just part of a new structure of the modern/ colonial/ capitalist world
system. Following Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro Gomez, I hold that
the recognition of difference in the 1991 constitution is not a friendly liquidation
of the past but just a new strategy of occidentalization of indigenous peoples and
Afrodescendants in accord with the logic of late capitalism (Ramirez, 2007).
Van Cott focuses on the recent history of constitutional transformation.
Although she includes in her analysis a moment of implementation of
constitutional law, the time her book was written and published did not allow
her to have a deeper analysis of constitutional cases, wherein the Colombian
Constitutional Court implemented the multicultural state created in 1991.
Daniel Bonilla, a law professor at the Universidad de Los Andes, wrote a
complete analysis of constitutional cases, where he shows how the Court has
dealt with the multicultural state. In the following pages I want to analyze
Bonilla's argument, but I will focus more closely on constitutional cases in
chapter 5.
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The Multicultural Constitution
Daniel Bonilla analyzes indigenous rights in the 1991 Constitution. His
analysis starts from a study of different political theorists, like Will Kymlicka,
Charles Taylor and James Tully. Bonilla shows that in these authors there is a
liberal analysis of indigenous rights and shows that they are unable to
understand and solve the challenge that illiberal societies pose to liberal ones,
because they just claim the need to make liberal what they consider to be
illiberal. Bonilla sees in most of the cases of the Colombian Constitutional Court
a similar inability to respond to the illiberal challenge. In his analysis he shows
the history of the 1991 Constitution and shows that the indigenous
representatives were incapable to argue coherently for indigenous rights that did
not negate liberal rights. He poses the dilemma in the following terms: equality
and political unity, on the one hand, and diversity and political autonomy, on the
other. At the end of his analysis, Bonilla offers five criteria that he finds relevant
to solve the illiberal challenge. My purpose to analyze Bonilla's book is not to
see the validity of his argument, but the way indigenous rights are protected in
Colombia. However, it is important to say that Bonilla's five criteria are as
liberal as the authors he criticizes, mainly because he thinks that the history of
rights began with the 1991 Constitution and that it is enough to claim for
intercultural dialogue and protection by the state to solve this challenge. Bonilla,
as the Colombian Constitutional Court he criticizes, is unable to offer a strong
argument to define how that intercultural dialogue should be done and how
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mestizo majorities are going to solve that problem. Material questions like the
right to the territory, the right to protection from any majority, and affirmative
actions in terms of reparations are notably absent in his text.
Bonilla's account of the history of the 1991 Constitution is based on John
Dugas' account, and for that reason I will not revisit those arguments. However,
in the same way that Dugas and Van Cott do, Bonilla assumes that the
constitutional transformation occurred in 1991 was the result of a peaceful
revolution. He does not take into account the importance for the fate of the
Constitutional Assembly of Alvaro Gomez Hurtado's kidnapping and the effect
that the pamphlet entitled war on the oligarchy had in the minds of the elites, who
saw that the war involved them in a way that was not common before. In his
analysis of the arguments presented by Lorenzo Muelas and Francisco Rojas
Birry, indigenous leaders that had access to the two seats reserved for indigenous
peoples, Bonilla misses one important fact: the discussion on the rights of Afro-
Colombians, who are invisible in Bonilla's account in the same way they were in
the minds of several members of the Assembly (Interview Gustavo Zafra,
Bogota, June 2
7
th 2005). Bonilla fails to take into account several elements that
make up the history of indigenous peoples' and Afro-Colombians' mobilization
in the past five centuries. To Bonilla, indigenous rights were the result of
popular mobilization and struggles that took place in the late 1980s and early
1990s. As Dugas, he does not give a coherent explanation for the recognition of
indigenous rights in 1991 and assumes its recognition as a positive result; falling
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in the same liberal naivete he criticized in authors like Kymlicka, Taylor, and
Tully.
To summarize, Dugas, Bonilla, and Van Cott are epitomes of a way of
understanding constitutional history in Colombia, in particular the history of the
inclusion of indigenous rights in the 1991 Constitution. They do not pay
attention to the colonial history of Latin America and the role law has played to
constitute identities and the different ways of resistance to that process. These
authors fail to see the big picture, that is, the role indigenous peoples play in the
new model of development and the way difference is celebrated in the new
model of neoliberal globalization, and the hermeneutic violence that universal
rights exercise on indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombians. In the following
sections I will spell out my theoretical ground in order to show a different kind
of history in the remaining chapters of this dissertation.
Law and Constitutive Power
Law has traditionally been conceived as the product of sovereign power.
H.L.A. Hart, from a positivist perspective, shows the relationship between law
and sovereign power (Hart, 1994). Based on this conception, law is analyzed as a
product and as an instrument. As a product, because the state is seen as the one
in charge of producing it; and as an instrument, because the state uses it with the
purpose of producing order in society. According to Melossi, legal positivism is
based on a Hobbesian conception of the state, for the state is an artificial man that
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exists to keep social peace and for that purposes uses law as an instrument. The
best expression of that concept of law is criminal law, with its structure of
prohibitions and sanctions (Melossi, 1994).
Other conceptions of law show it in a different way but in all of them it is
seen as an instrument in the hands of the state. To a Marxist view of the law, the
latter is an instrument that a dominant class uses against another class; in that
way law is conceived as ideology, that is, it is used to exercise domination or as
an instrument in the reproduction of a particular mode of production. Alan
Stone presents it in the following way: "Capitalist law (exemplified by contract
law) reinforces an ideology that embraces individualism, private autonomy and
material self interest but which at the same time, affirms mutual obligation and
obedience to external authority” (Stone, 1985). One of the variants of legal
Marxism leads to the elimination of law once the capitalist state is eliminated,
which has led Boaventura de Sousa to state that in Marxism there is not a theory
of law but a theory against it (De Sousa, in Fine, 1979). However, from an
analysis of the productive character of law, E.P. Thompson and Alan Hunt find
that law is not only domination but also that it is part of a process of constitution
of identities.
In liberal theories as well as in Marxist theories, the normative power to
produce law resides in the state, be it the legislature or the judges, whereas the
space of freedom is placed in civil society. In these traditions there is a
contradiction between law and freedom. Freedom is in that way controlled
64
through the law, but it is unthinkable for subjects to be constituted and
controlled through the use of their freedom.
In Michel Foucault's Discipline mid Punish (Foucault 1995 {1977}) we find a
conception of law as an instrument to discipline subjects. But in his analysis on
governmentality there is a different view of law. In his last work, Foucault has a
positive view of power as productive and constitutive of identities (Brewer,
1999). In Foucault, law is not just an instrument to produce discipline, but part
of a mentality of government, a way to control populations (Hunt and Wickman,
1994; Ewald, 1990; Tadros, 1998). In Foucault we do not see a transition from
discipline to regulation but a more subtle movement, that is, an incorporation of
discipline and regulation in biopower, that is, the introduction of life in history
(Negri, 2001). Law does not disappear but starts functioning as a norm and it is
incorporated as part of a group of technologies of the self (Ewald, 1990).
With the emergence of a neoliberal model of government, the state loses
its centrality and with the law we find other ways of regulation, coming from
psychology, psychiatry, which has made law look increasingly normalized.
According to Nikolas Rose and Mariana Valverde, there seems to be a
contradiction in Foucault's theory (Rose & Valverde, 1998), but this is only
apparent, because biopolitical strategies of governmentality have used and
needed a legal framework, like for instance sterilization laws in the United States
and Germany, and, for the purposes of this dissertation, the constitution of legal
identities for indigenous peoples and Afrodescendants. Democratized
65
sovereignty serves the purposes of surveillance through the destruction of
obstacles that prevent the development of a disciplinary society.
The difference between the juridical and the normative (an extension of
governmentality) is found in the Kantian distinction between autonomy and
heteronomy, the latter being for the law, the former for governmentality
(Castoriadis, 1996; Estrada Araque, 2005; Diaz Estebanez, 2005). Kantian ethics
became the model for modern ethics, one based on the idea of the autonomy of
the individual. But those subjects who were incapable of being free were seen as
abnormal subjects in need of normalizing treatment. The norm is the way the
group watches itself, with no one with the power to declare it or to establish it.
Normal subjects are controlled via their own freedom; the abnormal is object of
technologies of the self that will make him/her normal, that is, controllable
without the state's intervention (Foucault, 2003).
In times of governmentality, law is not understood as the product of the
sovereign, as it is presented in a Hobbesian view of the state, rather it is seen as
the product of a whole set of practices that produced legal discourse. Law is not
only what Congress says it is, but we find law in judges' decisions and in
everyday life. 12 To analyze the legal complex means to study the role legal
mechanisms and legal fields play in the strategies of regulation. Hence the
analysis is not about law as such, but about the way a problem becomes a legal
12 For an American reader this is just obvious. But for someone educated in the civil law tradition
this is a different understanding of the law. This distinction is important because of the
transformations in Colombian legal culture since the 1991 Constitution. See Sarat (1990) and
Bourdieu and Teubner (2000)
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one to be part of a strategy of governmentality. In this way, the modern
separation between state and society becomes blurred, because it is the
constitution of a problem as legal what allows the state to intervene, and that is
done via social practices. Criminal law becomes a central element in the process
of constitution of identities and becomes an element that links disciplines with
governmentality, because it is the violation of the law what allows the
intervention and it is this intervention what gives an opportunity to constitute
subjectivities. Law becomes central in modern European states because of its
power of capture, that is, because it is a unifying element of the other sites of
power. Disciplinary power normalizes subjects, produces subjectivities, and it
does so without needing to legitimatize its power (Tadross, 1998).
The Legal Constitution of Identities and Post/Decolonial Theory
Traditional conceptions of Marxism saw law as an instrument with which
a class tried to exercise domination over another class. In Pashukanis, law is
seen as a capitalist instrument, up to a point in which its disappearance is
predicted with the disappearance of capitalist society (Pashukanis, 1980). But it
is with the works of Karl Klare, Nicos Poulantzas, Louis Althuser, and E.P.
Thompson that law's power started to be seen in a different way. From these
authors we see that law is not just a mechanism of repression, but that it can have
constitutive power (Sumner, 1979; Klare, 1979; Poulantzas, 1980; Althuser, 1970;
Thompson, 2001). In the production of subjectivities both the dominated and the
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dominator are produced through the law. From this point of view we can
understand the participation of the subaltern in the production of its own
control, because law is seen as an instrument that can help in the protection of
their interests. The discourse of rights becomes a discourse of the oppressed
against the state's oppression that is promoted and defended by the state. Law is
presented as the law for the freedom of the oppressed, and not as the law to
control individuals.
In Alan Hunt we find the bases for a constitutive theory of law. Hunt
analyzes law as a constitutive mode of regulation and in that way the traditional
separation between consensus and coercion simply disappears. As Hunt writes
it, "regulation involves the deployment of specific knowledges encapsulated in
legal or quasi-legal forms of intervention in specific social practices whose
resultants have consequences for the distribution of benefits and detriments for
the participants in the social practices subject to regulation" (Hunt, 1993: 314).
Hunt shows that regulation makes choices and eliminates alternative worlds;
agents and knowledges emerge and power is exercised via the law and
regulation. However, in Hunt there is a lack of a wider perspective, because he
uses the nation state as his unit of analysis. He does not explain the racial
constitution of legal identities or the fact that some world regions are normalized
whereas other regions have normalizing power. 13
13 Other authors are concerned also with the constitutive power of the law. However the same
perspective is used in their analyses, that is, one in which the law is seen as national and in which
race and class are seen as separated, See Ewick and Silbey, 1998, Klug, 2000 and Brigham, 1996.
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Taking into account the limits of a simply national perspective, I wish to
attempt another kind of analysis of the law and its constitutive power, based on
the recent discussion about postmodernity, postcoloniality and decoloniality in
Latin America. This discussion starts in the 1980s and the 1990s around the idea
of a postmodern Latin America. Whereas some people wanted to extend this
European category to the region's situation, Argentinean philosopher Enrique
Dussel tried a different kind of analysis. Firstly, he asked about the question of
modernity in Latin America. Is Latin America a modern region? If so, what is
this modernity like? To Dussel, European modernity has an invisibilizing effect
in the region, and that is why he talks about the covering up of America and not
about the discovery of the region. To Dussel, America is the first periphery of
Europe and this is what allows Europe to be the core in the modern/ capitalist
world-system. Castro Gomez, following DusseTs analysis, shows that
exploitation, slavery, and coloniality of power are part of modernity, something
as its darker side (Dussel and Castro Gomez in Mendieta, 2001).
Modernity has been defined as the search for the new and as the product
of European experience. In the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas
analyzes the philosophical character of modernity and show how moderns
defined it (Habermas, 1987). According to this account. Modernity is the epoch
that followed antiquity, and one in which nature was freed from its sacred
character and one that could be used as object of research (Heidegger, 1977).
Given that modernity is an epoch that desacralizes everything, political power
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became desacralized too. Traditional forms of legitimation were replaced by
legitimation based on popular will. The French Revolution brought about a new
way of legitimacy that put into question the principle of aristocracy. Given that
the people became the source of legitimacy, a new concept appeared in the
discourse of the French revolutionaries. This discourse is that one of the Nation,
as the representative of the people and as the public sphere that mediates
between the state and the private sphere of the individuals (Flabermas, 1989).
Modernity is not the result of internal processes of European medieval
cities, but rather the result of the discovery of America, by which Europe became
not only the center of the capitalist world-system, but also when Europe had the
Other that made possible its process of construction of an identity. The existent
interpretation of this process is based on a Eurocentric conception. European
philosophers like Jurgen Habermas see this process as based on European
history. To this author, three different processes have defined modernity and
helped construct modern subjectivity: Protestant reform. Enlightenment, and
French Revolution, these are European events that cannot be understood without
the discovery of America. But, the experience of the discovery of America is the
central element in the constitution of European subjectivity (Dussel, 1994).
Dussel puts it the following way:
The first concept is Eurocentric, provincial, and regional. Modernity is an
emancipation, a Kantian Ansgang, or "way out," from immaturity by
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means of reason, understood as a critical process that affords humanity
the possibility of new development. In Europe, this process took place
mainly during the eighteenth century. The temporal and spatial
dimensions of this phenomenon were described by Hegel and commented
on by Jurgen Habermas in his classic work on modernity. Habermas's
narrative, unanimously accepted by contemporary European tradition,
posits, "The key historical events for the creation of the principle of
[modern] subjectivity are the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the
French Revolution." As can readily be observed, a spatial-temporal
sequence is followed here. Furthermore, other cultural processes are
usually added to this sequence as well, from the Italian Renaissance and
the German Reformation to the Enlightenment. In a conversation with
Paul Ricoeur (1992, 109), Habermas suggested that the English Parliament
should also be included. Thus the sequence would run from Italy
(fifteenth century) to Germany (sixteenth to eighteenth century) to
England (seventeenth century) to France (eighteenth century). I label this
perspective "Eurocentric," for it indicates intra-European phenomena as
the starting point of modernity and explains its later development without
making recourse to anything outside of Europe. In a nutshell, this is the
provincial, regional view that ranges from Max Weber (I have in mind
here his analysis on "rationalization" and the "disenchantment of
worldviews") to Habermas. For many, Galileo (condemned in 1616),
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Francis Bacon (Novum Organum, 1620), or Descartes (Discourse on Method,
1636) could be considered the forebears of the process of modernity in the
seventeenth century (Dussel, 2000: 469).
To Dussel, there is an alternative approach to modernity that shows that
in the constitution of European identity the central character is the presence of
the other. However, European identity was based not on a presence that is
visible, but rather on a presence that is absent. In Spanish Dussel has referred to
this not as a process of discovery of the other (descubrimiento del otro) but as a
process of covering up of the other (encubrimiento del otro). This encubrimiento
will be seen in the debate about the conquest and how indigenous peoples and
Africans were constituted as non-presences, that is to say, they were constituted
as entities that were covered up and analyzed through European eyes. This
same encubrimiento would mark the development of the nation in the new
republics. In this way, the nation as a modern concept will be based on a
dialectic of descubrimiento/encubrimiento that I labeled as a dialectic of
inclusion/ exclusion.
The discussion on the modernity of Latin America led to the question of
the postmodern character of Latin America. Castro Gomez and Dussel are
coincident in saying that Latin America modernity is not just the mirror image of
European modernity. In the same way, European postmodernity cannot be the
mirror image for Latin America, because the processes and the intellectual
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origins of that debate are completely different from the debates sustained in the
region. Based on Said's work (Said, 1994 [1978], see also Escobar, 1995 and
Mudimbe, 1988), Argentinean semiotician Walter Mignolo studies the invented
character of Latin America and shows how it is invented in the discourses and
how that invention is instrumental in the consolidation of the
colonial/ modern/ capitalist world-system (Mignolo, 2005). Said's and Mignolo's
texts show how geography and identities are discursively constructed, how
through those discourses power is exercised, and how European subjects are
identified in the negation of the other. Enrique Dussel rephrases Descartes idea
of cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I am) and instead he defines the modern
subject as conquero ergo sum (I conquer therefore I am). An analysis of law as
discourse will show the mechanisms with which some subjects are constituted
and how those in power constitute themselves to dominate and to legitimize
their own power.
Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism
The modern world-system is based on the management of centrality by
Europe, that is, the process by which Europe became the center of the world-
system and by which America became its periphery. According to Dussel,
Europe's central role cannot be conceived without America as its periphery.
However, in order for Europe to become central it was necessary to construct it
as a colonial power culturally superior to the colonized. The centrality of Europe
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has been based on the construction of Europeans along racial lines. The
conquerors of America thought of themselves as having the right to conquest the
Americas and to subjugate her peoples. The colonization of America was
possible, in the juridical discourse, because the conquerors, especially those from
the School of Salamanca, thought that Spain had a right to conquest and
subjugate these peoples, because there was a just cause that made the war of
conquest a legitimate one. The dispute about slavery and the rights of the
indigenous peoples is read within this framework. However, what is at stake is
their occidentalization, that is, their conversion in western subjects able to be
dominated by colonial powers.
Based on this understanding of the colony, Anibal Quijano finds that the
identity of Portuguese, Spaniards and Europeans can only be understood taking
into account the racial differentiations between Europe and the rest. "In other
words, race and racial identity were established as instruments of basic social
classification" (Quijano, 2000: 534). This racial classification made possible not
only the exclusion of slaves from the colonial society as non-subjects but also the
exclusion of the indigenous peoples as half way between slaves and full citizens.
In the same way, due to territorial belonging there was a classification and
hierarchy between those born in the Americas and those who were born in
Europe. After independence, the incorporation of indigenous peoples and
Africans was possible only under the category of worker, and not under the
category of citizens. Given the racial classification of subjects in the Americas,
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whites were seen as privileged, because they were the only ones with the right to
have access to capital and it was this access to capital that made possible their
identification as members of the polity.
This centralization of global capitalism around Europe was relevant not
only in the European management of centrality, but also in the constitution of
identities in the Americas. In fact, the process of nation building in Colombia,
which could be extended to the Americas, was based on the inclusion/ exclusion
of Africans and indigenous peoples. The coloniality of power in these countries
repressed indigenous knowledge, practices, and subjectivities and, on the other
hand, it imposed European forms of knowledge and political practices. Amongst
the elements of the coloniality of power we find the imposition of the models of
political grouping existing in Europe. The particular political grouping that we
call the nation was part of the American experience, but not as an imagined
community of equals but rather as a political grouping of non-equals, where
indigenous peoples and Africans were excluded as non wage earners in the
capitalist system . 14
To Anibal Quijano one of the elements that show in a better way the
tragedy of the coloniality of power is the question of nation and state building
and the question of the Nation-State. As Quijano writes it, "a modern nation-
state involves the modern institutions of citizenship and political democracy, but
14 Quijano shows how the identity of the different indigenous peoples that lived in the territory of
what is today called the Americas was conflated as Indians, and I would add as Native-
Americans For peoples coming from Africa the label was blacks, Negroes, or African Americans.
Quijano (2000) 551. See also Devon Carbado for a critique of the dichotomy Black/ White in the
analysis of racism in the United States. Carbado. , 2002.
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only in the way in which citizenship can function as legal, civil, and political
equality for socially unequal people" (Quijano, 2000: 557). To Quijano, it is not
enough to imagine a community because, in order to create a nation, members of
the nation need to have something in common that allows them to imagine their
political grouping as a nation. As he shows for the Southern Cone, the process
of construction of the nation state involved the inclusion/ exclusion of
indigenous peoples and Africans. The "nation" in these countries was a political
grouping that was based on the inclusion of those peoples as workers but also on
their exclusion as citizens. Quijano puts it in the following way:
"Homogenization was achieved not by means of the fundamental
democratization of social and political relations, but by the exclusion of a
significant part of the population, one that since the sixteenth century had been
racially classified and marginalized from citizenship and democracy" (Quijano,
2000: 564).
In this way the process of political grouping in Latin America could not be
considered a process of nation building in the sense Benedict Anderson
understands it, not only for the lack of democratization but also for the particular
configurations of inclusion/ exclusion that the legal coloniality of power presents
(Anderson, 2003). In this way the loyalty to a political grouping did not achieve
the same form that it did in Europe. In the process of nation building in Europe
the dialectic of inclusion/ exclusion involved two different groups. The inclusion
of the people of the nation meant the exclusion of others, but it was the excluded
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the ones who were the reference for the identity of the nation (Brubaker, 1992;
Quijano, 1981; and Marx, 2003). In the analysis of the construction of the
European nation the fact of the coloniality of power is not taken into account,
because what happened in the Americas was perceived as not having anything
to do with political processes in Europe. In this dissertation I want to show that
in the Colombian case the legal coloniality of power is an element that has to be
analyzed when considering the nation.
(Post/De) Colonial Identities
The critique to colonialism is not new in Latin America. Edmundo
O'Gorman and Angel Rama have criticized the power language has to constitute
and to dominate the colonial subject's language (O'Gorman, 1958; Rama, 2004).
Angel Rama has shown how the written word became the distinctive character of
civilization and a base of colonial power and Creole's domination during the
Republic. Latin American elites used the written word to establish political and
symbolic domination. Instead of the Spanish colonial vision, creoles re-presented
the nation in their own terms, a nation in which the subaltern was included as
excluded. The latter does not mean that there was not any form of resistance, or
that the written word was not put into question with the oral tradition or the
testimony (Ashcroft, in Del Toro, 1999), but it does mean that the written word
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and the lettered man used it as part of his strategies of disciplining and of (pos)
colonial domination. 15
Angel Rama tries to articulate the role national literatures played in the
process of nation builciing in Latin America. Literature, as a written text,
constitutes itself as an instrument to shape the social imaginary of the nation and
as an instrument of legitimation of social projects and formalization of the
hegemony from the nascent national bourgeoisies, translated into a bourgeois,
liberal and republican rhetoric, which is central in the process of nation building.
Mabel Morana, analyzing Rama's work, points out that the homogenizing and
unifying process of the empire was done through the implementation of
institutionalized discourses that defined social practices from the spaces of the
administration, the Court and the monastery. From that space, it regulated the
relationships between the hegemonic space of the dominators and the satanic
space, borderline, or simply marginal of the popular sectors articulated in the
apparatus of power (Morana, 1997 and Morana, 1994).
Rama's analysis is useful to understand the role law plays in the
subalternization of subjects. To begin with, and given the lettered structured of
law, it is evident that the subaltern does not speak in the law, that her voice is
silenced and even transformed to be written in the language and code of the law.
This means that the concrete human being, man or woman, is made a juridical
subject, frequently a transgressor. Given the absence of a subaltern voice, the
alternative we find in Rama is to analyze the conditions under which that voice
15 In this case I mean men, because women were under some forms of control too.
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was silenced, what Julio Ramos calls the violent elision of the subaltern in the
law (Ramos, 1994: 195). In the act of controlling emerges the juridical subject,
there is a process of transculturation, that is to say, the field wherein the
subaltern lives is transformed. This is a fiction but with real effects. When they
are constituted as subaltern, they resist or conform to the category created, but
they live determined by that category, anyways.
Post/ Decolonial theory, from Said's work, has shown how discourses are
spaces in which identity is built and where the other is constituted with the
purposes of exercising power. In a similar process to the Colombian one, after
Indian independence the masses' experience was made invisible to give room the
story told by the elites. Analyizing Guha's work, Castro Gomez points out that
peasants' insurgencies are understood as processes of awareness expressed in
manifestos, written texts and rationalized programs of political action. The non-
lettered practices are deprived of all kind of leading role. According to Guha,
humanities worked as strategies of subalternization used by the educated elites
that emerged from Indian independence. Those are essentialist narratives,
subjected to colonial epistemologies, which hid cultural hybridization, mixed
spaces and transversal identities (Castro Gomez, 1999 and Restrepo, 2004).
In this dissertation I wish to show precisely that process. Analyzing the
law and some legal cases, I aim at showing the subject that is under construction
since 1492. To do so, in the following chapters I will analyze some legal artifacts
used to produce subaltern subjectivities during the colony, the Republic, and the
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developmental and neoliberal state. Governmentality theories will give
theoretical bases to understand the process by which subaltern subjectivities are
produced, but that process cannot be understood without taking into
consideration Colombian position in the world-system and Colombian long
colonial history. The legal coloniality of power will be shown as a global pattern
of racial classification through the use of the law.
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I. THE LEGAL PRODUCTION OF SUBALTERN SUBJECTIVITIES
CHAPTER 2
THE COLONIAL ENCOUNTER AND THE LEGAL COLON1ALITY OF POWER
Introduction
This chapter analyzes the encounter between Spaniards and Indigenous
peoples at the beginning of the Spanish conquest of the Americas. Colonialism
marked this encounter, and law was a central part in the process of imagination
of the Americas and its incorporation in the European imaginary.16 The legal
coloniality of power, as a pattern of global power that classifies subjects and
spaces with the use of the law and of legal artifacts, classified subjects and
produced subjectivities in order to guarantee not only physical conquest but also
the conquest of the imaginary.
In order to show the way indigenous identities were constituted through
the law, I analyze the colonial encounter and the importance symbols played in
the conquest of the imaginary. Law was part of the symbolic world that
Spaniards brought to the Americas and that symbolic world made possible the
production of the Indian in the imaginary of the conqueror, in the same way that
the structure of the city, religious rituals, and the use of Spanish as the language
of the land did. I analyze the legal constitution of an occidental identity, that is.
16 I use Mignolo's definition of imaginary, that is, a "symbolic construction through which a
community (be it racial, national, imperial, sexual, etc) defines itself" (Mignolo, 2003: 55). The
term has a geo-political meaning and it can be used to understand the foundation and creation of
the imaginary of the modern/ colonial world-system.
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an identity that conflates the indigenous difference and that depicts indigenous
peoples as the other to be controlled and civilized.
The colonial project sets some of the bases of the legal coloniality of
power, because in colonial law and colonial legal doctrine we find the Indian as it
is imagined by Spaniards. At the end of this chapter I describe briefly how the
use of the testament marks the legal occidentalization of indigenous peoples,
because they started to be seen and to behave as subjects of law. I begin my
analysis by presenting the colonial encounter and how that encounter meant the
conquest of the indigenous imaginary, that is to say, how the indigenous
worldview was replaced by the European one, and how Latin America became
invented as an occidental category (O'Gorman, 1958; Mignolo, 2005).
After studying how the legal coloniality of power brings about the
deletion of the Indian past, I analyze the juridical debate about the conquest
between Bartolome de las Casas and Juan Gines de Sepulveda, in order to show
that both men saw indigenous peoples from European eyes, and in that way the
dispute about the nature of the Indian was in itself part of a process of
occidentalization of indigenous peoples, in spite of the different approaches to
the question these authors had. The debate brought some transformations in the
situations of Indigenous peoples in the Americas, but this cannot lead us to
forget that what was at stake was the occidentalization of the Indian , a process
that was almost complete at the moment indigenous peoples saw themselves as
subjects of law and, therefore, as people with the right or the duty to leave their
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will not only to dispose of their property but also to incorporate their sons and
daughters in the European imaginary.
I only deal with the first encounter, which means that I do not analyze the
different legal artifacts that were used during the Colony to control and
constitute indigenous peoples and African slaves. My interest in this chapter is
to show the legal coloniality of power in the first documents that regulate the
situation of subalterns in the Americas. This analysis will serve me to show the
persistence of colonial structures after 19th century political independence and in
the 1991 Colombian constitution.
How to produce and reproduce an environment that has credibility in
situations in which political and social transformations eliminated an old world
and gave birth to a new one? This is a central question in order to understand
the symbolic transformations brought about by the Spanish presence in the
Americas. I do not intend to show the transformations in the indigenous
consciousness, especially because the subaltern voice is silenced in the archives
and in the accounts of the process of colonization. I would rather analyze the
processes and the juridical artifacts whereby the subaltern voice was silenced
and the kind of voice that emerged (Spivak, 1994). In this chapter I want to
analyze the apparatuses of power used to silence the voice of the subaltern, in
this case Law and legal doctrine, which were used to constitute the subaltern
conscience and a new identity in the "new" world (Gruzinski, 1993).
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My purpose in this chapter is not to show the way indigenous peoples'
thought or the exact terms in which their worldview changed, but rather the
legal instruments that were used to make that transformation possible. In a way
I want to do a sort of historical ethnography, by appealing to the law and
analyzing its voice, in order to see the way the Spaniards wanted to see the
Indian and the kind of territory they were imagining (Anderson, 2003; Rama,
2004; Said, 1994).
The Colonial Encounter and the Conquest of the Imaginary
Latin American Philosopher Enrique Dussel has shown the role Latin
America played in the constitution of modernity and in the role Europe played in
the modern world-system (Dussel, 1994). According to Dussel, to analyze
modernity and Europe's current centrality we need to take into account the
"comparative difference" that the discovery and the exploitation of America
gave to Europe and how it was important in constituting the latter as the core of
the modern world-system (Dussel, 1998). Dussel's point of view focuses on the
effects that the Other, coming from America, had in the constitution of European
identity, and on the way identities were constituted in the new world in order to
facilitate domination and control.
Immanuel Wallerstein shows the role the Americas played in the process
of constitution of capitalism in Europe and the centrality Europe achieved later
on (Wallerstein, 1999). However, as Dussel has written (Dussel, 1998),
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Wallerstein focuses more on the transformations existing in Europe, like the
creation of a bureaucracy and the state, than in the importance of the processes
whereby Europe ended up having a periphery vis a vis the Chinese empire (see
also Abu Lughod, 1989). Wallerstein's analysis departs from what Dussel calls
"second modernity", in opposition to the first one that began with the discovery
of the Americas and the Spanish hegemony, followed by a second modernity
characterized by the hegemony of The Netherlands and the centrality of northern
Europe, and it does not take into account processes different from European ones
in the emergence of the modern capitalist world-system. Dussel and Wallerstein
take into account material processes, like the development of capitalism or the
fact that the material resources coming from the Americas gave Spain the
necessary wealth to become the first hegemony of the world system.
However, symbolic processes and the role they play in the constitution of
Europe's centrality are completely forgotten in DusseTs and Wallerstein s
analysis. Walter Mignolo takes this symbolic constitution into account, but he
leaves the law out of the picture as if it had a very small role to play (Mignolo,
2005). Symbols play an important part in the constitution of power and its
consolidation. The Conquest was not just a process of physical force by which
Spaniards dominated the territories of the Americas. Spaniards had to convince
themselves and the competing European powers, especially Portugal, of their
right to control and dominate these lands, and at the same time they had to
establish symbolic power in the Americas in order to count with the cooperation
86
of the Indians (Stern, 1992). Law and the juridical discourse were central part in
the constitution of this imaginary.
One important aspect of the conquest of the imaginary is found in the
architecture of the colonial city. The messages the inhabitant of the city could
find were destined to tell her the symbolic power of the conqueror and, in that
way, the need to subject herself to that power. In the Plaza Central they found
ceremonies of information, that is, rituals that created and recreated symbolic
power to the eyes of both Spaniards and Indians. These ceremonies reminded
them of the power of the Church, the glory of the King, and the exemplar justice
he exercises in case of violations of the law (Lomne, 1993; Foucault, 1995). The
imaginary of the conquest and the conquered territory was visually constructed
in order to create a unique memory of the past, the present, and the future. The
Indian's past was erased and in its stead the European past became The Past;
Athens and Rome entered as the model cities in the Americas. The first step in
the creation of new memories was the erasure of the old. Indigenous identities
were erased and a new one, the one of the Indian subject of the King of Spain,
was instilled in his/her mind. The old memories suffered a damnation memoriae,
a deletion of the language, history and tradition. 17
Spaniards were immersed in a discourse that led them to see the Indians as
noble savages (Columbus), as perros cochinos (the encomenderos), as homunculus
17 It is worth to mention that the erasure during the colony was followed by a new epistemic
violence during the Independence, that is, the appropriation that the Spaniards in America did of
the Indian past and their history of oppression as part of the rhetoric of independence and the
process of des-identification with the Spaniard from Spain.
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(Gines de Sepulveda), as human beings in need of protection (Las Casas), and so
on so forth. The nature of the Indian became important in order to determine the
legitimacy of the Spanish adventure and to allow the transition from conquest to
colonization. The very fact that the written word became the mark of Spanish
civilization, even though the Indians had written word and many of them
expressed in written even better that many of the inhabitants of Spain, has to be
taken into account because it affected our way of perceiving the world and our
way of understanding history (Rama, 2004).
According to O'Gorman the so-called discovery was the final result of a
hermeneutical development that constituted the Americas as a thing and as a
place, and this hermeneutical strategy determined the way Spaniards saw the
presence of Columbus in the Americas and the juridical tools that were necessary
to ensure Spanish control of the territories and its peoples. In his analysis,
O'Gorman focuses on the discourses that made possible conceiving this event as
a legitimate act of conquest and later on of discovery, and he tries to show when
and how the Americas emerged in the historical conscience of Europe. This
means that this event had to be framed within the confines of the way of thinking
of the time, that is, a vision that did not predict the existence of lands towards the
west of Europe and that led Spaniards to struggle about its juridical regime and
the nature of its inhabitants (Zavala, 1944).
O'Gorman shows that the response to Columbus's discovery was one of
skepticism and not one of naive credibility to what he had encountered. The
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Spanish Crown adopted a juridical position that allowed them to treat
Columbus' discovery as a hypothesis and therefore in the drawing of the Linen
Alejandrinn, also known as the western line, they took into account the fact that
Columbus might have arrived to a new place or to some land in Asia (O'Gorman,
1958: 40). It is with Amerigo Vespucci that the Americas became a new world,
and therefore, a new place in the European imaginary. However, with the
invention of the Americas, Western Culture reached presence in the entire globe
and in doing so it took the whole universe as her property (O'Gorman, 1958: 81).
The Earth became the center of the universe and Europe as the core of the
modern world-system (Wallerstein, 1999).
Inga Clendinnen has analyzed the moment of the encounter between the
Spaniards and the Indians in Yucatan in the 16* century. The focus of
Clendinnen's study is to show the effects of that first encounter between the
colonizer and the colonized, and the struggles between their imaginaries of the
world, which ended up in the consolidation of Spanish power (Clendinnen,
2003). This author shows the tragic encounter between two worldviews and how
one of them acted as if it had the right to conquer and colonize the world. The
indigenous perspective is seen as confused and unable to understand the
Spaniards' world. At the end, they became more and more subjects to be
assimilated and as a result their worldview was silenced, changed, criminalized,
and colonized. In her analysis on the Franciscan friars from Yucatan, Clendinnen
shows the real effects of discourses and worldviews. Indeed, Franciscan friars
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arrived to Yucatan to evangelize the Indians and they thought that they were
successful in doing so. But events proved them wrong, and they reacted in a
paternalistic way, disciplining and punishing the Indians, but in such a cruel way
that the sanctions horrified even the Crown and the Church. 18 Even after the
criticism they received, the friars did not see any thing wrong in their behavior
(Clendinnen, 1982). Her study shows that worldviews determine the way we
perceive events, and it is important to understand that frame in order to be able
to understand the discussions that took part at the beginning of the conquest of
the Americas, and how this discussion led to the beginning of the process of
colonization that lasted for almost 300 years.
Legal tools and legal discourse were important in this process of
colonization of the indigenous imaginary (O'Gorman, 1958; Gruzinski, 1993).
Conquerors came to the Americas based on three utopias; one of richness,
another one of social status, and one of Christianization, understood as the
dominant discourse of civilization during early modernity. The early conquest
was characterized by a struggle about the meaning of the conquest and about the
utopia that was going to define it (Stern, 1992). It is important to take this
context into account, because the struggle determined in a way the role law
played, and the final status of the territory and its peoples. However, this
process was not done without resistance, because indigenous peoples fought for
their freedom, adapted their customs to the Spanish ones, or simply faked their
18 Clendinnen writes that the friars behaved as fathers, but, she adds, there are fathers and there
are fathers. And the friars were very cruel ones.
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conversions, and their resistance was important in the final shape of legal
doctrines and the law. The conquerors and the defenders of the Indians were all
aware that they were in a political fight to define who had legitimate symbolic
power to determine the purposes and restrictions of the conquest (Clendinnen,
1982; Barral, 1992; Hanke, 1968; Rajagopal, 2005).
In the first account about the discovery we see the three utopias in tension
and the problems faced by the emergence of an unknown, no necessarily new,
world. Columbus' letters show the tension between the three utopias but at the
same time they show the fascination for the Other, an Other that he is trying to
capture with words and images and, later on, physically. Columbus first
epistemic violence has to do with the naming of the place he arrived to. In the
second letter to the Scribe of the Spanish Crown, Columbus informs him that he
has arrived to an Island that is inhabited by people different from the Europeans
and that they called Guanahani. He decided to change all the names of the
Islands and renamed Guanahani as San Salvador, another island as Santa Maria
de la Concepcion, and so on so forth.
The conquest was characterized by the constant need the conquerors had
to describe the places they were encountering, a constant need to capture with
words what was only visible to the traveler. But words and images became
important in the constitution of the imaginary about the Americas. The texts are
rich in descriptions and judgments. The reader can feel the presence of the Other
in the texts and the amazing universe the writer is discovering for his European
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reader. But at the same time there is a process of capturing with words, that is,
of taming that universe and putting it into the known language of the time, to
make it comprehensible to be able to apprehend it and dominate it. Amerigo
Vespucci is a good example of this attitude. His letters are stories about his trips
to the Americas. He gave enough details for the European reader to be able to
feel the place he was describing. In the letter addressed to Lorenzo de Medici in
1502, Vespucci describes to him the nature of the people he sees in the territory
he is traveling around. It is interesting that he describes the Indians as reasoning
animals, but there is no purpose yet of constituting them as part of a past of
Europe:
Now let us consider the reasoning animals. We found the region
inhabited by a race of people who were entirely naked, both men and
women... They have no laws, and no religious belief, but live according to
the dictates of nature alone. They know nothing of immortality of the
soul; they have no private property, but every thing in common; they have
no boundaries of kingdom or province; they obey no king or lord, for it is
wholly unnecessary, as they have no laws, and each one is his own
master...They are very prolific people. There is no inheritance among
them for they have no property of their own. When their children, that is
to say their daughters, are old enough to have children, they must be
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possessed first by their nearest relative, the father excepted; then they are
married (Vespucci, 1951: 290).
This letter advances some of the questions that are going to be of interest
for the Spaniards in their process of occidentalization of the Indians. The fact the
institution of inheritance did not exist in the Indian communities that Vespucci
knew, showed him that they were at a level close to the savage, if not that they
were savages. Once the colony began, Spaniards instituted the inheritance
amongst the Indians, not because they had properties to leave, but because they
had to behave as subjects of the law (Rodriguez, 1994; Rodriguez, 2002; Rojas,
1999). But it is the Lettera of 1504 the one that has the best description of
Vespucci's voyages to the Americas. In this letter he tells Lorenzo de Medici
about all his trips to the Americas (four in total) and all his impressions about
this. This Lettera is important because it allows us to have a view of the European
mind at the time of the Discovery and how they saw the Americas. Vespucci
behaves as an anthropologist, taking notes of everything he sees, doing
ethnography, and describing from his and his society' point of view what he sees
in the Indian. The fact that he sees that a sign of civilization is to have some
juridical institutions shows us the importance of the law in the constitution of
identities and in the constitution of places and persons as colonies and colonized
(Rivera Ramos, 2001; Engle Merry, 2000; Grosfoguel, 2003; Santiago, 1994). The
comparison between European customs, civilized and superior, with the Indians'
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customs, barbaric and inferior, goes on in the letter entitled Mundus Novus,
written in 1503. This letter presents the idea of a new world and he proposes to
call these lands in such a way:
On a former occasion 1 wrote to you at some length concerning my return
from those new regions which we found and explored with the fleet, at
the cost, and by the command of this most Serene King of Portugal. And
these we may rightly call a new world... I have found a continent more
densely peopled and abounding in animals than our Europe or Asia or
Africa, and, in addition, a climate milder and more delightful than in any
other region known to us, as you shall learn in the following account
wherein we shall set succinctly down only capital matters and the things
more worthy of comment and memory seen or heard by me in this new
world, as will appear below (Vespucci, 1951: 299).
In this letter Vespucci describes these customs in the following way:
They have no cloth either of wool, linen or cotton since they need it not;
neither do they have goods of their own, but all things are held in
common. They live together without king, without government, and each
is his own master...They dissolve their marriages as often as they please,
and observe no sort of law with respect to them... They live according to
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nature, and may be called Epicureans rather than Stoics (Vespucci, 1951:
302).
As Angel Rama has shown (Rama, 2004), the idea of good behavior in the
city and the manners are important features of a civilized man. Following the
transformations that Elias shows in his analysis of the concept of civilization in
Europe during the transition from medieval times to modernity, we can see that
in Vespucci a sign of civilization is precisely the fact that Europeans had clothes
and laws, whereas Indians lack these two things (Elias, 2000).
In 1519 the Spanish Crown received information from Hernan Cortes
about the conquest of Mexico and in 1533 Hernan Pizarro gave notice of his
conquest of Peru. These two events confirmed them the idea that they had
arrived to a new world and that it was more important than they originally
thought. The splendor of the Aztecs, Mayas, and Incas impressed the Spaniards
and they did not think that Indians were those savages of the islands, but
civilized subjects worth of their respect. Responding a letter sent by Cortes, the
king of Spain wrote that he would not allow encomiendas in the territory that
Cortes discovered and instead they had to live in freedom as subjects of the
Kingdom, in order to force them to accept Catholic faith and to have friendship
and exchanges with the Spaniards (Renom, 1982: 54; Le Riverend, nd: 93-135).
As a result of the King's provisions, Indians were not taken alive, because they
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could not be enslaved, and the King was forced to change his order and to
regulate the enslavement of the Indians.
America as a new world lacked a definite identity. In order to try to
determine this region's identity, Europe imagined her as a new world, and as a
possibility, that is to say, as other Europe but in an earlier state of civilization.
The present of Europe became the eternal future of the Americas. This way of
conceiving this geographical region determined on its part the way the American
being was thought. The Indian was thought as having a natural capacity to be
civilized and to be incorporated in Christian culture. But this view was not taken
without dispute, and that is precisely the debate in Valladolid between
Bartolome de las Casas and Juan Gines de Sepulveda.
Conquest and the Colonial Order: Memory, Forgetting and
"Remembering"
The Indian memory and his/her symbolic world had to be erased before
the constitution of a new world. However, this process cannot be understood in
chronological sense but as a synchronic act. That is, by creating a new memory
of the past, the Indian past was erased or transformed. The law is important in
the process because it creates a new subject of rights and duties, that is, the law
talks to a subject of the King of Spain and in doing so it constitutes the Indian
precisely as a subject of occidental law.
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From the beginning the three utopias were disputing the meaning of the
Conquest. Columbus' letters show the tension between the duty of christening
the Indians and the goals the conquerors had when they came to the Americas. In
a letter Columbus sent after his third trip, he puts at the same level the religious
mission and the economic one. In this letter he addresses the Queen and the
King and says to them, "the Holy Trinity moved your highness to this enterprise
of the Indians and because of your infinite kindness made me a messenger of
that... taking with me all that I knew to serve our Lord and to spread his holy
name and faith to so many peoples". In the same letter he says that the
discoverers "rescued" some gold in a high quantity, showing that he put at the
same level the economic and the religious utopias. According to Renom Carulla,
Columbus confused in some letters the enslavement of the Indians with the
mission of christening them (Renom, 1983: 3; Le Riverend, nd: 33-55). But the
combination of spiritual and material gains was no privilege of the Spanish
Crown. Pope Alejandro VI by giving his approval to the Conquest thought
convenient to combine the spiritual mission with the material one. This means
that at the beginning of the conquest the two utopias were in tension but with
neither of them with the power to impose on the other.
Columbus' letters and the Pope's instructions show that the two utopias
were central in the process of constitution of the Americas. What we see in the
letters is a clear combination of identity constitution and material exploitation, in
order to incorporate the Indians and the Americas in the modern world-system.
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As we can see in the instruction that the Spanish Crown gave to Columbus in a
letter dated on May 29 th 1493, they stressed the need to attract the inhabitants of
the islands to which he arrived to the Catholic faith as part of the whole process
of achieving the discovered lands for the Kingdom and for the economic benefit
of both the Crown and the entrepreneurs that paid and led the Conquest.
But the Crown was aware of the need to impose her power on the
conquerors if it wanted to have the benefits of the conquest. Encomenderos were
decimating the Indians with their bad treatment and were making the Conquest a
difficult and expensive task. The Crown and her advisers did not want to fight
with the Conquerors but they did not want to lose control of them either. The
legal status of the encomienda became a central point in the discussion, because, as
one of the king's advisers wrote, to have perpetual encomiendas meant to have
people born in the Americas with no links to Spain and her King, and therefore
the seeds of rebellion planted, given that at some point they will feel no need of
paying tribute to the Kingdom. Having limited encomiendas will guarantee not
only the Crown's control of the encomenderos
,
but also it will ensure the royal
presence and the peaceful domination of the Indians. As a result of this
discussion, the Kingdom passed on May 20Ul 1500 a real decision that prohibited
the enslavement of the Indians and it ordered the Conquerors to return them to
the islands and to let them be free. But just some time after this decision, the
Queen declared that enslavement of the Indians was prohibited unless they
resisted to the process of evangelization of the peoples of this territory. In this
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way the Spanish Crown found a good way to solve the tensions between the
conquerors' goals and the Christian mission. Following this doctrine, the
institution of the Encomienda was created by Real Cedula in 1503, that is, an
institution that gave the Conquerors the right to exploit the Indians, as free
persons, but in exchange they had the duty to educate them in the Catholic faith
(Renom, 1983).
Once Dominicans set foot in the Americas they saw the inhumane
conditions to which the encomenderos subjected the Indians and decided to make
public these conditions. In 1511, Padre Montesinos said in a public speech that
the conquerors were in mortal sin and questioned their right to subject the
Indians to those conditions. The speech examined the right that Spain had in the
new world, her duties with the Indians, and the rights the Indians had with
regard to the Conquerors. As a result of the criticism of the Dominicans, the
Spanish Crown convoked a meeting of the Junta de Tedlogos y Juristas in order to
determine the legality and morality of the Conquest and the treatment of the
Indians. After several meetings wherein Padre Montesinos took part and could
give his arguments about the inhumanity of the treatment of the Indians, the
Junta concluded that the Indians were free men and that they had to be protected
and educated in the Catholic faith, but without detriment to their duties
regarding the encomenderos. The Junta recognized the right of the Spanish Crown
to these territories but at the same time it called the attention to the duty of
Christianization of its inhabitants. As a result of this dispute, that advances some
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of the arguments that would be given in the dispute between Las Casas and
Sepulveda, the Crown passed on December 27th 1512 the Ordenanzas o Leyes de
Burgos de 1512 that regulated the rights and duties of Spain with regard to the
Indians.
These laws considered that the Indian was free, but they also assumed that
Spain had a legitimate right to conquer these territories. The meaning of
freedom in the theological doctrine of the times is not the kind of freedom that
liberals would defend later. The freedom that the laws of Burgos took into
account is the one that allowed subjects to be under the power of the Master in
feudalism. This is to say, they were not slaves in the sense that there could not
be any kind of trade with their bodies, but their labor force was subject to the
power of the master and, in the case of the Indians, of the encomendero.
The law tried to stop the extinction of the Indians, because the treatment
that they were receiving was decimating the indigenous population. From a
population that, according to Las Casas was of two or three hundred thousand
persons, the islands fell to a population of 60.000 by 1508 and 20.000 by 1512
(Hussey, 1932). The Laws of Burgos were the result of Dominican concern about
the situation of the Indians. The ordinances had the purpose of solving the
tension between the faith and the economic use of the Indians. In these
ordinances, the Crown was trying to adapt the Indians to the uses of Spanish
customs, and that is why, for instance, they commanded the Indians not to have
more than one wife; pregnant women were not forced to work in the mines, and
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instead they had to work in their own husband's farm or in the farms of the
Spaniards; the clarifications of the ordinances held that within a period of ten
years, men and women were to begin wearing proper clothes, that is, western
clothes; and it allowed indigenous peoples to have their own customs, but only
within the limits of Christian civilization (Hussey, 1932). As Silvio Zavala shows
in his analysis of Bishop Vasco de Quiroga's American utopia, the purpose of all
these ordinances, that gave some freedom to Christened Indians, was to make the
native acquire the habits of virtue and make it become part of their nature, that is
to constitute them as western subjects and therefore subjects of Spanish control
and domination: "The task of civilization in the New World should therefore
consist, not in transplanting the old culture among the newly discovered peoples,
but in elevating them, in all their natural simplicity, to the ideal standards of
humanism and of primitive Christianity.. -Quiroga's project is distinguished by
the will to apply the noblest political idea of the Renaissance. He had observed
at close hand the life of the Indians, and he exalted the civilizing mission of
Occidental man to heights of moral purity which have few equals in the history
of colonizing thought" (Zavala, 1947: 345)
Through the treatment of the Indians as free individuals, the Laws of
Burgos were not trying to stop their exploitation. In fact the exploitation
persisted, but these laws were trying to create an order wherein the labor force of
the Indian was used in a manner that did not destroy them and, at the same time,
that guaranteed the Crown's control over both the Encomenderos and the Indians.
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The laws created a subject that responded to the commands of the law as well. In
other words, in the same way that one of the first measures Spaniards took was
to impose Spanish as the language of the land and capitalism as the economic
system, there had to be a homogenization of the subjects' identities, so there
could be an audience for the measures taken by the Spaniards. For that reason it
is important to notice that one of the first legal measures Spaniards brought to
the Americas was inheritance laws. It has to be remembered that indigenous
peoples did not have this institution in their legal tradition and that they related
to the land not in terms of private property, as the Europeans did, but in terms of
a relation that takes the land as part of their identity as a community. By making
the Indians have testaments, the Spaniards were transforming their relation to the
land, their relationship to their family, and their identity as indigenous peoples.
In this way the land ceased to be a part of their identity; after these
transformations the land became a thing, and object and the Indian a subject
under the law, a proprietor, regardless of the fact that most of the testors did not
have any property to leave in their wills. Furthermore, by having the Indians
leave a will, they were constituted as free will persons: a person that could pay
taxes and not a thing that was under the encomendero's control (Zavala, 1973). 19
In the testaments the body was the least important element, what the scribes
cared more about was the fact that the testator had free will, a healthy one in
19 It is important to notice that in the early conquest the Indian was treated as an equal, then as an
Other, and in some of the trip stories, as a savage. The economic system that was developing
needed more free men (and it was concerned only with men) than slaves. As Restrepo shows it,
this just made exploitation easier (Restrepo, 1999: 96; Bolahos, 1994).
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order to be able to obey the law and to incorporate her/his heirs in the western
legal regime (Rodriguez, 2002).
In the discussion about the Americas, the legitimacy of the Conquest came
into question. Based on the idea that the Indians were free people, they could not
have been subjected to the power of the Conquerors, at least not as slaves. But, if
they could be under servitude as free persons, then Spaniards had to justify the
duty of the Indian to serve the Spanish Crown. It is at this point that Spaniards
had to solve the tensions between evangelization and conquest. Based on the
just war theory, Spaniards held that the only reason that justified the domination
of the Indians was their refusal to accept the Catholic faith. If the Indians were
willing to receive and listen to the catholic missioners they could and had to
remain free and Spain had to respect their right not to be invaded.
The emerging debates transformed their medieval views and the way they
saw the Indians. Francisco de Vitoria, Professor of Theology at the University of
Salamanca, was one of the main contributors to this debate, for he set the terms
of the discussion and gave a meaning that was influential in the understanding
of the legitimacy of the conquest. The legislation that was passed in 1542 signs
the beginning of the execution of the new Vitorian mentality in the solution of
the problems in the Americas. Vitoria rejected the Pope and the Empire as
legitimate sources to explain the titles Spain had in the Americas. Bv doing so,
he was radically rejecting and transforming the way medieval thinkers thought
about the universe. After analyzing several arguments, Vitoria concluded
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writing that the only valid title was the natural and divine right to spread the
gospel. He conceived people as being part of a community that was not only
national but that was part of humanity as a whole, and it is this belonging to
humanity that gave Spain the right to apply the law of the peoples in its colonies
(Hanke, 1964; Hanke, 1985). His argumentation took the point of view of the
"victims" of the infidel's domination. Given that the title was based on the right
to spread the gospel, Spaniards could represent with legitimacy the Pope, and
the Pope could decide that Indian rulers could not rule their peoples because, as
Thomas of Aquinas said, the Church could deprive infidels of the dominion and
jurisdiction over Christians. Spanish Armed intervention was also authorized
because they acted in defense of humanity, in this case, of the Indians who were
victims of their own rulers (Vitoria, 1998).
The School of Salamanca and the Debate on Spanish Domination
Antonello Gerbi analyzes the debate about the nature of the Americas
(Gerbi, 1960). In this book he focuses on the studies that De Pauw did on the
American Indians and the responses to his analysis. The idea of the immaturity
or inferiority of the Americas was introduced to the French world by Buffon in
the mid 17th century. According to Buffon, the American Indians were new men,
in a new world where mans plans did not have time to develop properly. In a
passage Buffon presents his idea of modernity as destruction and transformation
of the land, along the lines of Francis Bacon's Nozmni Organon. Indeed, in a text
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quoted by Gerbi, Buffon writes that in the Americas everything is cold and
animals are small, and only when trees are taken down and rivers contained,
only then the earth will become rich and man could be the same as in other parts
of the world, like Europe. But he adds that is not that animals will grow or men
will change, only that those who are transported to that place will not suffer the
effects of the environment (Gerbi, 1960: 13). As Gerbi, shows, the idea of the
inferiority of the Americas is central in the philosophical discourse in Europe. De
Pauw, writing after Buffon, writes that the Indian is a degenerate being that
needs to be under control, and that western nature, that is the Americas, is not
imperfect but decadent (Gerbi, 1960: 50).
The debate Gerbi is analyzing focuses on the discussion in France,
England, and Germany, leaving aside the early discussion in Spain and the
arguments given to justify the Conquest. He presents in a brief section the
debate about the nature of the Indian between Las Casas and Gines de Sepulveda.
However, the book is structured in a way that the reader is led to conclude that
this debate is based on Buffon s and De Pauw's ideas, when it was long time
before and in a way it determined the view that Europe had of the Americas and
the Indian. It is important to see the intellectual debate around the discovery,
because it shaped the way the Americas were seen and the kind of measures
taken to discipline its subjects.
The first important debate about the nature of the Indian took place in
Spain and the School of Salamanca, at the time one of the most important
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universities in Europe and a place where theology was going through a process
that led it right into modernity. The School of Salamanca is known for the
debates between Bartolome de las Casas and Gines de Sepulveda, especially
because members of the School participated in the junta that had to decide about
the dispute between these two authors and the nature of the Indians and the
legitimacy of the conquest. But the school is also known by its transformation of
medieval theology and its more modern approach. Medieval theology enters
into crisis in the 15 th century and there is an effort to modernize it. This
modernization produces two fundamental directions of thought:
1. The creation of a new theology, doing tabula rasa with the old thought.
This is the line of thought followed by humanist thinkers like Erasmus
from Rotterdam and Valla.
2. Returning to medieval scholastic but with a renew sense that recovers
what was good about its way of reasoning and enriching it with the
values brought by humanism. This is the line followed by Francisco de
Vitoria and, after him, by the School of Salamanca (Belda, 2000).
The School of Salamanca could be defined as a movement of thought that
seeks the renovation of theology that has Francisco de Vitoria as its founder and
his new way of thinking about scholasticism and logic, as well as current and
theological problems (Balmes, 2000). Before the writings of the members of the
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School, the problem of the justification of the conquest and colonization of the
Americas had been argued from an Augustinian and medieval perspective,
especially taking as the main legal title the Pope's power to distribute the lands
(and therefore the Bulns). But this justification was easy to counter as indigenous
peoples did: by criticizing the Pope's authority over these territories and by
questioning his jurisdiction to give to others land that did no belong to him,
because he did not even know that those lands existed (Belda, 2000: 920).
The School became the center for the discussion of the legitimacy of the
Spanish Conquest vis a ins Portugal, the rest of European powers, and the Indians.
There are three generations in the School of Salamanca: The first generation
counted with Francisco de Vitoria, its founder, and Domingo Soto and Melchor
Cano (1526-1560); the second generation is focused on the Cultural expansion,
and goes from Sotomayor and Medina (1560-1584); and the third one focused on
doctrinal systematization, from Banez to Francisco Suarez (1584-1617). Their
thought was of great importance for the fate of the Americas and its peoples
(Luis Frayle Delgado. In Vitoria, 1998: XV). Vitoria's analysis constituted the
juridical bases for the Conquest of the Americas and his ideas were at the base of
the debate between Bartolome de las Casas and Juan Gines de Sepulveda. In the
Relecciones sobre los Indios, Vitoria analyzes the titles the Spanish Crown had on
the territories of the Americas. When Vitoria wrote this text, there were reports
on the abuses of the Conquerors, especially with regard to the Encomiendas. Even
though the topic had been analyzed before by jurists of the Crown and the Juntas
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de Burgos in 1512, leading to the Laws of Burgos that became the first regulation on
the situation of the Indians, Vitoria took this issue to analyze all over again,
developing a theory based on natural law and theology, with a modern and
universal vision on the status of the Americas in the law of the peoples (Vitoria,
1998). After studying the illegitimate and legitimate titles that had been used to
justify the conquest, Vitoria went on to analyze the titles he thought did justify
the Spanish Conquest and its domination of the Indians. In the second Releccion,
Vitoria focused more on justification of the war, based on an idea of the
Communitas totius Orbis, wherein he justified the Conquest by appealing to a
universal community that would give Spaniards the right to step in the Americas
and stay there and even become citizens of those territories. However in Vitoria
this right did not give them the right to own the Indian 's land:
Francisco de Vitoria finds, amongst several titles that can justify the
penetration in the Indias, communication as one justification that is
protected by the laws of the peoples. He talks about human sisterhood,
primitive community of goods, freedom of navigation and commercial
exchange between different groups of men; so this commerce or
communication is due not only to the arbitrary inspiration of common life,
but it is in accord with the laws of the peoples, that links all the peoples.
According to these principles, he states that Spaniards could tie their ships
up anywhere they like, to travel without being disturbed, to stay in the
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country they wish and become citizens with their sons and daughters
(Zavala, 1944: 63).
Vitoria considers in the second releccion that Barbarians, meaning those
who did not belong to Christian civilization, cannot limit access to common
goods that are accessible to anyone, regardless of citizenship. For instance, if
nationals have the right to extract gold from the mines, it is illicit for barbarians
to prohibit Spaniards to extract gold from those mines. At the same time he
introduced the idea of lands and things that had no owner, and therefore
according to the right of occupation, Spaniards could become owners of those
abandoned or without owner things (Vitoria, 1998: 134). If barbarians prevented
Spaniards from exercising this right, they had the right to exercise war against
them and occupy their lands, because Spaniards would be defending a legitimate
right. And if barbarians resisted to this war, then they could be subjected to
servitude according to the laws of war and respecting the limits of justice and
prudence. To Vitoria, the first title to justify Spanish presence in the Americas
and the right to conquer those territories was found in the right of free trade. If
barbarians had not impeded free trade, Spaniards would not have had a right to
conquer the Indians.
To the idea of free trade Vitoria added the idea of the evangelization of the
Indians. He showed that as a result of the Conquest, some of the Indians had
converted to Catholicism, and that fact gave Spaniards a right and a duty: a duty
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to defend Christians from barbarian domination and a right to conquer them, in
order to protect those Christians living in barbarian territory. And even without
the authority of the Pope, Spaniards could liberate the Indians if they saw that
barbarians practiced inhumane rites and customs (Vitoria, 1998: 145).
The main point of discussion emerged in the middle of the discussion
with the institution of the Encomienda. It was an institution that had its origins in
the islands ruled by Columbus (Zavala, 1973). The institution became central in
the process of colonization of the Indians, because it combined economic
exploitation with personal transformation. Hernan Cortes, for instance, passed
some regulations in 1524, March 20th
,
in order to have the children of the Indians
educated in the Catholic faith. Responding to some attacks against his way of
governing the conquered territories, Cortes sent a letter to the Spanish Crown,
and in that letter he defended the institution based on several reasons: economic,
because it supported the Spaniards' businesses in the Americas and it was a way
to pay their expenses in the discovery and conquest of the Americas for the
Spanish Crown; political, because it was a way to control both the Land and the
Indians; and religious, because it allowed the evangelization of the Indians
(Zavala, 1973: 47). Until 1529 there was a tendency in favor of encomiendas
,
but
the decrease in the number of Indians in the region led the Crown to try to find
new ways of exploitation. After the first debates in Spain, and with the opinion
of some jurists of the Crown, Spain legislated that the Indians would not be under
the encomendero dominion. The abuses of the encomenderos led to the debates
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about the nature of the Indians. The debate put into question all the traditional
explanations about the Conquest and about the legitimacy of the presence of the
Spaniards and their right to have commerce and slaves in the Americas. The
debate had antecedents in the documents of the Pope declaring the Indians to be
free (1537), and in the discussions about the just war by Francisco de Vitoria.
Bartolome de las Casas had arrived to Spain in 1539 and a new Junta was
convened in Valladolid in 1542 in order to discuss once and for all the status of
the Indians. Las Casas presented to this Junta a document entitled Remedios,
wherein he claimed that the Indians were free and that they could not be subject
of encomiendas.
Las Casas argued his cases based on twenty arguments. Those arguments
focused on the tension between the material gain of the encomienda
,
the task of
the faith, and the protection of the Indians. Those arguments can be summarized
in the following way (Zavala, 1973: 75):
1. The reason of the Conquest was the conversion of the Indians, and
because of it, the Kingdom was no authorized to delegate this task to
private persons.
2. The encomenderos were more interested in material gains, than in
converting the Indians' souls.
3. Because of the encomienda, according to Las Casas, more than 12
million people had died.
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4. Indians were free, and they did not lose this freedom by becoming
subjects of the Spanish King. Las Casas took into account, as a
precedent, the Laws of Burgos and the decision of the Junta of Burgos
in 1523.
5. Given that the encomenderos acted as tyrants, there was no legitimacy in
their control of the Indians.
6. The encomiendas were killing the Indians, and this caused prejudice to
the Spanish Crown and it might affect the Spaniards obedience to the
King. By eliminating the institution, the king is saving not only the
Indians but also he is preventing bloody money from coming to Spain
and causing consciousness problems in Spain.
In 1542 there was a favorable opinion for Las Casas' arguments. In 1542
the Court moved to Barcelona, where it held some more meetings to discuss the
matter and finally the Crown passed new legislation to regulate the situation of
the Indians, treating them as free people. As a result of the New Laws oflndias,
the institution of the encomienda was reformed. From that time on, the
encomendero was not able to pass his right to his heirs. But given the protests in
the Americas against the new laws, on October 20 th 1545 the Crown re-
established the rights of the encomenderos and therefore the right could be passed
for two more lives.
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The Debate on the Nature of the Indian
In the debate about the nature of the Indian, Juan Gines de Sepulveda,
humanist and confessor of the emperor, presented two texts: Democrates II and
Apologia. The former was only published until 1892, because its publication was
prohibited and it was one of the reasons why the Junta was convened. For the
facts of the situation Sepulveda relied on Fernandez Oviedo's Historia General,
whereas Las Casas relied on his first hand knowledge of the situation of the
Indians in the Americas (Losada, 1971: 280). The process to the Conquest of the
Americas had as its antecedents the speech given by Montesinos in 1511, where
he denounced the system of the encomiendas, the enslavement of the Indians, and
the decrease in the population of the Spanish colonies. After the failure to
control the encomenderos, Vitoria wrote his relecciones where he justified the
domination of the Indians, although the ambiguity of his book gave some people,
like Las Casas, reasons to believe that Vitoria was against the violent conquest of
the Americas (Perena, 1992: 10).
In 1550, in the Junta de Valladolid, Bartolome de Las Casas and Juan
Gines de Sepulveda debated about the nature of the Indians and, therefore, about
the legitimacy of domination over them. The debate began with the publication
of Sepulveda's book entitled Democrates Secundus, written about 1542 and that
Las Casas could know only in 1547. Sepulveda argued that one of the reasons for
the inferiority of the Indians was their geographical position, but he also argued
about the need to elevate these peoples to the condition of human beings up to a
point where their conditions allow it (Zavala, 1977: 60). Las Casas responded to
Gines de Sepulveda in his book Apologia, which followed the same structure of
Sepulveda's book. On April 16 th 1550, the King of Spain suspended the
Conquest until a Junta of theologians and jurists discussed about the legitimacy
of the Conquest and the best way to govern the Americas (Fernandez, 1994: 225).
The two positions under debate were the following:
1. To Sepulveda, the incorporation of the Indians should be done by force,
through the direct subjection of the Indians and by the Spaniards,
regardless of their status, given their natural superiority.
2. To Las Casas, colonization should be peaceful and with the free will of the
Indians and under the direct control of the friars, because they would take
care of the well being of the Indians (Losada, 1971).
The debate focused on two aspects that were central in the work of both
authors:
1. The question of the just war: To Sepulveda the war was justified
because of the natural inferiority of the Indians.
114
2. The four arguments that Sepulveda gave abut the justice of the cause to
wage war:
i. The natural inferiority of the Indians
ii. To stop cannibalism
iii. Some of the rituals of the Indians are against Christian
civilization and therefore there is legitimacy in conquering
them in order to defend the victims of those rituals.
iv. The Conquests is a good instrument to spread Christianism
and Christian civilization.
Despite the importance of the debate, it is necessary to take into account
that there was no final resolution, although some people think that the jurists
sided with Sepulveda and the theologians with Las Casas. But Las Casas
returned to Mexico as a winner in his community, whereas Sepulveda received
praise from the cabildo of Mexico City, in spite of being unable to publish in Spain
his work on the legitimacy of the Conquest, because it was thought to hold a
dangerous doctrine.
Although Las Casas saw Indians as men with a soul, against Gines de
Sepulveda who saw them as lacking soul and therefore as being by nature
subjugated, the two of them were trying to find justifications for the Spanish
presence in the Americas. What is coincident in both of them is their
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consideration of Indians as inferior and Spaniards as superior. Given the
superiority of Spain, their cultural products like religion and domination should
and had to be accepted by the indigenous peoples.
The process of the conquest meant for the Indigenous peoples of America
and for the Africans a transformation in their identities and their juridical status.
For the Indians, the conquest meant their incorporation in the world-system as
slaves and later on as serfs. They were included in the Christian community as
members who were in need of education, protection, and control. They were
normalized in order to make them Christians and western. At the same time,
their incorporation into the Christian community was not a complete one,
because they were considered as children who needed protection and assistance
of the white man. It is the white man who had the privilege of being part of the
Christian community as a subject with all his rights and the possibility of earning
wages. For the Africans the process was different but led to the same result, that
is, the dialectic of inclusion/ exclusion. They were brought to America as slaves,
that is, there were no neeci of extensive justification of their status, even if they
were christened, they could not be free, because they had never been. Flowever
they were included in the Christian community as objects and as Christian, not
as persons. But that inclusion by itself meant the exclusion from the white
Christian community, they did not have a right to be part of the community or to
become active members of that community.
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The Dispute and the Legal Production of an Indian Subjectivity
As a result of the dispute, in 1556 the Crown passed the official
prohibition of the war of conquest, setting the beginning of colonial government
and the humanization and pacification of the Indians and their territories. The
Crown returned some properties and titles to the Indians, a process of education
in their rights and an attempt to insert the Indians in Spanish society, what an
author calls a real politics of human rights (Perena, 1992). In the period that goes
from 1542 to 1573 there were different attempts to change the legislation that
regulated the colonies. In 1542 Carlos V passed a document that contained the
rights of the Indians regarding Spaniards and with respect to their lands in the
Americas. In this document Carlos V recognized the freedom and equality of the
Indians and their right to have the laws of Spain and the protection as subjects of
the King. In this Chart, they have the right to a salary and to have access to
education to become Christian. In this document there is a provision that rules
that the Indians should live together and for that purpose towns should be
created (Penera, 1992: 175). Later on, they were subject to a politics of control of
their bodies and souls, educated in Spanish, subjected to the Catholic faith, and
now under the direct control of the King of Spain, with the help of what is
known as the New Church (Penera, 1992: 233; Castro Gomez, 2005a).
The critiques made by Las Casas were part of what is known in the
Spanish revisionist history as the Black Legend (Garcia Carcel, 1992; Hanke,
1964). But what is interesting about this whole process is not only the fact that
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there was a bloody conquest, but also the use of the law and juridical arguments
to justify what the Spaniards were doing in the Americas. The 1550 debate is a
good proof of the division of opinions amongst the conquerors. The Crown from
the very beginning appealed to juridical titles, like the Bulas, in order to justify
their presence in the Americas. They passed many laws to regulate the status of
the Indians. At first sight the whole debate gives us the impression that we are
dealing with a discussion about the protection of the Indians. But if we follow
that path it is completely incomprehensible that the situation of the Indians did
not change in a significant manner, on the contrary, more regimes of government
were imposed upon them. As Jose Ingenieros wrote at the beginning of the 20 th
century, the conquest abounded in friars and catechisms, but it lacked morality
(Hanke, 1988: 17). The fact that there was so much legislation and very little
compliance it is expressed in the old motto "we obey but we do not comply".
However, a more deep analysis show that what was at stake was something
more important than the protection of the Indians: the justification of royal power
above the encomenderos and above all sort of local rulers; and the constitution of
the indigenous peoples as western subjects and in that way as subject of
governing techniques, that did not need force to keep the territory in peace and
under Spanish rule.
The dispute between Las Casas and Gines de Sepulveda brought about
changes in the legislation, especially regarding the nature of the encomiendas and
the best way to regulate these lands. The testaments of the Indians is a good
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source to see if they were successful in incorporating the Indian to the western
world and the important role law played in constituting the Indian as a subject of
law. As Pablo Rodriguez writes, Indians adopted testaments as a way to
integrate themselves in the Spanish culture but at the same time as a way to
defend themselves against the pressures that were exercised against them
(Rodriguez, 2002: 15). Those Indians that used the testament were the most
Hispanicized, and in a way they are not representative of the real meaning of the
colonization of the Americas. But, on the other hand, they also express the
effects of colonization and the strategies Spaniards used to materially and
spiritually colonize the indigenous world. The testament shows the first Indians
that were Occidentalized and how they were integrated into the system, and
their acceptance of some western institutions (Rodriguez, 2002: 17). The fact that
in the testament there was not necessarily a disposition of goods is an evidence
that they main purpose was not economic but symbolic, that is, to show their
incorporation and to incorporate their heirs.
Pablo Rodriguez has collected 100 testaments drafted in Santafe de
Bogota, between 1567 and 1668. The testaments were part of the process of
integration in colonial society and a defense mechanism against the pressure
they were receiving from the conquerors. In the testament the Indian no only
leaves his or her property, whenever there is one, but they also make a
declaration of faith. They show to the people that they and their heirs are part of
the Christian community, they belong to civilization and they expect to be
treated as such:
In Dei nominee amen, sepan cuantos esta carta de testamento vieren como
yo, Juan Navarro, indio cristiano y casacio, natural de la ciudad de Tunja,
estando enfermo del cuerpo y sano de la voluntad y en mi buen juicio y
entendimiento natural que Nuestro Senor Dios fue servido de me dar,
creyendo como creo en la Santisima Trinidad, Padre E hijo y Espiritu
Santo, tres personas y un solo Dios verdadero y en todo lo que tiene y cree
la Santa Madre Iglesia de Roma, temiendo me de la rnuerte ques cosa
natural por salud y salvacion de mi alma y descargo de mi conciencia
hago y ordeno mi testamento y ultima voluntad en la manera
siguiente... (Testamento de Juan Navarro, indio de Tunja (In Rodriguez
2002 : 25 ).
In this testament, Juan Navarro defines himself as an Indian and as a
Christian. He is one of the first Occidentalized Indians. Those who leave a
testament are witnesses of the success of the colonial policies, because they used
the Spanish institutions to be part of the community. But the fact that most of
them were poor and that they did not even know how to write is also evidence of
the lack of real integration. They existed only as the scribe presented them; they
existed as the law imagined them. We know that the Indian Juan Navarro did
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not write the testament, and that perhaps he did not want to leave any property,
because he was not used to do so. But the scribe writes the testament with the
language of the law, the Indian Juan Navarro becomes by such an act a subject of
the king and a legal subject: he becomes a testor.
The structure of the testament was the following: first, the testor made a
declaration of his identity: he or she was an Indian and a Christian. That is, his
identity needed the idea of being part of the occidental community to exist in the
testament; second, she or he worried about her/his soul, and therefore left it to
God in order to find salvation in the after life; third, she or he disposed all the
necessary about their properties. In some cases the testor made sure that their
sons and daughters had a house or a parcel to live, which shows the importance
of housing in a time where indigenous peoples were deprived of their lands. In
most of the testaments, the person was only identified by his Christian name and
by they place they came from: Juana, India de Santafe; Ines, India de Tunja; Juan,
Indio de Engativa; and so on so forth.
The testament is a document of singular importance because it shows the
real effects of laws and combines in one document the material and the spiritual
world. The testaments of the Indians have the same structure and present the
same elements. It is not important how many properties they are leaving to their
heirs, some of them, as I mentioned earlier, do not have any property to leave.
But they show us how the legal structure of the world, brought by the Spaniards,
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is functioning perfectly, up to a point that the Indians wanted to leave their will,
showing their assimilation to the Spanish world.
Conclusion
The colonial encounter was characterized by the use of different symbolic
artifacts to incorporate the Americas into the European imaginary. Legal
artifacts were important in the constitution of this imaginary. From the
construction of the city, to the reorganization of indigenous lands, to the dispute
about the nature of the Indian, we see different strategies that were used to
convert the Indians in occidental subjects, that is, in subjects of the King of Spain,
laborers in the encomiendas, members of the Christian community, and subjects of
law. Indigenous imaginary and indigenous institutions were erased and only
some of them, that were functional to Spanish power, remained.
The dispute about the nature of the Indian determined the final fate of
indigenous peoples in the Americas. Both, Bartolome de las Casas and Juan
Gines de Sepulveda, saw the Indian from different point of views, but neither
established an intercultural dialogue with the indigenous peoples. In the debate,
the indigenous voice was silenced, they were spoken for, and indigenous
worldviews fell simply into oblivion. The testaments marked the new
subjectivity that was produced in the Americas. In the text we do not see the
Indian speaking, what we see is the testor leaving his or her will, that is, what we
see is the Indian constituted as a subject of law. This process did not end with
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19 th century Colombian independence. Despite the fact of the indigenous
participation in the wars of independence, and the rhetoric of freedom and
equality, the colonial logic of domination persisted during the Republic. Chapter
3 will show how the legal coloniality of power persisted during the Republic.
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CHAPTER 3
THE LEGAL CONSTITUTION OF THE COLOMBIAN NATION: THE
DIALECTIC OF INCLUSION/EXCLUSION
Introduction
This chapter addresses post-independence legal coloniality of power and
the process of construction of the imaginary of the nation in the law. I will focus
mainly on constitutional discourse and on some legal strategies that were taken
just months after the independence from Spain, showing that criollos' main goal
was political autonomy from Spain but not political and social independence for
all the subjects in Colombia. Indigenous peoples, women, and people of African
descent remained subjects of social and political domination that did not differ
from colonial power and that are part of the legal coloniality of power. 1 will
analyze the historical trajectory of the Colombian nation in order to show its
homogenizing character; then I will show the discourse of Independence, to
focus, in the third section, on some legal artifacts that show the elite's imaginary
of the nation.
The nation-state has become the predominant form of political grouping
in the capitalist/ colonial/ modern world-system. Political grouping around the
idea of the nation-state became the dominant form of political organization but at
the same time the form that some groups gave to their cultural and historical
similarities. It emerged during the 19 th century as the way to homogenize
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groups, that is, the way to stress their similarities and obliterate their differences.
Public policies emphasized the need of new groups to assimilate to the nation
and forget their old differences. This homogenizing intention is part of the
process of colonization and of the coloniality of power (Quijano, 2000). It is
important to stress that this homogenization is a strategy of power, that is, the
way elites wanted to perceive their political grouping, and, as such, it does not
necessarily mean that their strategy was successful (Quijada, 2000).
These strategies are not privative of Colombia, for they belong to the
pattern of colonial power that is predominant in 19th century independent Latin
America. In these nations we find violence against indigenous peoples side by
side with public debates about their protection and their preservation as the
"original Americans"; we also find public policies that seek the liberalization of
the Indian, that is, laws and legal artifacts that treat them as liberal subjects and
as individuals with free will and with private property that can and should
behave as if they were equal subjects in the market. Based on this idea of the
Indian and of people of African descent, the elites constructed their imaginary of
the nation, one that was white, middle class, heterosexual, male, and propertied.
Homogeneyity and the Nation
The nation-state and the idea of citizenship are closely related.
Citizenship is an old idea that has changed according to historical circumstances.
We can distinguish two ideas of citizenship: one that comes from Greece,
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exclusive and based on the idea of some people being included and some others
excluded; and another idea of citizenship, constituted in modernity, based on
race or on geographical origins. For more than two centuries the concept of
citizenship was unimportant in western political theory, which was more
focused on constitutionalism, on the relations between subjects and kings, and on
administrative efficiency. However, it is important to take into account the
debate about the Indian in Spanish America and the debates that, as I showed it
earlier, discussed the idea of citizenship for the Indians and their inclusion in the
polity (Riesenberg, 1992). Rousseau and Diderot recovered the Greek iciea of
citizenship and put it under new light. They, nevertheless, saw the idea of
citizenship as political membership to a territorially limited polis, that is, a
territory that did not have the extension of the nation-state or the cultural
differences of the Americas. The idea of sovereignty moved from the king to the
people, and therefore virtu was not the central quality of the citizen, but
rationality and responsibility (Neidleman, 2001). The second idea of citizenship,
that became the mainstream concept during second modernity, constituted a
system of privilege and therefore of selection and exclusion (Quijada, 2000).
Citizenship selects some people above others. This brings the question of
homogeneity to light, as the barrier that makes us citizens and that differentiates
us from "them". Then the question becomes one of definition of the other,
understood as the excluded, and it imposes to the elites the need to justify that
exclusion based on race, geography, merits and so on so forth. However, the
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problem in the Latin American republics is how to justify the exclusion of those
who geographically and historically should be part of the nation. The idea of the
coloniality of power is important to understand the strategies of
inclusion/ exclusion of Indigenous peoples and people of African descent in the
Latin American nation.
The idea of the nation is the modern way of selection of citizens, that is, of
those who are included, and therefore, those who could enjoy protection and
who could claim to be protected by and from the state. Initially the political
grouping was based on faith, that is, on belonging to Christianity. But soon it
began to stress the idea of race, the new construct of modernity, and the modern
way of selecting people and excluding the other (Balibar, 1991). We can find that
idea in the Federalist papers, where we see the following statement:
Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country, to one
united people, a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the
same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same
principles of government, very similar in their manner and customs (...)
This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and
it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so
proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other bv the
strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous and
alien sovereignties (As in Quijada, 2000: 19).
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In this way, the coloniality of power constituted the nation as a racially
imagined community, that is, as a community that was imagined in terms of
racial homogeneity, including only those who belonged to the same race and
gender and sexual orientation, and excluding the rest as non citizens, people who
did not qualify to be part of the nation and therefore as people who did not
deserve protection from and by the state (Barcellona, 1991). The movement of
homogenization created some sort of equality but at the same time it constituted
inequality, because it linked racial and ethnic differences to social class and to
geographical differences (Munera, 1998; Munera, 2005). Indigenous peoples did
take part in elections, and it seemed that the polity was inclusive and egalitarian
(Posada, 1996). But the numbers in political participation should not lead to
confusion, because in the same way that Indigenous peoples had the right to
leave their own testament as part of the strategy to make them occidentals, in
that same way the newly independent bourgeoisie had the intention of make
them "citizens" via political participation, but a class of citizens that participated
in elections but that did not participate in the benefits of citizenship (Quijada,
2000: 34).
The Nation as the Political Grouping of Equals
In the second half of the 19 th century Lord Acton identified three ideas
that subverted three central principles of modern Europe: Egalitarianism which
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subverted the principle of aristocracy, communism subverting the principle of
property, and nationalism subverting the principle of legitimacy. At the same
time, those ideas mirrored the way social sciences were shaped at the end of the
19 th century. The principle of aristocracy was related to the social field, property
to the economic one, and legitimacy to the political one (Wallerstein, 1996). What
is important for the purposes of this chapter is the fact that those subversive
ideas were modern ones, that is, they were developed during modernity and are
said to have configured the world in which we live nowadays (Anderson, 2000).
They were the result of Revolutions, of which just one completely changed the
face of the world: the French Revolution and its idea of egalitarianism did not go
beyond a formal idea that did not have real application; the communist
revolution, which could be understood as a way of correcting the flaws of the
French one, did not last more than 70 years and did not bring the elimination of
private property, not even in the Soviet camp. 20 Of these Revolutions the only
one that appears to transform the face of the world was the nationalist
Revolution. The world in which we live today is understood along the lines of
nation and nationalism.
Despite this agreement on the modern character of nationalism, there has
been discussion about the relationship between nationalism and the nation. To
some scholars, the nation is the result of the religious struggles in the process of
20 The life of Marxist legal theorist Eugevny Pashukanis is a good example of this failure, a firm
believer that with the elimination of private property the law would disappear did not see the
danger of sustaining the elimination of the commodity form in a state that had to live within a
capitalist world See Spitzer (1983) and Beirne & Sharlet (1980).
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state building in Europe (Marx, 2003). From this point of view, the nation has a
primordialist character and the struggle is about how an already constituted
nation achieves statehood. This perspective is best summarized in the works of
John Stuart Mill, who thought that every nation should live in the territory of one
single state in order to avoid confrontation. One nation, one state, is the idea
behind the modern configuration of the state (Mill, 1982; Mill, 1985; Acton, 1906;
Acton, 1907). To others, based on Benedict Anderson's seminal work, the nation
cannot be understood without nationalism, that is, there are not primordial
communities fighting for statehood. From this perspective, the nation is a
community that is imagined in the nationalist struggles. As Anderson puts it,
the nation is "an imagined political community- and imagined as both inherently
limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 2003: 6).
To this kind of analysis, the nation is a modern concept, and specifically a
European modern one. In his analysis of the nation as an imagined community,
Benedict Anderson denounces the conception of nationhood and nationalism as
European ideas that were spread around the world. To him, this is
Eurocentrism, because in other parts of the world, like in the Latin American
case, we find struggles for nation and nationalism that are not related to
European nationalism. Anderson is right in considering that these approaches
are too centered on European history, assuming that the modern character of the
nation can be explained only from European history without taking into
consideration the existence of America and the relationship between Europe and
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its colonies. From this perspective the otherness of Europe, which was the base
of European nationalism, had to be found within Europe and at most in the
Orient.21 Anderson recognizes that there were other political groupings in Latin
America that existed before 19 th century European nationalism. However, he
applies European concepts to the configuration of the nation in Latin America,
without taking into account the coloniality of power existing before and after the
construction of the nation. To him, the nation that was developed in Latin
America is an imagined community that was all-inclusive, serving as a model for
the rest of the world. To summarize, Anderson's analysis of the nation is not
less Eurocentric than others analyses of nationalism that he calls as such, mainly
because he wants to see in the history of Latin American nations an all inclusive
form of political grouping, without taking into account the presence of groups
with very different historical trajectories. 22
What is missing in his analysis of the nation and nationalism is an
alternative understanding of modernity that we do find in Dussel's and
Quijano's work. To the former, modernity cannot be understood without taking
into account the fact of the discovery of America (Dussel, 1992; Dussel, 1998;
Dussel, 1996). To the latter the question of the coloniality of power has to be
taken into account to be able to understand nationalism. To Quijano, "State
21 1 use the word Orient to convey the idea expressed by Edward Said. See Said (1994).
22
I use Carl Schmitt's idea of a political grouping. That is, one based on the dichotomy between
friend and enemy, that he sees as the foundation of the political (Schmitt, 1996). However, I add
the dialectic of inclusion/exclusion that is based on the analysis of capitalism and feudalism in
Latin America made by Ruy Mauro Marini and Rodolfo Stavenhagen. See, Stavenhagen (1980).
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formations in Europe and the Americas are linked and distinguished by
coloniality of power" (Quijano, 2000).
The history of Colombian struggle for independence supports Dussel's
and Quijano's critique of the Eurocentric character of traditional interpretations
of the nation and nationalism in Latin America. Colombian struggles for
independence initially are not struggles for nationhood but a struggle for
equality within the Spanish nation. That is, we cannot understand Latin
American nation building process without the relationships between the
Spaniards in Spain and the Spaniards in America. This process became later on a
process for nationhood, but the nation that was proposed was too inclusive on
the one hand, because it referred to a mythical Nuestra America, and too exclusive
on the other, because it excluded Indians and blacks from the new nation. 23 This
process of inclusion/ exclusion has to be understood along the lines of racial
definitions and racial hierarchies.
By showing Colombian fights for independence in 19th century, I want to
show that the nation, as an imagined community of equals, had not place in the
discourse of the leaders of these movements. David Bushnell has written that
this was a process for nation-statehood but not for cultural nationhood.
However it is more adequate to say that it was a process for the construction of
an inclusive/ exclusive nation, in which the relations of the colony were
replicated in the new Republic (Bushnell, 1993).
23 This Nuestra America from Jose Marti s idea of an inclusive and anti-imperialist Nuestra America.
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To understand this process we need to determine the purpose of the
fighters for independence. Contrary to Anderson's account of the Latin
American case, I argue that indigenous peoples and people from African descent
were included/ excluded from the nation. Without the exclusion that was at the
base of the coloniality of power existing in Colombia, it is impossible to
understand the configuration of the Colombian nation (Quijano, 2000). The
grouping of Afro descendants and Indigenous peoples can be understood from a
different point of view, by asking the same question that Chattterjee asks for the
Indian case: whose imagined community are we talking about when we say that
there is a Colombian imagined community that we call the Colombian nation?
(Chatterjee, 2000).
The Nation as an Imagined Community
As I mentioned earlier, there were three ideas that were putting into
question the status quo in Europe. One of them was nationalism. According to
Ernest Gellner, even though nationalism was the product of industrialization,
there were some instances in which the nation would wake up and claim its
statehood. In Gellner we see the nation as a typical European concept that has
spread around the world in the same way that modernity has done it.
To Miroslav Hroch the nation is the product of a long and complicated
process of historical development in Europe. The process lived in Europe allows
him to identify three elements that are central to understand the process of
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nation building. They are: "1) A memory of some common past, treated as a
'destiny' of the group -or at least of its core constituents; 2) a density of linguistic
or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication within the
group than beyond it; 3) a conception of the equality of all members of the group
organized as civil society" (Hroch, 2000).
By analyzing the process lived in Europe, Hroch determines different
stages in which the process of nation building can be made. All the elements that
Hroch identifies about the nation are elements that belong to the historical
process of nation building in Europe. Hroch assumes the national when he
writes that nationalism is a form of national consciousness. However in this
analysis he just takes into account processes not only internal to Europe but also
internal to the national formation. In this way, when he explains the process of
construction of the nation in the Czech Republic he does not take into account
the position of this country in the world-system and assumes that there is
already a national formation wherein the national consciousness arises. This is
evident when he holds that successful national movements come from events
such as crisis of legitimacy, vertical social mobility, high levels of social
communication, and nationally relevant conflicts of interest.
Despite the different appreciation of the national movement and
nationalism, we find in Gellner a similar Eurocentric conception of the nation.
To Gellner the nation is not a political unit but a cultural one that is in search of
political form. The combination between sovereignty and culture is the Nation-
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State. To Gellner this combination is a modern product and it is specifically the
result of industrialization where the culture of the elites became the culture of an
entire society. What is characteristic of this process is that this kind of society
requires a process of homogenization of culture, that is, a process whereby the
high culture incorporates all the members of society. However, what Gellner
does not mention is that this process needs to be made through the oppression or
suppression of people's cultures, that is, through the use of hermeneutical
violence. This is a process in which, according to Gellner, all the cultures are in
competition and at the end one of them wins the allegiance of the masses.
Gellner writes, "The state-cultures live in competition with each other. So this is
the end product: a mobile, atomized, egalitarian society with a standard culture,
where the culture is a literate, 'high' one, and where its dissemination,
maintenance and boundaries are protected by a state. Stated even more briefly:
one culture, one state. One state, one culture" (Gellner, 2000: 111).
Although Gellner recognizes the constructed character of the nation, the
process that he explains is based on the European experience, where some
groups were fighting for the protection of the state. However, in the Latin
American case what he shows as competition -and this seems not even to be the
case in Europe- is just a process of exclusion of groups from the polity, in order
to not allow them to enjoy citizenship rights and therefore the protection of the
state. But this process involves also a process by which these groups were
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constituted as subjects and as workers in order to facilitate their capitalist
exploitation as living labor.
Hroch and Gellner explain the nation in different terms. However what
identifies them is the fact that their conception of the nation does not take into
account their European character and the different configuration that it had
when it was applied in other places of the world. This conception can be
considered Eurocentric because these authors just do not take into account other
experiences and the particular processes that were developed in other parts of
the world and because they do not take into account the process by which the
nation, as an European product, became the model to adopt in these nations . 24
As Ubbong E. Effeh's book, "Through the Human Rights Prism: Globalization
and Africa's Economic (Under) Development Revisited" shows, the nation
becomes a model that enables the elites to continue colonial domination (Effeh,
2008 ).
One question that arises from the discussion about the nation and
nationalism is that one about the nature of the nation. From a primordialist point
of view the nation would be a preexistent community of people with similar
24 Norbu explains the Eurocentric character of the studies on nationalism. He writes that: "ever
since then -that is Renan's work- the term nationalism came to be equated with the modern
political doctrine of popular sovereignty, and any nationalism that does not have this
pronounced democratic bias is called 'culturalism' or 'traditionalism', as is often described in the
case of early Chinese, Indian or Arab nationalism" (Norbu, 1991: 7). Although I agree that there
are other forms of political grouping in the so-called Third World, I think that by terming them
nationalist means to accept the terms of political grouping in European political thought.
However, in this chapter I want to show that nationalism and the nation as a community of
equals was not constructed in terms of equality but rather of exclusion. The fact that we call it
nationalism is to show that even European nationalism is based on this exclusion, because, as a
European concept, it is based on the coloniality of power.
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history and ethnic backgrounds.25 This ethnic or religious community exists
previously and independently from the state and it is fighting for state
protection. However, as Benedict Anderson has shown, it is impossible to talk
about the nation without talking about nationalism. As an imagined community,
the nation is the product of discourses and practices that created it in the process
of fighting for it. Nations appear to replace old communities that constituted the
main grouping before the appearance of the nation-state. This new community is
imagined as equal and as a promise, but due to the formal character of this
community its promises remained unfulfilled (Barcellona, 1991). To Anderson,
the Nation, appeared as aligning with the large cultural systems that preceded it,
like religious communities and the dynastic realm. It is this "ancient" character
of the nation, with a sort of nostalgia of the present, what made it become the
main grouping in modernity and one of the reasons why Benedict Anderson
could say that people would die in modern times for the nation in the same way
that they had died for their religious community (Anderson, 2003). The main
drive that made possible that people living in different parts of a territory could
identify themselves as part of one nation was print capitalism, that is, the print
word that made possible the imposition of high culture to the masses, and the
possibility of the masses to have their own cultural production, due to the
existence of a vernacular. Anderson puts it in the following way: "Why this
25 This is what Quijada, following Grillo, calls the ethnicization of the polity. But this is not other
than the recognition that the nation as a political grouping selects groups of people based on
class, race, gender, etc. This sort of analysis is unable to explain the so-called European
superiority and it assumes it as a given (Quijada, 2000).
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transformation should be so important for the birth of the imagined community
of the nation can best be seen if we consider the basic structure of two forms of
imagining which first flowered in Europe in the eighteenth century: the novel
and the newspaper. For these forms provided the technical means for re-
presenting the kind of imagined community that is the nation" (Anderson, 2003:
25). Anderson finds Latin American authors writing for a community that is
being imagined in the novels or the newspapers as a homogenous community, as
people who shared at least the idea of being imagined
Benedict Anderson criticizes the Eurocentric character of most analysis of
nationalism. He shows that these analyses consider nationalism as a European
invention. To him, nationalism and its imagination of communities appear for
the first time in the new world and it is in no way related to the processes
existing in Europe at the time. He finds that creoles in Latin America could be
considered pioneers of this new form of imagination. The process that was
developed in Latin America, according to Anderson, was different from the one
lived in Europe, because there was no different language that made possible the
distinction between communities, and yet, to him, the movement of
independence was a national independence movement. According to him,
Simon Bolivar and Jose de San Martin considered slaves and indigenous peoples
as part of the polity that was being imagined in the process of independence.
Anderson cites as support of his argument the declaration made by San Martin in
1821, in which he said, "in the future the aborigines shall not be called Indians or
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natives; they are children and citizens of Peru and they shall be known as
Peruvians" (Anderson, 2003: 50). What is striking to Anderson is the fact that
these places did not share any of the features of European nationalism and yet
they were national movements. One way to explain it is by appealing to the
relations between Spain and the colonies; another one, the one preferred by
Anderson, is the administrative separation of the colonies that made possible its
future existence and independent political units. The fact that creoles were
Spaniards born in America, who were not truly Spaniard or truly Americans,
would explain that they identified themselves with the political unit that was
created by Spain.
Even though Anderson believes that Creole nationalism created a
community of equals in which slaves and indigenous peoples were included, the
history of Latin America proves otherwise. The Colombian case shows that the
process of inclusion/ exclusion made impossible to think of the nation as a
homogenous imagined community of equals. Anderson's explanations about the
central character of political units are not supported by the facts from the
movement of independence, because those units did not fight for independence
as political units but as America. Anderson does not take into account that
Venezuela, Nueva Granada, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia were the result of the
process of independence and the fights against centralization in Caracas -due to
Bolivar place of Birth- and not the cause of independence. The fact that Bolivar
and San Martin met in Peru to discuss the future of the process of independence
139
of the colonies in America remains unnoticed to Anderson. He does not take into
account that the process of independence was a white process, and it was this
whiteness that is stressed in the documents creating public policies in the 19 th
century. For instance, some few years after the end of the Colombian wars of
independence (the definite war being in 1819), the independent government had
to take measures to organize the Nation. In several decrees passed by Francisco
de Paula Santander, the government decided to organize the nation according to
their own view. A law passed on June 7th/ 1825 legislated about the region of
Choco, where indigenous peoples and slaves lived, and it decided to give lands
from Choco to people from England, because in Santander's opinion the only
way to achieve progress was by changing the racial configuration of the nation.
Based on the law, the government signed several agreements with English
merchants. In one of them, we can read:
Art. lo. El Supremo poder ejecutivo de Colombia usando de las
facultades que tiene por la citada ley de siete de junio ultimo (1825)
concede a los senores Herring, Graham y Powles negociantes de Londres
docientas mil fanegadas de tierras baldias con el destino de que las
pueblen de extranjeros europeos (Segunda Contrata de tierras baldias
para poblarlas con extranjeros. Gaceta de Colombia No. 190. June 5th
1825).
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In another law the government established the following:
Que es un deber de la nacion, protejer cuanto sea posible la inmigracion y
establecimiento de estranjeros utiles y laboriosos en el territorio de
Colombia, los cuales al mismo tiempo que hagan su propia fortuna,
aumenten la poblacion, la agricultura y el comercio de su patria adoptiva
(Ley del 3 de abril de 1826. Gaceta de Colombia No. 249. April 23rd 1826).
But this discourse was not new and was not going to end after
independence. On the contrary, the view of the nation as white -or what they
defined as white- is very present in the history of the constitution of the
Colombian nation (Munera, 2005). Those groups making up the nation would
need to identify against another group or there should be a sort of primordialist
identification, if Anderson's argument has any weight for the Colombian case.
Given that creoles were not communities born in the New World, they could not
share a primordial character that made them an ethnic group in search of a
nation-state. 26 Anderson is then right in saying that this was not a primordial
community. But what kind of imagined community was this? To say that they
were creoles that thought of themselves as non-Spaniard and non-Americans is
26 As I showed in chapter 2, the King of Spain was unwilling to grant perpetual encomiendas
because he feared that people born in the Americas were going to lose their links to Spain and
create links with the new world. At the time, the King was thinking in terms of America as a unit,
and the same was true for the creoles at the moment of independence, because they thought of
themselves as Spaniards in exile, but Spaniards nevertheless, and later on, as a sort of strategic
essentialism, as Americans.
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to say that they knew what to be Spaniard and American meant. That is, they
seemed to be first national Spaniards and after that national Americans.
Anderson does not take into account the process of nation building in Spain that
served as a model for the creoles, and he does not take into account that the
model constructed in America was based on the process of inclusion/ exclusion
developed during the colony.
Anderson pays exclusive attention to the experience of creoles that
identified themselves against Spanish policies and who imposed "national"
identity to indigenous peoples and slaves, as if they represented the Peruvian or
New Granadan nation. The fact that Jose de San Martin ciecided that slaves and
indigenous peoples were from that point not Indios or negros but Peruvians
shows the whiteness of the nation, that is, the imposition of an imagined
community based on the coloniality of power and on a dialectic of
inclusion/ exclusion.
Anderson's conception of the imagined community does not take into
account other forms of political groupings, like those existing in India before the
emergence of Nationalism (Chatterjee, 2000; Chatterjee, 1986). Chatterjee shows
that Anderson's conception of nationalism is based on some templates given by
Europe and, in the second edition of his book, by the Americas. However, he
shows that this conception left nothing to be imagined by the colonies. Even
imagination remains colonized in Anderson's account. In his book on Third
World nationalism, Chatterjee shows how the imposition of western concepts to
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non-western practices produces illiberal results. Indian nationalism, due to
western imposition, instead of liberating people became another way of
legitimizing the power of the elites. Based on the analysis of two kinds of
nationalism made by Plamenatz, Chatterjee finds that eastern nationalism
appeared amongst peoples whose cultures were transformed or repressed by
colonial rule. Eastern nationalism tides to appropriate western practices but it
cannot imitate it because it cannot completely eliminate the indigenous culture.
As a consequence, eastern nationalism presents a dual rejection: of western
nationalism for being foreign, and of indigenous practices for not being universal
enough. Although Chatterjee does not write in terms of the coloniality of power,
his critique of the division of European and Eastern nationalism shows that it is
the imposition of western models that made eastern nationalism illiberal, that is,
it is western nationalism that is illiberal because it is based on the exclusion of
peoples defined as inferior and in need of protection by the state but not within
the state. In the Colombian case, it is the coloniality of power that was at the
base of the illiberal and exclusive nation that resulted from the wars of
independence. In the following sections I want to show that the nation and
nationalism are European exports that were imposed in the colonies as a new
way of normalization based on the dialectic of inclusion/ exclusion.
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Up with the King and down with the Bad Government: the
Constitution of the "Nation" in 19th Century Colombia
The history of indigenous peoples in Colombia and their relationship with
the white man was marked by violence and by the appropriation of the means of
production of the indigenous peoples in Colombia. The coloniality of power
defined them as inferior and power relations in the new world were based on
that definition (Supra Ch. 2). Once Colombian independence was achieved, the
situation of Indigenous peoples did not change in a substantial way, despite
being formally part of the Colombian polity. With respect to black communities,
their situation of slavery remained the same until the second half of the century,
when they were incorporated to the Colombian polity in the same way as
Indians, but mainly due to economic reasons, because in some regions, like Valle
del Cauca, black people were free long time before, and cheaper and more
effective strategies were developed (Colmenares, 1975; Colmenares, 1991). Since
the beginning of the Republic, the interests of the State were identified with the
interests of rural aristocracy, who were dispossessing them from their lands.
After the Encomienda, Indian lands were regulated under the regime of the
resgnardo, a way in which the colony guaranteed free Indian labor without
depriving them of their freedom and without subjecting them to the control of
the conquistador, whose behavior usually led to disastrous economic results
(Izquierdo, 1978: 13; Gonzalez, 1982).
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Creoles were exposed to the ideas of the Enlightenment and to the fact
that the process in Spain, that led to the Cortes de Cadiz and later on to the 1812
Constitution of Cadiz, did declare formal equality for all subjects, and in that
way it put them in an awkward position with regard to the population of the
Americas. One of the reasons blacks in the north part of Colombia decided to
fight for independence was the fact that they saw that the promises of the Cortes
de Cadiz could be a response to their claims of equality and rights. Pablo Morillo
used the failure of the elites in recognizing these rights as a way to gain support
for his process of re-conquest of these territories (Munera, 2005).
Education was central in the dissemination of ideas. It is important to
notice that members of the movement for independence were educated in
schools that had a respect for science, despite the fact that they were catholic
institutions. People like Francisco Jose de Caldas, Jose Felix Restrepo, Camilo
Torres, Fermln de Vargas, and Antonio Narino, were educated in the Colegio
Mayor del Rosario but later on were under the influence of Jose Celestino Mutis,
an enlightened biologist who created a botanic garden and scientifically analyzed
and classified Colombian plants (Calderon, 2001).
The process of Independence did not begin with the purpose of creating a
Colombian nation. In fact, the process began due to the influence of the
Revolution of slaves in Haiti, the French Revolution and the American
Revolution. The translation of the document entitled "Rights of men", by
Antonio Narino, was a central element in the independence of Colombia.
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However, in the discourse of the libertadores there was not any mention about a
total independence of Colombia from Spain. In Cartagena, in November
11/1809, and Bogota in July 20/1810, the purpose of the movements of creoles
was aimed at changing the bad government and keeping loyalty to the King. If
we define the nation as the place to which a person has loyalty, it seems clear
that the creoles that wanted the transformation of the status quo in 1810 were not
thinking of a new imagined community to which they could swear allegiance.
The movement for independence in Latin America did not bring about radical
transformations in the region. If we want to talk about nationalism in Latin
America, this was not the case for the movement of independence in Colombia,
because the leaders of the movement wanted to be part of Spain. The beginning
of the struggle for independence was a struggle to follow the caudillo, not one to
imagine a community of equals (Campa, 1968: 120). The construction of the
nation in America was the result of processes of construction of the nation in
Spain. In the Constitution of Cadiz 1812, after the revolts in Latin America, the
Spanish government declared the equality of all Spaniards born in Spain or born
in the Americas.27 In a newspaper published in Lima, that did not necessarily
mirror the opinion of the Spaniards in Spain but that it did mirror the opinion of
white creoles, we find that the nation is defined as "the reunion of all Spaniards
from both hemispheres and for that reason this is our common patria" . In the
discourse of creoles there was no attempt, at the beginning of the movement, for
independence or to create a new nation. This is clearly found in one of the first
27 This process was favored by the French occupation in Spain. See Friede, 1972.
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documents in which the Creoles expressed their intention of making the
promises of the French Revolution come true. Camilo Torres in his Memorial de
Agravios (1809) says that "the Americas are not made up from foreigners to the
Spanish Nation." and "Americans are as Spanish as the heirs of don Pelayo"
(Hernandez de Alba, 1965):
Las Americas, Senor, no estan compuestas de extranjeros a la nacion
espanola. Somos hijos, somos descendientes de los que han derramado su
sangre por adquirir estos nuevos dominios a la corona de Espana; de los
que han extendido sus limites, y le han dado en la balanza politica de la
Europa, una representacion que por si sola no podia tener. Los naturales
conquistados y sujetos hoy al dominio espanol, son muy pocos o son
nada, en comparacion de los hijos de europeos, que hoy pueblan estas
ricas posesiones. La continua emigracion de Espana en tres siglos que han
pasado, desde el descubrimiento de la America: la provision de casi todos
sus oficios y empleos en espanoles europeos, que han venido a
establecerse sucesivamente, y que han dejado en ella sus hijos y su
posteridad: las ventajas del comercio y de los ricos dones que aqui ofrece
la naturaleza, han sido otras tantas fuentes perpetuas, y el origen de
nuestra poblacion. Asi, no hay que enganarnos en esta parte. Tan
espanoles somos, como los descendientes de Don Pelayo, y tan acreedores,
por esta razon, a las distinciones, privilegios y prerrogativas del resto de la
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nacion, como los que, salidos de las montanas, expel ieron a los moros, y
poblaron sucesivamente la Peninsula; con esta diferencia, si hay alguna,
que nuestros padres, como se ha dicho, por medio de indecibles trabajos y
fatigas, ciescubrieron, conquistaron y poblaron para Espana este Nuevo
Mundo.
It is evident from these discourses for independence that the movement
ciid not begin as part of a movement for the construction of a new nation, but
rather as part of the construction of the Spanish nation. It is important to notice
that creoles were talking about members of the Spanish nation, that is, Spaniards
born in both sides of the ocean. This means that those who were born in Africa
or were in America before the Spanish presence could no be part of the Hispanic
American nation, they were not Spaniards and therefore they could no be part of
the new Spanish nation (Soler, 1980). The revolutionary movement did not bring
about real independence from Spain and instead it opened Colombia to English
penetration. To Bushnell this fact explain the end of slavery in regions like
Antioquia, in the north part of Colombia, because the incorporation of this region
in the world-system required new capitalist forms of labor and not colonial ones.
Bushnell has written it in the following terms: "When they adopted the free birth
principle, therefore Antioquenos could assume that -along with the growing free
black and pardo (brown) population -enough of the free born offspring of slaves
would be willing to work for pay in the mining industry to meet its labor
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requirements" (Bushnell, 1993: 42). Indigenous peoples, as born in America,
became part of the rhetoric of independence, but this did not mean that they
were part of the nation or that they improved their material or symbolic
situation. Spanish creoles in America used the history of oppression on Indians
as part of their rhetoric against the Spanish Crown; in this case Creoles hijacked
the condition of indigenous peoples as victims of Spanish colonial power (Konig,
1995: 236). In one pamphlet of the independency movement, we see that creoles
transformed their domination and exploitation of Indians in domination and
exploitation of the Spanish Crown against Spaniards in America: "With horror
we take out of our sight the 300 years of oppression, miseries, suffering of all
kinds, that our country accumulated over the ferocity of its conquerors and
Spanish governors, whose history posterity could not read without being
admired of their sufferings" (In Koenig, 1994: 242).
As a result of the unequal commercial relations between the colonies and
Spain, the movement for autonomy became a movement for independence from
Spain. Given the lack of government in Spain, Spaniards in America assumed
the discourse of popular sovereignty as part of the control of these territories not
only against France but also because the sovereign power, that is the King of
Spain, was unable to rule in America. It is at this moment that the bourgeoisie
and the aristocrats decided to declare their independence from Spain. But this
movement is not one of independence of the particular units as such, as
Anderson writes, but a movement of the Americas as a whole. The movement
149
for independence was in that way under the motto of Our America. From
Anderson's point of view, Nuestra America could be understood as the seed for
the nation in the American republics. However, when we see in more detail
which people were part of Nuestra America -in Bolivar's and San Martin's
understanding- we easily see that only white creoles were included in this
community. It is in this moment that Spanish Americans, who useci to see
themselves as Spanish born in the Americas, saw themselves as Hispanic
Americans, that is, Americans with roots in Spain. The patria was in that way
conceived within the broader confines of America, and not within the limits of
the administrative units.
To be sure, the movement of independence is a movement for the
independence of Nuestra America and that consciousness is reflected in the
attempts of Bolivar and San Martin of liberating the entire continent from
Argentina to Mexico. Due to the coloniality of power, established by Spain from
the beginning of colonial power in America, indigenous peoples and blacks were
excluded from Nuestra America. With regard to blacks the claim was based on
their identity as foreigners, that is, as Africans. And with regard to Indigenous
peoples they were excluded as children, as uncivilized. Alba defines the fate of
indigenous peoples in the following way: "the conquest was the work of the
Indians
,
independence was the work of the Spaniards".28 It is worth to mention
that some indigenous groups did not see the process of independence as an
28 This process has been labeled as one of independence without nationalism (Alba, 1968: 19;
Garcia, 1969).
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improvement in their situation, and rather they saw it as something even worse
than Spanish domination. For that reason, in the South of Colombia, in the
region of Narino, some indigenous peoples supported the Spanish Crown and
fought against Bolivar troops (Gonzalez, 1997; Rappaport, 1994).
In the accounts of members of the Expedition Botdnicn, that gave to the
fights for independence many of its members, the project that Spanish priest Jose
Celestino Mutis created to classify the botanic species existing in Colombia, we
find the use of geography to explain the superiority of Europeans and their
progress, and the inferiority and the backwardness of the regions with black
presence. Based on modern science, mixed with his racial prejudices, Francisco
Jose de Caldas, one of the leaders of the movement for independence and killed
in 1816, wrote that climatic conditions determined people's place in the line of
progress. As Cesare Lombroso wrote in his analysis of lower classes in Italy and
as Mary Shelley did with her novel Frankenstein, in Caldas we find a discourse
of degeneration associated to climate (Pick, 1989). Caldas describes people from
Africa as degenerate, ludicrous, and dedicated to trade with women. African
women are described as lascivious and as prostitutes who do their work without
remorse. Wondering about the superiority of Europeans, Caldas "finds out" that
it is due to the cold weather. This kind of weather stimulates hard work,
progress, and reason whereas hot weather, as the one we find in Africa and in
the hot regions of Colombia, encourages men and women to be lecherous and
lazy (Caldas, 1942: 158). However, this view of the climate did not want just to
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express the differences between Europe and the Americas, for in the periphery
creoles set up a core and a periphery too. In the Colombian case, for instance, the
colei lancis of the Andes, like Bogota, were meant to have domain over the whole
country as they expressed better the real spirit and nature of the nation, because
they did not have a kind of weather that encouraged the bad habits of regions
like Choco, in the Pacific, and the Caribbean, in the north part of the country
(Caldas, 1942: 161).
In the discourse of the revolutionaries the word citizen is found as part of
the rhetoric to get the support of the masses (Hernandez de Alba, 1981). But this
evocation of the word citizen appeals to the consciousness of Spaniards in
America as Spanish citizens. As I have mentioned earlier, in the movement for
total independence the question was transformed in a question of citizenship for
Spaniards in Nuestra America. In 1830, Simon Bolivar showed this identity of
citizenship as part of the discourse of the nation in Colombia, but he addressed
his message only to white Creoles, who extended colonial power over blacks and
Indians and who were part of the incorporation of the new republics in the
capitalist world-system.
The dialectic of inclusion/ exclusion of indigenous peoples led to their
incomplete incorporation to the nation building process. The process of
consolidation of the Republic and the Colombian Nation could not be
understood without the process of transformation of indigenous peoples in
individuals. One of the first acts of the patriots after the first movement for
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independence in Colombia was the elimination of the Resguardos because they
violated Indians' individual rights. This process was followed after 19 th century
Colombian independence with the purpose of liberalizing indigenous peoples in
Colombia, that is, in order to make them liberal subjects and commodify their
lands. As a result of Laws of 22 June/ 1848 and law of June 3/848, indigenous
peoples became, as individuals, owners of their lands. Given their situation of
poor peasants they were forced to sell their lands to latifundistas who became
exploiters of indigenous labor. One of the leaders of liberalism in 1850s
Colombia, Salvador Roldan, wrote about the situation in Colombia in the
following terms: "They sold their land immediately to their bosses for prices
ridiculously low. Indians became wage earners with wages of 10 cents a day,
food became scarce, lands for agriculture became lands for cattle and the rests of
the Indian race, owners of these lands before, had to go to warm lands in search
for better salaries, where their situation has not improved" (Salvador Camacho in
Fajardo, 1975:43). This situation remained the same until the Constitution of
1991, when the rights of indigenous peoples were recognized by the
Constitution, but a new attempt to make them liberal subjects under the
discourse of human rights began under the umbrella of the discourse of
universal human rights (Garcia, 1952; Infra, Chapter 5).
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The Legal Constitution of Identities
Law has been central in the constitution of a liberal identity for
Indigenous peoples and for black people. There was continuity between the way
colonial powers and colonial elites perceived Afrodescendants and indigenous
peoples and the way creoles saw them. This perception determined the policies
and the laws that were created in order to control them and to constitute the new
nation. The Republic was organized with the Andes as its core, because of its
climate and the assumed presence of white creoles,29 and the regions in the
Pacific Coast, especially Cauca and Choco, and in the Caribbean Sea remained in
the periphery, due to their backwardness and the presence of Indians and Blacks.
This perception and the need to create a new white and male nation explains
why Francisco de Paula Santander passed a decree wherein he ordered the
“import" of white people from England to change the racial form of the
Colombian nation and to incorporate it in the modern world-system and in that
way in the path to progress.
Constitutions -as legal artifacts- were central documents in the
constitution of the Colombian nation. Their structure and their norms were
meant not for women, slaves or serfs but for free men. Colombian 19 th century
constitutions mirrored the discussion in the public sphere and the debates about
the nature of the subalterns. However, my argument does not lead to say that
29 Alfonso Munera has shown that the presence of Blacks and Indians in Bogota was higher than
traditional historiography wanted to believe. But the imaginary of the creole political grouping
wanted to believe that the majority of the population was white (Munera, 2005).
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there was a unique and monolithic nation. As Alfonso Munera has argued, there
has been a myth in historiography about the nation, where scholars wish to
prove that there was a sole political unit during the Colony and therefore after
independence there was just one project of constitution of the nation. I am aware
that Colombia has been and is a country of regions, but I argue that there is also a
project of the nation that expresses the ideas of the geographical, racial, and class
elites. In the Colombian case, these elites resided in Bogota and they had a
project that imagined the nation in a particular way. In spite of the fact that the
region's elites had their own project, which was not national at all, it is clear that
the law and the national constitutions reflected the hegemonic project of the
Bogotanan elites. My purpose is not show that this project was successful,
Munera and Konig have shown its failure, but the way the Bogotanan elites
imagined the Colombian nation in the law is important because it shows the final
shape of that project. Corruption, smuggling, and a culture of disobedience
show that this project was not successful, but it also shows that there was a
project that condensed the imagination of the Bogotanan elites (Munera, 2005;
Munera,1998; Konig, 1994). 30
In this section I do not want to write a constitutional history of Colombia
but I would rather want to analyze three documents that I consider are important
to show the legal coloniality of power in action. That is, my purpose is not to
30 The debates between the regions and the center of Colombia are used in different ways. In the
current process of negotiation between Alvaro Uribe s administration and the paramilitaries, and
the prosecution of some members of Colombian Congress, there have been voices that claim that
it is all a persecution against the costeno (Caribbean) culture that replicates the divisions of the
nations with its origins in the 19 th century.
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show in detail the legal and constitutional history of Colombia but to show that
in those texts we find the nation that is imagined, and how that imaginary of the
nation persists despite the ideological differences in the three constitutions. But
indigenous peoples managed to obtain some rights thanks to their participation
in the wars in the state of Cauca and they created a new tradition in Law
89/1890, a law that had institutions that were the result of colonization and that
show the hybrid character of the indigenous identity. Indigenous peoples
defended institutions like Resguardos, cabildos, and caciques, which were legally
created to Occidentalize the Indian, because they saw them as indigenous
institutions, showing the strange career of political concepts and of indigenous
resistance.
The Act of Independence and the Invisibility of the Subaltern
Colombian historiography has focused on the myth that before
independence there was a unitary and monolithic Nueva Granada and that after
independence elites just needed to continue the project of unification brought by
the Bourbon reforms. The fact that there were not enough roads that
communicated the regions and the center proves that there could not be a unified
administration and that the government of the colony was not as smooth and
simple as some historians present it. When the so called movement for
independence began the situation in the Colony was extremely diverse: Cities
like Santafe de Bogota wanted to have some autonomy and later independence
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but its elites wanted to have the same symbolic control and importance they had
during the colony. But due to the confrontations that emerged during the
colony, cities like Cartagena de Indias wished to have autonomy from the
viceroy, whose sea was Santafe de Bogota, but without total independence from
Spain. To make the situation even more complex, Santa Marta remained loyal to
Spain, even after 1810, and Mompox decided to have independence from both
Spain and Cartagena de Indias (Munera, 1998). The nation that was imagined
after independence was not a unified nation that represented the ideas of the
elites in the whole country. Indeed, Cartagena, Tunja, and other cities wanted
autonomy and promoted regional struggles that were used by Pablo Morillo to
re-conquer Colombia. However, in Bogota the elites did imagine a national
political grouping and did want to remain the political and symbolic core of the
country in the same way as they did during the colony. It is this project the one
that we know; although recent historiography has shown regional projects and
even subaltern participation in the constitution of alternative nations or
alternative ideas of it, the main project of the nation is the one we find in laws
and constitutions.
The movement for autonomy got the elites' support not only because of
the influence of enlightened ideas, as the traditional version goes, but also
because of the French-Spanish war and the resulting liberal government in
Cadiz. Spanish liberals promised equality for all Spaniards, whether they were
born in Spain or in America. Given these two factors, creoles in Colombian felt
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that they had reasons to obtain autonomy, because the liberal government
supported such a feeling, and anyways even if they did not have such support
they were confident that Spain was too busy with the war to react to any
movement in the Americas.
But, precisely, due to the need to have support in its war against France,
the Spanish government looked at America for monetary and military support.
The Cornejo de Regencin invited Americans to elect representatives to the Courts,
and in that way they would feel that they were not colonies but regions of Spain
with the same rights as those who were born in the Peninsula. On February
4 th/ 1810, the Consejo de Regencin proclaimed the equality of all Spaniards, but as
the events proved it later, this equality was merely formal (Tierno Galvan, 1964).
But this decree was just one element in the struggle for more autonomy and in
the fights between Bogota and Cartagena to be the core of the country and in the
end to impose Spanish law. In Cartagena creoles and mulatos were trying to
obtain independence and managed to have control of the Junta de Gobierno and
expel the Spanish representative without declaring independence from Spain.
According to Munera, this fact, that prevented the Spanish Army stationed in
Cartagena to react, was central in the success of the declaration of independence
by creoles in Santafe de Bogota on July 20^/1810. But due to the decisions in the
Junta de Cadiz, denying equality and citizenship to non-whites, mulatos and blacks
promoted a movement for real independence that ended up in the events of
November 11 th/ 1811, when subalterns forced creoles in Cartagena to break up
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with Spain (Munera, 1998: 187; King, 1953; Anna, 1982). The struggles for
commercial power during the colony re-emerged during the Republic and the
idea of a nation that unified all the regions remained a utopia. The country was
unified during the 19 th century by the elites in Bogota, but it did not reflect a
project that was the result of a sort of consensus of all the national elites.
However this just shows the inclusive and exclusive character of the nation, and
the idea that the nation is an imagined community that exists as imagined,
regardless of its actual existence. Legal documents show the group that has the
power to imagine and the kind of world that these elites want to imagine. At the
end, the movement for independence created a state but not a nation. The
question I want to answer in the remaining pages of this chapter is, what kind of
nation the Bogotanan elites imagined and who was included and who excluded?
On July 20^/1810, creoles in Santafe de Bogota gathered with Jose Acevedo y
Gomez, representative of the King of Spain, with the purpose of creating a
provisional government in the virreinato, but without questioning the King's
sovereignty. These elites were aware of the impossibility of creating a unified
nation and they proposed the creation of a federal system, but with the center in
Santafe de Bogota. The elites were aware that they were in a difficult position
and wanted to leave some ambiguities in order to be prepared for the final result
in the war with France. For that reason they appealed to religion, race, and
patria, that is, they did not claim independence from the King and defended the
idea of monarchy, race, and catholic religion, but with the condition that the
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King ruled this region directly and not through viceroys. In the Actn we see that
there is continuing mention to the idea of the people and the need to defend the
rights of the people. However, unlike Cartagena, where the racial configuration
of the city brought about the need to recognize politically the presence of mulatos
and blacks, in Santafe de Bogota white elites presented themselves as
representatives of the people. In the Actn there is no reference at all to women or
to other subaltern subjects. This silence is interesting because in traditional
historiography creoles are presented as inclusive and egalitarian.
In the accounts about the movement for independence, some women are
presented as the model for heroism and for an open polity. One of these cases is
Policarpa Salavarrieta, also known as La Poln, who is one of the heroines of
Colombian independence and who is used as an example of the openness of the
new system for women's participation. The myth around La Poln has the purpose
of presenting the history of women's participation in the war of Independence
under the colonial dominant discourse of womanhood. That is to say, creoles
wanted to keep the idea of the woman as caste and feminine. Those women who
fought and died for independence, and who took control of their life, were
completely invisible and in its stead the account of heroines like Ln Poln
remained. The myth of Ln Poln, who worked in houses of Spaniards and who
brought information to creoles but someone who did not fight directly or
involved in any way in the use of arms, perceived as a masculine activity, is a
good example of the idea of the republicans after independence, that is, to
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confine women to the domestic sphere and under their husband's control. The
way La Pola is described stresses her feminine features, whereas other heroines
are just forgotten (Carrillo, 2008).
Women participated in public life before and after independence and
creoles could not prevent it at the beginning of the Republic. However, after a
while, criminal law was used to control them and to send them back to the
domestic sphere. Women who worked in chicherias, bars where chicha -an
indigenous and subaltern beverage- was sold, were considered guilty of affecting
the normal way of life. However, they had not committed a crime and therefore
could not be punished for their behavior. Despite that, creoles found out ways to
bring them to Court, where they were punished for their vulgar behavior before
the judge. Their vulgar behavior consisted in telling the judge that they were
under the orders of the King of Spain and not of this disorganized junta de
Gobierno (Ospina, 2007). The strategy proved to be successful, because after
independence women were made invisible and their participation reduced to the
way creoles wanted them to be imagined. Family law was also used to control
women who wanted to divorce from their husbands. It is interesting that, once
the colonies declared their independence, women, indigenous peoples and
blacks, based on ideas of equality and dignity, took those declarations seriously,
and in the case of women we see an increase in the numbers of petitions of
divorce, even one by the wife of one of the leaders of the movement for
independence, Jose Maria Carbonell. However, judges appealed to the idea of
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public and notorious in order to deny these petitions, that is, as long as the fights
an the vices of the husband remained private, judges saw themselves as having
no authority to declare the end of those matrimonies. However, in the case of
Petrona Duro y Alvarez, Carbonell's wife, due to her class and status, she was
successful in her petition to divorce (Ospina, 2007: 33).
Constitutions and the Creation of Legal Monism
Law condenses the way elites imagine the nation, and that is why it is
important to take them into account for any analysis of the history of the nation
in Latin America. Constitutions are important documents because they are
supposed to present the way the nation and the state should organize and relate
to each other. In constitutions we see norms that deal with structure, but also
with rights and with an image of the people ruled by that constitution. In the
case of the Leyes de Indins, for instance, the image that the Spaniards had of the
Indian was one of inferiority and, therefore, of someone in need of protection and
control. The discourse of Christianity as opposed to the idea of the soulless
savage was important in the justification of the conquest and the colonization of
the Americas, as I showed earlier with regards to the debate between Juan Gines
de Sepulveda and Bartolome de Las Casas (Supra Ch. 2).
Legal positivism is part of the constitution of the Colombian nation, for
the law ended up mirroring the kind of nation the elites were constructing.
During the process of independence Simon Bolivar wrote about the way he saw
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the nation and the Indians within the nation. In the Carta de Jamaica he wrote
about the need to civilize the Indian:
It is a great idea to pretend to create in the New World one nation with a
tie that links all the parts to each other and to the whole. Given that it has
the same origin, tongue, customs and religion, it should have the same
government in a confederation of all the states that are created (...)
And in the Decree that determines the freedom of all slaves, he writes:
Savages living in these areas will be civilized and our possessions will
increase with the acquisition of La Guajira (...)
From now on, there will be just one class of men, all of them will be
citizens".
The policies during the colony led to the incorporation of Indians as
savages and therefore as heretics. But during the Republic the discourse of
citizenship was the result of the incorporation of the Indian within the nation.
That incorporation was not egalitarian, and the kind of citizenship was not the
kind reserved for the white propertied classes. Given this inferiority, indigenous
customs were forgotten or silenced, or at its best they were just tolerated, as long
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as they conformed to the "white majority's" idea of justice. The mainstream idea
was one of legal monism, that is, legal artifacts showed that modern law was the
only kind of law that could be accepted, whereas other legal practices were
accepted only as part of customs, as a residue of a primitive past.
During the colony, some indigenous peoples resisted to the Spanish
armies and escaped into the jungle. In order to incorporate them, the Crown sent
religious missions, to civilize them and incorporate them. Clendinnen shows the
effects of such a policy in Yucatan and Bonilla shows it for the Colombian case,
especially in the region of the Amazonas River (Clendinnen
,
1982; Bonilla, 1972).
After independence, the Republican government kept the policy of sending
missionaries to the jungles and reserved legal control for others subjects,
especially white creoles and "civilized" Indians. During the 20th century criminal
law became important, as we shall see in the next chapter, because it allowed
control of indigenous peoples via criminalization and treatment as children
(Yrigoyen, 2005). Bolivar and the elites that fought for independence did have a
project of the nation, not one confined to the limits of the current nations but one
that reached the whole territory of Latin America. To Bolivar and these elites
indigenous peoples should be civilized before they could be part of the nation,
that is, they were not included in the nation as citizens but as objects of control
and education. Given their lack of citizenship their lands should pass to the
state, which will give them a correct and proper use. The elites' constitutional
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pact did not change in a meaningful manner the treatment that Indians and
blacks received during the colony.
With the beginning of independent government, the new republics had to
look at other places in order to determine the kind of legislation they wanted to
have. Colonial law was not available because of the intention of showing an
independent world, but a total break up was also impossible, because of the need
of having some sort of legal and bureaucratic continuity that could show the
world that they were civilized and, consequently, that they deserved to be
treated as independent nations (On the use of law as symbolic status, Engle
Merry, 2000). Indigenous and African law was not even discussed as a possible
model, because they did not have symbolic status, and therefore they could not
be part of the constitution of a civilized nation (Morrison, 2006; Zaffaroni, 2007).
From the 1812 Constitution of Cadiz, the new Republics took the idea of
sovereignty, the organization of parliament, individual guarantees -not rights-,
and the morality that was embedded in the texts of the constitutions. The U.S.
Constitution and German Law were models of legislation that were used or
would be used to organize the legal system of the new Republics.
The Constitutional Act of 1811 (November 27/1811) established, for the
first time, the possibility of sending missionaries to take indigenous lands.
However, the new republics did not see those lands as inhabited but as lands
that were nullins, that is as empty and without owners and therefore as available
to private appropriation in a Lockean sense (Locke, 1993: 325). In the text of the
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act it is clear that the elites saw the nation as white, because of their civilized
character, and for that reason their purpose was to import foreigners to inhabit
these lands and to civilize Indians. To the indigenous peoples who lived in these
lands, the elites recognized their right, as the old owners, to receive religion and
civilization and to be treated as educated people, unless they proved otherwise
with their savage and hostile behavior. In those regions where there were
peoples that could be considered civilized, the elites ruled about the possibility of
having trade and treaties with them, and at the end attract them to the right
religion. The elites left some of the institutions of the colonial system, mainly
because it benefited them and the old aristocracy. One of those institutions is the
system of inheritance, that does not allow free will, as in the United States, but it
establishes a complicated system of inheritance that puts the family at the center
of the institution (Mirow, 2001; Perez, 2007).
The first Colombian Constitution, passed in 1819, constituted a liberal
state wherein property and individual rights were defining features of the
system. This is a liberal constitution that stressed the idea of Colombia as a
nation that is independent from Spain and from any kind of foreign domination.
It is interesting to notice that creoles were aware of the symbolic character of the
nation, creating new traditions that celebrated the idea of the new republic and
the new nation. In article 13 th of the Ley Fundamental de la Union de los Pueblos de
Colombia, passed on July 18 th/ 1821, we find the following:
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Articulo 13. Habra perpetuamente una fiesta nacional por tres dias en que
se celebre el Aniversario:
1. De la emancipacion e independence absoluta de los pueblos
de COLOMBIA.
2. De su union en una sola Republica, y establecimiento de la
Constitucion.
3. De los grandes triunfos e inmortales victorias con que se han
conquistado y asegurado estos bienes.
In the first constitutions Colombia is emphatically presented as an
independent nation. Article 1 st of the 1821 Constitution establishes that the
Colombian nation is independent from any foreign power and that sovereignty
resides in the Nation. This Constitution established a system of representative
democracy with a very limited idea of representation. To be able to vote, voters
needed to have property and be literate (from 1840). But not everyone could be a
representative of the people, because to the conditions of having property and
being literate, article 87 of the Constitution added the requirement of being a
professor of one science, which in the end means that only elites could represent
the people.
Indigenous peoples were included in the nation as excluded, as subjects of
a policy to constitute their identity as individuals. Legislation aimed at changing
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their status and at making them liberal subjects in order to better control their
lands and to make them a social class of peasants, with individual access to the
land and with individual rights. The law did not see them as a people with
collective titles and with a different relation to the land, because that would
impede internal colonization and the incorporation of the country in the
modern/ capitalism world-system. Article 78 of the 1863 Colombian
Constitution, one of the most liberal constitutions in the 19 th century, allows the
state to have special legislation regarding indigenous peoples. But what is
interesting about the text of this constitution is that it gives representation to
those places where civilized people reside, that is, it is not enough to be in
Colombia to be able to have the rights associated to citizenship, it is necessary to
be a civilized Colombian in order to count as a person that could have
representation in Congress. According to this article, only those territories with
more than 25.000 civilized inhabitants could have the right to have
representatives in Congress (Yrigoyen, 2005). In order to civilize indigenous
peoples, the 1863 Constitution ruled that the federal government would have the
power to send missions and to civilize them, but to do so the federal government
would need to have authorization from the states and establish a policy of
internal colonization.
In the exact moment that the country was trying to reincorporate into the
world-economy with a policy of free markets and elimination of trade barriers,
liberal elites create the legal artifacts that were necessary to allow foreign
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investment to come to Colombia and to exploit its resources. The idea of baldios,
the constitution of indigenous peoples as individuals, the transformations in
legal regimes to allow land acquisition, all were elements that elites used elites as
part of the project of nation building. Given that Indians were excluded, it
becomes clear why it was more likely for foreigners to become real citizens, as
long as they were white and propertied.
The 1886 Constitution is surprisingly silent with regards to indigenous
peoples. But such a silence should not lead us to think that there is not any
provision regarding indigenous peoples. Indeed, the 1886 Constitution departs
from the idea of a unified nation and therefore to have a provision about people
who did not really belong to the nation would mean to recognize the fragmented
character of the Colombian political grouping. Instead, white elites regulated the
fate of indigenous peoples in a different way. In Law 153/1887 and Law
89/1890, based on the model of the Cauca regulations, elites classified Indians in
the following way: civilized, semi-civilized, and barbarians. For the latter, the
law provided civilizing missions, that is, priests, usually Dominicans, with the
charge of bringing them to civilization. Once they were brought to the civilized
world, they could be under control of national law, because that would mean
that they belonged to the Colombian nation. For civilized Indians, criminal law
was used. For those semi-civilized and barbarians, education as children was
created, but, as Clendinnen shows it, this paternalistic treatment did not
necessarily mean that they were treated with respect, because harsh punishment
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was frequently used as Bonilla shows for the Capuchins controlling the missions
in the Amazonian jungle of Colombia (Bonilla, 1972).
Conclusion
Constitutional law was important in the constitution of the Colombian
nation. In this chapter I have discussed the idea of an inclusive/ exclusive nation
and I have shown that the law, as an elites' artifact, condenses the ideas elites
had about the membership to the nation. As such, in the documents I have
analyzed in this chapter, the idea of a white nation and the exclusion of
indigenous peoples and people of African descent is very clear. But
constitutional law was just a part of the strategy. In the next chapter I want to
focus on the role criminal law played in Colombia and its importance in
constituting and controlling indigenous peoples and in homogenizing
Colombian nation, but this time by making them invisible in the law, that is, as
non-civilized people who did not have a place in criminal law because they
lacked the necessary rationality to be subjects of criminal law. The process of
homogenization continued during the 20th century, but following other
strategies, amongst them, the politics of multiculturalism, which focused on
similarities, taking the differences as folklore or as peculiarities that did not affect
the homogenizing essence of the nation (Infra, Chapter 5).
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CHAPTER 4
CRIMINAL LAW AS A CONSTITUTIVE STRATEGY
Introduction
In this chapter I analyze the role criminal law has played in the production
of subaltern subjectivities. Criminal law and criminological discourse have been
important to control subaltern groups and to constitute their identities. Latin
America, and Colombia in particular, have appealed to criminal law to solve
their social problems, in a strategy that has been labeled as law's symbolic
efficiency (Garcia, 2001; Garcia, 2002) or as penal efficienticism associated to the
state of exception (Aponte, 2006).
I analyze current criminological discourse in order to show that neoliberal
governmentality deals with the idea of constituting identities in order to control
subjects through the use of their freedom. I show that this kind of discourse is
part of a long strategy of control where criminal law has been central to
constitute spaces and to control subjects. In chapter 3, 1 dealt with constitutional
law during 19 th century and showed that constitutional law condensed the idea
of the nation that elites had. Law and the nation-building project were important
because constitutions show the kind of white nation elites are imagining.
Chapter 5 will deal with the role constitutional law has played in the constitution
of liberal identities after the 1991 Constitution and in what Charles R. Hale has
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labeled as the permitted Indian (McNeish, 2008; Hale, 2004; Fisk, 2005). 31 In this
chapter I show that there is an implicit discourse under this classification of
subjects, that of the civilizing mission, according to which criminal law was
reserved for the civilizeci man, whereas religious missions and other forms of
control were used for the savages and the semi-savages. I will show the influence
of global designs in local politics, and how the global is connected to the legal
production of subjectivities and the legal coloniality of power within the confines
of the nation-state.
I argue that penal policies in Colombia are not created in a void. They are
part of policies designed and applied in other places. I will show the history of
the civilizing discourse in criminal law and how it has persisted in current
policies in Colombia. The emergence of an actuarial system of justice led to
policies like zero tolerance, incapacitation theory in the prison system, and to an
unprecedented increase in the prison population. I argue that there is a global
trend that renounces to the discourse and practices of re-socialization and instead
opts for a management/ control of populations that are a risk -not at risk- for
society. Following Alessandro De Giorgi's analysis, I call the attention to the
centrality of the American experience in this trend. However, from a world
historical perspective, I aim to show the ways icieas and policies traveled to
Colombia and the reasons why the American model of crime control was
adopted in Colombia in the 1990s, as part of the transformations in the model of
31
I owe the reference to the idea of a permitted Indian, el indio permitido, to Professor Sonia
Alvarez.
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development established under Cesar Gaviria's administration (1990 - 1994) and
after the 1991 Constitution.
The End of Correctionalism: Towards a Control of Risky Populations
In 1973 Jock Young, lan Taylor, and Roger Walton published a book
entitled The New Criminology (Young, 1973). This book was essentially an attack
on traditional positivist and correctionalist criminology. Arguing that these
traditions acted as an academic justification for discriminatory practices in the
penal and criminal justice systems, these authors proposed a radical criminology
and a criminal system that took into account the interests of the working class
(Muncie, 1998). As a result of the book, but also of transformations in
sociological theory during the 1960s, deviance and crime were not seen as
individual pathological acts, but rather as the result of definitions from sites of
power and in relationship to structural transformations in the national economy
and in the world economy (Muncie, 1998: 221).
After analyzing different theories about crime. Young et al show that
crime is an ideological category generated by state agents and intellectuals.
Given this diagnosis of crime, it was not a surprise that criminologist were
concerned about the fate of the criminal justice system and the way to deal with
these problematic situations (Baratta, 1986). In Marxist thought there was a
dispute about the discipline itself. Some criminologists, writing in a collection
entitled Critical Criminology, put into question the very idea of a Marxist
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criminology (Young, 1975). From this point of view, the criminal justice system
was seen as oppressive and intrusive. The correctionalist ideology was criticized
as a disciplinary intervention in the souls of prisoners, and therefore as part of
the crisis of modernity (Foucault, 1977). The leftist critique left penal and prison
interventions without legitimacy. According to David Garland, during the 1960s
the left criticized the Criminal Justice System (CJS) and found that it was too
intrusive in people's lives and that it could lead towards a disciplinary society
(Garland, 2001). To critical accounts of the role of the CJS, the idea of re-
socialization was too totalizing and it could not be accepted in a democratic
society. During these times, critiques like the one made by Nils Christie about
the pain delivery nature of the CJS, as well as other accounts showing the need to
eliminate the prison, the CJS, or capitalist society in general were the common
currency of the day. The alternatives were restorative justice, community justice,
and a dialogue between the victim and her victimizer (Christie, 1971; Mathiesen,
1974; Hulsman, 1984). Given the failure of the alternatives and the problems that
it caused in the intervention from the CJS, the discourse of "nothing works" left
the CJS and its alternatives without legitimacy. However, at the same time
another discourse was developing. Faced with the inefficiency of the system,
some authors like James Q. Wilson and Gary Becker proposed not the
elimination of the Criminal Justice System, but in its stead a transformation of the
CJS and an improvement of its performance in terms of efficiency. Becker
analyzed the "supply" of offenses and how they are dealt with by the CJS. After
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analyzing the CJS in terms of costs and benefits, and in terms of the costs that
crime implies for states, Becker concluded pointing out the need for analyzing
the optimal conditions in which crime would be controlled via a rational decision
where the subject balances the benefits of crime with the costs of punishment.
Becker writes:
The main contribution of this essay, as I see it, is to demonstrate that
optimal policies to combat illegal behaviors are part of an optimal
allocation of resources. Since economics has been developed to handle
resource allocation, an "economic" framework becomes applicable to, and
helps enrich, the analysis of illegal behavior. At the same time, certain
unique aspects of the latter enrich economic analysis: some punishments
such as imprisonment are necessarily non- monetary and are a cost to
society as well as to offenders; the degree of uncertainty is a decision
variable that enters both the revenue and costs functions (Becker, 1968).
By applying an economic framework, Becker not only was introducing an
idea of efficiency within the system, but something more important: the idea that
subjects in the CJS are rational subjects who take rational choices and therefore
social conditions and historical reasons are not explanations for the crime
problem.
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Along similar lines, James Q. Wilson, explained the crime problem as a
question of city disorganization and as a sort of environmental problem (Wilson,
1975). In 1982, in an issue of the Atlantic Monthly, Wilson wrote his article on
Broken Windows that led to a series of policies, promoted from the conservative
think tank Manhattan Institute, which later on would be known as Zero Tolerance
(Wilson, 1982). In this article Wilson analyzed some of the literature on crime
control and showed that individuals in certain areas of the city are not afraid of
crime but rather of disorderly behavior. Wilson considered that disorderly
behavior affects people's lives and that it could lead to an increase in crime. He
analyzed research where the effects of broken windows were studied. To
Wilson, these studies show that disorderly behavior suggests that in areas where
law is weakly enforced it is more likely to have problems with crime. When
disorderly behavior is controlled, people do not think that law is not enforced
and therefore more grave crimes will not occur. This means a more active role of
the police and more involvement with the community. 32 Wilson writes at the end
of his article on Broken Windows:
But the most important requirement is to think that to maintain order in
precarious situations is a vital job. The police know this is one of their
functions, and they also believe, correctly, that it cannot be done to the
exclusion of criminal investigation and responding to calls. We may have
32 Analyzing the case of New York, where Zero Tolerance policies were implemented, Bowling
and Harcourt show the limitations of this policy and the lack of bases on social science (Bowling,
1999; Harcourt, 2001; Harcourt, 2002).
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encouraged them to suppose, however, on the basis of our oft-repeated
concerns about serious, violent crime, that they will be judged exclusively
on their capacity as crime-fighters. To the extent that this is the case, police
administrators will continue to concentrate police personnel in the
highest-crime areas (though not necessarily in the areas most vulnerable
to criminal invasion), emphasize their training in the law and criminal
apprehension (and not their training in managing street life), and join too
quickly in campaigns to decriminalize "harmless" behavior (though public
drunkenness, street prostitution, and pornographic displays can destroy a
community more quickly than any team of professional burglars).
Above all, we must return to our long-abandoned view that the police
ought to protect communities as well as individuals. Our crime statistics
and victimization surveys measure individual losses, but they do not
measure communal losses. Just as physicians now recognize the
importance of fostering health rather than simply treating illness, so the
police—and the rest of us—ought to recognize the importance of
maintaining, intact, communities without broken windows (Wilson, 1983).
The idea of management enters in that way the field of criminal law and
crime control. These two ideas of a more efficient criminal justice system -
management of resources-, and the need to control not individuals but
populations, -the biopolitical management of populations-, were central elements
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in the paradigm of society that was being developed in the 1970s, which Foucault
labeled as governmentality and Deleuze as societies of control (Foucault, 1990;
Foucault, 1992; Foucault, 1998; Foucault, 1993; Deleuze, 1990). In Foucault we
find the transition from a disciplinary society to a society where transformation
of the soul is not as important as control through freedom. Foucault shows a
subtle movement from discipline, where souls are the object of disciplinary
practices, to regulation, where under the idea of freedom, subjects are left
without state intervention and therefore they have to control themselves (Ewald,
1990; Rose & Valverde, 1998). Neoliberal governmentality complements the law
with regulatory practices that are being exercised outside the state. In
neoliberalism, subjects are not disciplined within the state, but now they are left
to their own freedom and private institutions have to develop their own
normalizing practices. According to Hudson, neoliberal governmentality
establishes a government from the distance. State institutions do not intervene in
people's lives, at least not directly. Law becomes what Deleuze and Guattari call
an ensemble of capture, that is, law and the legal system become places where
different sites and ways of power meet and constitute subjects and fields. In that
way, law ceases to be used as an instrument of discipline or of direct power, but
rather as a way to control populations that can constitute a risk for the
management of society (Hudson, 1998).
The prison crisis is related to the emergence of a new paradigm of control,
one that is more concerned about controlling populations and not about
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controlling crime or particular behaviors. The new penal policies are more
focused on controlling criminal or dangerous classes, the whole structure of the
criminal justice system is dedicated to this goal: it is the efficient risk
management of the criminal class. Crime control is de-individualized, subjects
are not particular targets of disciplining practices, and rather their class as a
whole is object of control. Mona Lynch puts it in the following way:
Feeley and Simon suggest that the new penal machinery may be heading
toward a kind of waste management model in practice. Specifically, they
argue that contemporary corrections may be pushing toward a self
understanding that views its primary role as, herding a specific population
that cannot he disaggregated and transformed but only maintained -a kind of
waste management function. The waste management model emphasizes
securing and neutralizing the threat posed by the criminal class at the
lowest possible cost, while striving to downplay and deny the emotional,
irrational, and psychological elements of punishment (Lynch, 2000).
As a result of this model, increasing numbers of people have been sent to
prison. Prison became a place of confinement and management and not a place
for re-socialization. This crowding crisis is not the particular experience of
industrial nations, but also part of the experiences of other countries like
Colombia, where the need for more imprisonment has been exported. In the
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following sections I shall explain how this discursive field has been constructed,
making relevant the statements of economists in the field of criminal law and
crime control (Mathews and Francis, 2000; Nelken, 1994; Garland, 2001). I wil
explain how economists entered the field of criminal law and how they re-
constituted it to introduce ideas of efficiency and crime control for neoliberal
forms of governmentality.
Criminal Law and the Civilizing Process
Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth have analyzed the constitution of a
field of power in the law in Latin America. In their book they study the role
lawyers and economists played in the transformations that took place from the
1960s to the 1990s in the region. In their analysis they use the concept of palace
wars, a concept taken from Bourdieu, in order to show the internal disputes
between lawyers and economists for power, stressing the way these disputes led
to transformations in the state. According to Dezalay and Garth, lawyers, or
what they call gentlemen politicians of the law, represented a kind of aristocratic
ideal of government (Dezalay, 2002). Despite the differences in the historical
trajectories in each of the countries they analyzed, what is common in all of them
is the role lawyers played in the 19 th century. Garth and Dezalay show that the
legitimacy of the law was produced through internationally scholarly capital that
was acquired traditionally in Europe. They add that "the classical pattern did
not require all politicians to be law graduates, but the law provided the key
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network of relationships and legitimizing language" (Dezalay, 2002: 22). On the
other hand, using Jorge I. Dominguez' description of modern rulers (Dominguez,
1997), Dezalay and Garth show that in the 1970s there was a transformation in
the elites controlling the countries they analyze. They show how economists,
educated initially at the University of Chicago, used their connections to the
United States to access the state and to finally replace lawyers in the government.
Having access to the US gave these Technopwls access to prestige and to
international contacts that made their cultural capital more attractive than the
one held by Lawyers. While Lawyers' field of expertise was law, theirs was
economics.
This analysis is important because it shows those actors that introduce
ideas that later on will transform the structure of the state. However, in their
analysis, Dezalay and Garth just pay attention to the prestige that Europe had in
the 19 th and 20th century in Latin America, but they do not take into account the
reasons why European legal knowledge was so valued in the region and how it
was perceived by the elites. At the same time, they do not take into account that
the transformations in the model of development and in the hegemony of the
world-system constructed the field of power as an economic field, and how this
transformation was instrumental in the perception of the law as an instrument
and not as constitutive or as a political and contested space. In the 1990s the
neoliberal model led to the de-politicization of politics, and in our case of the law
(Teivanen, 2002). In Garth and Dezalay's analysis, the construction of a
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discursive field is left aside and the result is put as one of rational choice, where
actors look for the most prestigious and expedite way to access to power.
In this section I want to show the geography of legal knowledge and show
how law -and criminal law in particular- was an instrument in the civilizing
mission of the 19th century in Colombia. Colombian elites tried to apply a policy
of whitening the Colombian population, along the lines of the Sarmiento model,
and to do so they used criminal law. And it is this role in the civilizing mission
that gave the prestige European law had amongst Colombian lawyers and it is
from this part that I want to build my analysis following Dezalay 's and Garth's
explanations.
Law and the Civilizing Mission
19 th Century Colombia is characterized by its many wars and power
struggles. A traditional interpretation would show this period as a struggle for
economic power and the fights between urban rulers and the rich landowners,
and as a struggle for centralization of the state. This approach would show these
fights as combats between elites, leaving aside the role the popular sector played
in the constitution of the nation and the state in Colombia. At the same time,
such an approach would not take into account the special relations existing
between the elites and the popular sector. These relations were of domination
and control, but this is not enough to explain the special configuration of the
state and the role played by the law in this process. As Salvatore and Aguirre
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have shown it, a purely Foucauldian or Marxist approach does not take into
account the fact that the working class and the lower classes were in a process of
constitution and that European history could not explain the particular history of
Latin America (Salvatore and Aguirre,
,
1996; Melossi & Pavarini, 1981; Franco,
1981; Quijano, 1981).
The wars of the 19th century can be best understood as wars for
civilization. After the wars of independence, Colombian elites faced the
constitution of a new nation. They were not part of the Spanish Empire anymore
and they were claiming a new identity, that of Americans (Supra Ch. 3; Esquirol,
1997). But to be American could mean many things. In the discourse of
politicians like Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, the American nation had to be
white and more along the lines of the United States. Sarmiento is important
because his ideas about whitening the nation were followed in Colombia by one
of his disciples: Florentino Gonzalez, who translated them into constitutional law
(Duarte French, 1971). In the law, this idea was translated into a fear of the
people -the popular sector- and a need to constitute their identities in a way that
was functional to capitalism and civilization (Rojas, 2002: XXVII).
Travel stories were central for Colombian elites in the process of civilizing
the nation and constituting it as white and of European descent (Quijano, 2000).
Some members of the elites traveled to Europe in order to lear how to be
cosmopolitans and white. They wrote their impressions in books that circulated
widely amongst the elites and that served as models for them. These books
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presented the civilizing process in two ways: on the one hand, the elites
considered themselves to be different from the popular sector, because they had
different physical features and light skin. But at the same time, they realized that
they were not Europeans, and therefore that they were uncivilized. This double
negation characterized those travel stories. Elites traveled physically or
symbolically to Europe and learned the double negation and how to operate
within it. 33 Simon Bolivar expressed this double negation in the following way:
Neither Indians nor Europeans, but a race between the original natives and
the Spanish usurpers; in short, being by birth Americans, and our rights
those of Europe, we are obliged to dispute and combat for these rights
against the original natives, and to persevere and maintain ourselves there
in opposition to our invaders, so we find ourselves placed in a most
extraordinary embarrassing dilemma (Simon Bolivar as in Rojas, 2002: 1).
Lawyers, as part of the elites, became central actors in the process of
civilization. Given their central relation to the written word, they became
important in the exercise of power. The literati character of lawyers, in a lettered
city, explains why lawyers became politicians and the close connection between
lawyers and the state. Florentine Gonzalez, a lawyer himself, epitomizes this
idea of law as part of the civilizing project. To Gonzalez, creoles, and by that he
33 This double negation is very similar to the experience of the subaltern explained by Dubois and
his concept of double consciousness. However, elites had the opportunity to shape their image,
They act as subalterns/ oppressors at the same time. Cfr. Dubois, 1939.
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meant the educated ones, were the ones working for progress coming from the
European race, they were the only ones with the power to civilize the country
(Gonzalez, 1981; Rama 2004). Following Bentham, his proposal was based on the
rationality of the individual against the solidarity of the traditional indigenous
peoples. According to Gonzalez, Independence was not based on a vengeful
morality, but on an ethics of progress. In a letter to Jose Maria Torres Caicedo,
Florentino Gonzalez expresses candidly the racist character of the Colombian
nation he and the elites were trying to build:
Barbarians do not aspire to be equals to the civilized men, putting
themselves at their level with science and property given to them by work
and study...We have nothing in common with the Indians or the Africans,
who have barbarian tendencies and instincts that are against civilization.
Civilization has nothing to expect from them; on the contrary, they have
everything to fear from civilization (Gonzalez, 1863 as in Diaz Videla,
1994: 108).
Law books became part of those travel stories. Lawyers traveled to
Europe to learn law, to learn the organization of the state, and, in general to
understand how power worked in a civilized country. Given the colonial history
of Colombia, it is not surprising that they chose Spain as the place where they
wanted to develop their studies. The kind of travel book they wrote is not like
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the ones written by the literati but in general they shared the same features: they
talked about other places, they celebrated European culture, and finally they
referred to the backward situation of our laws. By treating law books as travel
stories, they did not talk about the real world of crime and criminal law, but
were speaking to civilized men to teach them how to deal with those barbarians
still existing in the nation, in sum, to teach them how to whiten the Colombian
nation.
The first treaty of criminal law written in Colombia was one written by
Jose Vicente Concha, a conservative lawyer who traveled to Spain and who
published his book for consumption in Latin America by the end of the 19 th
century. It is important to note that Concha wrote his book in Spanish and was
published in France, not only because of the lack of publishing houses in
Colombia, but also because of his desire of reaching the whole Latin American
continent (Concha, nd). The treaty is based on the most advanced theories of law
developed in Europe, which to Concha were almost perfect. Concha based his
analysis mainly on the studies of Francesco Carrara and Pellegrino Rossi, two
Italian lawyers who developed a theory of law based on the rationality of the
individual and on an economic theory of law. To these authors, crime was just a
violation of the law, and punishment was just a counter stimulus against crime.
That is, their theory of the criminal was based on an analysis of costs and
benefits. What is important about these theories is how they assumed that
criminals were like any other member of society. They did not constitute a
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different class or a different race; they were rational individuals breaking the
social contract (Carrara, 1984; Baratta, 1983).
One of the questions that arise is why elites decided to apply theories that
assumed equal treatment for everyone. However this adoption does not appear
to be as strange if we analyze the process of state and nation building having
place in 19 th century Colombia. As I mentioned before, after Independence in
1819 elites were fighting for power. These fights took place in different regions
like Cauca, Cundinamarca and Antioquia. Local elites fought for local power.
Since central power was not at stake, and the fight was between equals,
constitutions assumed that rebels were not criminals but combatants.34 That is,
criminal law was not supposed to be an instrument to control indigenous
peoples or Afrodescendants, they just did not exist for criminal law. Indigenous
peoples were controlled and constituted as peasants with other instruments that
did not involve the criminalization of their identities. It was the role of the
Church to take care of indigenous peoples and to make sure of their
occidentalization. With the introduction of liberalism in the mid 1800s,
indigenous peoples were constituted as individuals and therefore as equals
before the law. This time the kind of control was not criminal law, but the
informal structure of the hacienda (Muelas, 2005).
34 The war known as the One Thousand Days War, for instance, had the character of a sort of
international war between equals. White combatants were treated as equals, indigenous peoples
in Cauca were treated as guerrilleros and therefore as outside the field of the law. See Campos,
2003 .
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By the end of 19th century, criminal law was part of the civilizing mission
but not in charge of civilizing the barbarians. Indigenous peoples were not
mentioned because their status was regulated by Law 89 of 1890, a law that
divided indigenous persons between civilized, semi-civilized and savages
(Campo, 2003). For the civilized and semi-civilized the law had a regime of
control based on their confinement in the areas assigned to them by the
Government, also known as Resguardos, but where their autonomy was
essentially limited. For the latter, the law had the Christian mission, where
indigenous peoples were subject to the absolute power of the Catholic Church
(Bonilla, 1972).
Travel stories were important in the process of civilization of the
Colombian nation. They were used to show the goal Colombian elites needed to
achieve. Lawyers, as literati, became central actors in this process, because they
had literacy and the tools used in Europe to civilize the country from the state.
Up to that point Concha's book was used as a travel story used by lawyers and
judges in their understanding of criminal law. In the 1920s, Indigenous peoples
and peasants became visible due to their struggles for rights and land. The
Socialist party was created and Manuel Qu intin Lame was fighting for the
indigenous peoples of Cauca and Tolima (Sanchez, 1976; Espinosa, 2004; Medina,
1989; Infra, Chapter 7). In 1925 the elites tried to pass a reform to the CJS to
adapt it to the transformations in the culture and doctrine of law prevalent in
Europe. Carrara's and Ferri's conception of law were outdated and that is one of
188
the reasons why the reform drafted by Concha did not came into force, ciespite
Congress' approval. But another reason that is important to consider is the
utility, or lack of it, of Concha's doctrine for the civilizing mission and the
process of constitution of subjects as workers and as lower classes. Law 89/1890
had proven to be weak in controlling indigenous peoples, the latter and peasants
were revolting against the system, workers were organizing and protesting
against this state of affairs, in sum, the civilizing mission had backfired because it
had given tools to workers, peasants, and indigenous peoples to make claims
against the state. Quintin Lame, for instance, used the law as an instrument in
his struggles, or as one of the leaders of the Colombian indigenous movement
has put it: they used the law to control us; we used it to liberate ourselves
(Espinosa, 2004 and Interview with Don Jose Vicente Garcia. Director of the
Indigenous Regional Organization of Valle del Cauca, ORIVAC. Cali, July 7th
2005).
Up to this point lawyers were the ones in charge of promoting the reform
and giving scientific advice to politicians in topics related to criminal law and
judicial reform. The Universidad Nacional de Colombia and the Universidad
Externado de Colombia, two institutions that at the time were considered liberal,
were part of the promotion of a transformation of the criminal justice system.
Some of the professors of these two institutions traveled to Europe and brought
with them new theories that were to be used in the reform of the CJS in 1936.
Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, Carlos Lozano y Lozano, and Jorge Gutierrez Anzola were
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lawyers connected to both the government and these Universities that brought
travel stories in the form of a criminal law book. In these stories, they showed
the advances of criminal law in Italy and how law was useful to control the
dangerous classes.35
In 1936 a reform to the system was approved and a conception of the
criminal man as biologically different and in need of treatment was introduced.36
The Universidad Nacional de Colombia created the Institute of Criminology in
charge of studying the causes of crime and of studying different aspects of the
criminal man from a positivist point of view. Gaitan, recognized by Enrico Ferri,
the Italian founder of the Criminological Positivism School, as one of his most
brilliant students,37 did not write any book on criminal law but he used the
theories in his practice as a lawyer (Gaitan, 1983). His closing arguments were
published and widely read amongst the population of young law students.
Carlos Lozano y Lozano, another scholar also teaching at the Universidad
Nacional de Colombia, would publish his book in 1950, some time before his
death (Lozano, 1950). With the deaths of Gaitan and Lozano y Lozano, the
35 Herbert Braun analyzes the role lawyers and politicians played in the first part of the 20 th
century. Braun shows that politicians played a role of teachers of the masses. Private life did not
exist, because the public was the field of the education of the "populacho". Politicians like
Laureano Gomez, president of Colombia from 1950-1953, considered that racial mixture of
savages Indians and primitive blacks with Spaniards in addition to Colombian geography made
almost impossible to get progress and to become finally moderns Politicians saw that their role
was to civilize Colombian with the use of the law, and to obtain that goal it was necessary to have
a closed democracy where only the civilized could take part in the political system (Braun, 2008:
34).
3(5 Lombroso analyzed first the criminal man and later the criminal woman. In any case, the
functions of the CJS were different depending on the gender of the violator of the law Cfr.
Lombroso, 1971.
37 Given the lack of prestige of Ferri's doctrine in other regions, it is safe to say that he was
brilliant because he followed his doctrines.
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University's role in criminal law was passed onto the Universidad Externado de
Colombia, due to the fact that lawyers educated at this institution had access to
the necessary resources and networks with European universities.
Colombian professors of law were not full time professors, but mostly
practitioners that used the teaching of law as part of their symbolic capital or
judges who were connected to the University as part of those networks to
advance their careers (Gaitan Mahecha, 1961). Alfonso Reyes Echandia was one
mixture of both. He was once a practitioner and the Chair of the Criminal Law
Department at the Universidad Externado. After having been to Italy and
Germany, he went back to Colombia to teach and practice law. He brought his
own travel book and introduced German law and doctrine in Colombia. His
book Derecho Penal, published in the early 1960s, introduced theories that
understood the crime problem as a technical one, one in which criminals were
sanctioned following certain technical guidelines (Reyes, 1964). He also wrote
books on Criminology that the Police and people in the law enforcement
agencies used. The University positioned as the epitome of criminal law in
Colombia, and Reyes Echandia was central in that positioning, until his death in
the massacre of the Palace of Justice in 1985. However, he left the door open for
German law in Colombia.38 Colombian lawyers have traveled since then to
38 The 2001 reform was promoted by Attorney General Alfonso Gomez, who studied in Germany,
and his advisors were educated directly or indirectly in German Criminal law. It is interesting to
note that the disputes were about which German school of law we could incorporate in Criminal
Law: Gunther Jakobs' doctrine promoted by lawyers like Eduardo Montealegre and his team of
advisers in the Procuraduria (sort of Ombusdman office) or Claus Roxin's theory, promoted by
lawyers like Fernando Velasquez, Carlos Arturo Gomez and the team of advisers in the Attorney
General's office.
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Germany, Italy, and Spain, to learn German law and German doctrine and to
translate the works of German authors in order to keep up with the doctrine in
this country. In the 1970s, for instance, Colombian lawyers got involved in the
discussion about two theories of criminal law, a technical discussion that
emerged in the 1950s to cover the participation of those lawyers involved in the
Nazi regime. 39 A reform to the Criminal Justice System passed in 2001 was the
result of the influence of lawyers from this University, and it was based on the
need to update Colombian laws and doctrines, in order to remain as participants
of the civilized countries of the world. This approach to criminal law was under
attack in the early 1990s, but now the attack did not come from other lawyers but
from economists educated in the United States. But that attack was possible only
within a framework of development, where law made sense as an instrument to
promote it. In the next section I will show how the movement for law and
development set the bases where economists could make meaningful statements
in the field of law.
39 Edmund Mezger and Hans Welzel had participated in the Nazi regime, especially Mezger who
drafted some of Hitler's laws. After the end of the war, and as a way to divert attention from his
Nazi past, both authors were involved in a polemic about the nature of human action. A polemic
that lasted until the 1970s when German Congress passed the new German Criminal Code with a
structure of criminal law that was more along the lines of Welzel's theory. In the 1970s the
polemic was imported to Argentina, where lawyers got involved in it as a way to avoid
discussing the political situation of the country and the fact of the dictatorship. Roberto Bergalli
has shown that in Argentina the more critical the situation, the more abstract the discussions in
criminal law See Munoz, 2003; Garcia Mendez, 1985; Bergalli, 1984.
192
The Project of Development and the role of Law
The first wave of Law and Development was associated to the idea of
national development and it was connected to institutions like the USAID and
the Ford Foundation. In the discussions about development in Latin America in
the 1960s there are few references to the role of the state and none to the role of
criminal law in the project of development (Rodriguez, 2001). Despite the fact
that Prebisch's ideas about development preserved an important role for the
state, criminal law was not considered as part of this process. To Prebisch, the
state protects private initiative and the role of the state is to channel social
resources to the private sector, correct the forces of market, develop
infrastructure for development, and mediate between domestic entrepreneurs
and international aid (Prebisch, 1982; Bernal, 1980; Chua, 1998). In Cepal's and
Prebisch's thought, the role of the state is just one of helping a national economy
and the market to develop. Criminal law is not mentioned because for them
criminal law had no role in development, except the normal one of stabilizing the
state and bringing about order in society. At the same time, criminal law was
seen as part of the protection of universal values, and to say that it could be a
tool for development would mean that criminal law does not protect universal
values but particular interests.
In the United States, sponsored by the USAID and the Ford Foundation,
there was an attempt to involve law in the process of development. However, as
in the Latin American thought, law came too late to the project of development.
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Law Professors from the Universities of Harvard, Yale, Stanford, and Wisconsin,
were involved in a project whereby the legal system of Latin America was
considered traditional and for that reason seen as in need to develop. Law was
seen at the time as an instrument of social change, but most specifically as an
instrument of social engineering. The aim of judicial and legal reforms,
according to scholars involved in this movement, was to adjust the legal system
to social and economic changes that had already taken place (Trubek, 1972). It is
important to notice that lawyers came late to the reform and that they were seen
as secondary actors in that process. Traditional lawyers had thought otherwise:
in the reforms to the CJS they avoided using social scientists' advice, even
though they sometimes based their reforms on their understanding of social
science. For instance, the reform of 1966 was the result of how Colombian
Lawyers understood Durkheim's theory of solidarity and the inefficiency of the
system was not seen in terms of costs and balances, but in terms of how to
recover solidarity and in that way to fix the social fabric.
To David Trubek, one of the leading scholars of the movement, law and
development sees modern law as essential for the creation and maintenance of
markets, and the emphasis is on predictability as a set of universal rules
uniformly applied (Trubek, 1972). Given that underdeveloped countries lacked a
modern legal system, they had to adopt modern rules that led to freedom and
development, and they had to do so by importing foreign -meaning American-
codes. Domestic legal practices came to be seen as traditional or customary, and
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for that reason as non-rational and non-progressive. Given that economists did
most of the work in the transformation of the state, lawyers were left with just
the transformation of legal education, because underdeveloped countries had a
formalistic and traditional way of teaching law. However, Trubek, using Max
Weber's conception of law, wrote that modern law does not produce economic
development or political development; it just helps freeing the structure of the
market and supporting a centralized bureaucratic state (Trubek, 1972: 15).
Local histories were presented as inferior and in need of adopting a
superior model. To Robert Seidman, third world countries are based on a
tradition of dual law. According to him, the fact that there is a plural society and
plural legal systems shows the colonial legacy of these countries and the need to
transform them. To him, "by definition customary law cannot lead to
development", therefore we need to eliminate dual systems of law and unify the
economy and the legal system.40 As a result of this wave of law and
development, the Ford Foundation supported transformations of the legal
system in three countries: Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. In Brazil the
transformation was instrumental in helping to discredit the formal legal system
and the protections of formal law, yielding to forms of authoritarianism that saw
law as a neutral instrument of politics; in Chile it led to superficial
transformations; and in Colombia the project was a total failure (Gardner, 1980).
40 See Seidman, 1972: 315; Karst, 1975. This analysis reminds us of the discussion about feudalism
and capitalism in Latin America, and the idea that the dual economy of these nations was the
cause of underdevelopment. Cfr. Stavenhagen, 1980.
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However, the project of Law and Development left an important legacy
that was going to become important in the 1990s. During the 1960s, the model of
CEPAL left everything for economists in the transformation of the state.
Criminal law had not role, but legal education was central. The Ford
Foundation supported reforms in legal education but only the Universidad de
Los Andes was willing to have an American system of legal education. Law
students came to Harvard, Wisconsin, Yale, and other American universities to
be trained in the model of American law. They got their JDs in the United States
and went back to Colombia to become professors and to do scholarly work
following the American model.
These lawyers were trained in the use of law as an instrument of social
change. They learned the importance of social and legal engineering in the
process of development. This knowledge, tied with the neo institutionalism
model developed by the World Bank, became important for the reforms that are
being applied currently. These lawyers came to Colombia with a travel book: the
American law book and the idea of strategic litigation. In the 1980s and 1990s,
lawyers in Colombia began to publish the works of professors of Constitutional
law like Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman, Duncan Kennedy, and others and
began to import American discussions about Constitutional law, despite the fact
of the many differences between the Colombian legal system and the American
one. But economists got involved in the study of law too. Following the
analyses of Gary Becker, economists like Mauricio Rubio and Sergio Clavijo
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began to analyze the relationship between law and economics and introduced a
model of efficiency to understand the role of law. Like the gap studies of the
1960s in the field of law and society, these economists analyzed the best way to
implement the law and the best way to have an efficient legal system.
On the side of criminal law, lawyers kept their power and were leading
the transformations of the CJS using legal doctrines produced in Europe,
especially Spain, Italy, and Germany. With the 1991 Constitution, their role
became less relevant because they were unable to speak in a non-normative
language. The time for economists was coming.
From National Development to Neoliberal Development
The ideas of CEPAL and the idea of development were under strong
attack in the 1970s. From the side of dependency theory, it was shown that the
idea of development involved several contradictions. Fernando Cardoso showed
that it was possible to achieve development in conditions of political
dependency, that is, he separated political dependency and economic
underdevelopment (Cardoso, 1969). Ruy Mauro Marini and Andre Gunder
Frank focused on the idea that underdevelopment and development were two
sides of the same coin, and rejected the idea that Latin America was feudal and
that this feudalism was an obstacle to development (Marini, 1980; Frank, 1969).
On the contrary, they showed that underdevelopment was the result of
development. Prebisch himself wrote in 1982 a critique to the model of CEPAL
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and showed the need to create a new model able to achieve the desired
development of Latin American countries (Prebisch, 1950; Prebisch, 1982). By the
end of the 1980s and the earlier 1990s the idea of development as such was
criticized, scholars like Arturo Escobar and Philip McMichael showed how
development was a project or a discursive construct, but in any case that it was
not related to some natural destiny of the Third World (Escobar, 1995;
McMichael, 2000).
However, with the Washington Consensus and the writings of Francis
Fukuyama, the idea was that the state was an obstacle to development and that it
needed to be transformed. That is, democracy needed not only liberalization of
politics but also the liberalization of markets. After a long process of men culpa,
scholars in the field of law and development gathered around the idea of a right
to development (Otto, 2000). This new understanding of development did not
lead to a new international order, but it brought about a new push to the
movement of law and development. Now stable environments for foreign
investment with efficient protection of property rights and the protection of the
global rule of law to facilitate international transactions became the central
elements advocated by scholars in the field of law and development (Rodriguez,
2001: 14). This new conception of law and development led to an optimistic view
of human rights and development, which was tied to the wave of
democratization that were going on in Latin America in the 1980s. According to
supporters of this new wave of law and development, the lack of access to
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justice, corruption, instability of property rights, and the inefficiency of the legal
system to protect people's rights were obstacles for development. In this second
wave, the focus was not the transformation of legal education but the idea that
the state matters and therefore that the reform needs to cover more than the role
of lawyers as social engineers.
In 1995, scholars discussed the role of law in the process of development.
The goal was now to embark on legal technical assistance programs and in that
way there was a need of technicians, who were able to use law to achieve
development, now understood as facilitating market transactions by defining
property rights, guaranteeing the enforcement of contracts and maintaining law
and order (Faundez, 1997). To do so, the model goes back to the state, but this
time to ensure that there is an institutional design that guarantees the non-
intervention of the state in economic matters.
In the new wave of law and development it appears as if the main role of
the reform was just the rule of law. In the new model, reformers claim to
redesign the state in order to push for a reform that protects democracy and the
rule of law (Yashar, 1999). After the Summit of the World Bank, the criminal
justice system began to be seen as part of the process of development; and neo
institutionalism became the way to theoretically understand the reforms. Joseph
Thome, commenting on the second wave of law and development, asserted that
law reform was based on three premises: development requires a legal
framework resembling that of the United States; this model establishes clear and
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predictable rules; and this model can be easily transferred. However Thome
adds that these three premises have been proven false. In spite of that, these are
the premises that were at the base of the 2005 reform to the CJS in Colombia.
The World Bank began to be concerned with judicial reform and the role
of law in development. Now the reform was not only pushed from the AID and
the Ford Foundation, but from the Interamerican Development Bank, the World
Bank, and a series of multinational companies in charge of giving technical
support for the development process and for legal reform. The judicial system
was important to achieve the goals of neoliberal reform. In the proceedings of
the 1995 Conference on Judicial Reform, the World Bank states:
The World Bank's interests in judicial reform stems from its concern about
the sustainability of the development efforts it supports in borrowing
countries. Many of the programs of the Bank and other development
institutions and governments finance are at risk because of the lack of
enforcement of the rule of law, a basic principle for sustainable social and
economic development (Rowat, 1995: VII).
Institutions needed to be redesigned and the state needed to get involved
to ensure rights and stability. The World Bank promoted a transformation of
Latin American judicial systems and a new design of their institutions. The
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model of new institutionalism was central in this process (Salas, 2003;
Hammergren, 2002; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 2000; Schor, 2003).
Lawyers were not trained in the nuances of new institutionalism. It was
now the job of the economists to reform the institutions but to do so they had to
legitimize themselves in the field of criminal law (Hammergren, 1999;
Hammergren, 2002). Traditional lawyers focused on the state as a formal
institution and saw law just as the instrument to regulate people's behavior; for
that reason, their role in the reform of the system was increasingly losing its
importance. But at the same time, the World Bank became involved in the
reforms of institutions, because it began to connect development and the reform
to the criminal justice system.
As a result of the 1995 Summit of the World Bank, the legal system was
included in the social agenda of donor institutions. According to the World
Bank, third world countries are in need of transforming their legal systems in
order to promote economic development. However, this time the legal system is
not used as in Prebisch or as in the first wave of law and development, but as an
instrument to guarantee market transactions and to protect property rights.
Behind this is the idea of the best practice, that is, the World Bank looks for the
best practice in the matter of the CJS and it imposes this transformation on the
recipient countries. The World Bank has become an important institution in the
transformation of the justice system in Latin America (Rowat, 1995; Murrell,
2001 ).
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Economists enter the field of Criminal Law
The 1991 Constitution transformed completely the structure of the state.
The reform was the result of the policies brought by Colombian president Cesar
Gaviria, an economist from Universidad de los Andes, educated in the United
States and who brought to the government lawyers and economists who were
willing to redesign the institutions of the Colombian state and to implement a
model of development that opened Colombian markets to the world and made
the country more attractive to foreign investment. One of the transformations in
the Constitution was the creation of the Attorney General's office and the
Council of the Judiciary. Although these measures can be seen as democratic,
they were also part of the process of redesigning the state for the implementation
of neoliberal policies in Colombia, a project that Gaviria proudly labeled as
ape rturn (openness).
As a result of these policies, business people, politicians, and the owners
of the most important Colombian newspaper created the Corporacion Excelencia en
la justicia, a think tank dedicated to analyze the Justice System and to design
policies for the government to improve the efficiency of the system. This think
tank has been publishing a journal dedicated to study the relationship between
law and development. In this journal, justicia y Desarrollo, lawyers and
economist have published their articles on the efficiency of the system of justice
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and on how to improve it, and to do so they have been using a perspective of law
and economics.
Amongst the economists who have been publishing in several journals
about this topic are Armando Montenegro and Mauricio Rubio, who are
professors of economics at the Universidad de los Andes and educated in the
United States. In the pages of Justicia y Sociedad and Coyuntura Economica,
economists were constructing a discourse in which the criminal justice system
began to be seen not as an instrument to solve conflicts between the parties, but
as an instrument to control criminality, corruption, and to eliminate transactions
costs for foreign companies.
These journals have published several studies relating the economy to the
CJS. In these studies the need to have a reliable justice system in order to allow
the state and the economy to function properly is stressed. To do so, it is
proposed that property rights be granted and protected efficiently by the CJS.
Given that crime and corruption create transaction costs for the investors, the
authors of the articles published in these journals advocate for a more efficient
CJS. In a poll done in 2000, entrepreneurs opined that the inefficiency of the
judicial system and the instability of property rights were the main causes for
transaction costs and the main difference between a region and another in terms
of being attractive to investment and industrial development (Fundacion de
Investigaciones Economicas Latinoamericanas, 2000). In the same issue of Justicia
y Desarrollo, an analysis of the obstacles to foreign investment is presented,
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claiming that foreign companies prefer to have their business in places where
physical and safety rights are guaranteed. One of the obstacles to foreign
investment, according to the study, is the inefficiency of the judicial system
(Programa Convertir-DNP, 2000).
Armando Montenegro and Carlos Posada analyze the crime rate in
Colombia in the year 1995. Posada and Montenegro take Becker's rational choice
theory as their theory to explain crime. This neoclassic approach will show to
them that crime is the result of the person's rational choice. Although this
approach has been criticized because it does not take into account the structure
of society and it assumes that individuals break the law just because they want
to, these authors do not make an attempt to take into account any critical
approach to crime. In their article they show that the model of development is
unrelated to the idea of crime and therefore that it is not the process of
industrialization or the process of opening of the markets the main reason why
crime rate has increased. Since their approach is based on the relationship
between costs and benefits, they conclude by saying that it is not the lack of
social services but the absence of costs to crimes the main reasons why crime rate
has increased in Colombia in the 1990s (Montenegro, 1995; AAVV, 1995;
Granados Pena, 2001).
Mauricio Rubio, another economist educated at Universidad de Los
Andes and Harvard, analyzes the costs that crime causes to the state. In his
analysis, Rubio emphasizes the importance of an institutional redesign and how
204
it is the lacking structure of the state the main reason why crime has gone up and
people solve their conflicts privately (Rubio, 1999). In his book he shows how
crime affects the efficiency of the economy and how it can become an obstacle to
economic development, that is to say, to open markets.
One result of these economic analyses of criminal law is the emphasis
placed on efficiency. However, economists have defined efficiency in terms that
they can measure with their econometric analysis. Given that the efficiency and
efficacy of the system cannot be defined without taking into account the role of
the state and the law as an instrument of control and constitution of identities,
Colombian economists have had a hard time to define this term. Rubio and
others came up with the idea that efficiency means time in prison, therefore if a
person investigated for a crime is not sentenced to prison time, they would
consider that there is impunity in the system. Following this model, Mauricio
Cardenas stated in an article written in 1996 that crime rate has increased and
overwhelmed the ability of the system to deal with it. He adds that the
inefficiency of the system amounts to a 98% of impunity, because only 5% of the
cases are dealt with by the CJS and amongst those only a 2% sentenced people to
prison time. The system is as inefficient, according to Cardenas, as it used to be
in the 1980s but the budget has doubled since the 1991 Constitution (Cardenas,
1996).
The CJS is presented in these studies as an inefficient instrument and
consequently as an obstacle to the development of the country. Political
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implications of crime and justice, studied and analyzed in European
criminological discourse, and the normative questions asked by lawyers in the
European criminal law design, are just left aside by economists and instead
questions about efficiency began to be asked. In this way, the CJS is discursively
constructed as a technical instrument, analyzed only by technocrats, and as a
space where traditional lawyers have no place.
Economists have been writing about the need to treat the economy and
the model of development as a technical matter and not as one that involves any
kind of political discussion. Salomon Kalmanovitz, professor of the Economics
Department at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia and the Universidad de
Los Andes and former member of the Board of Directors of the Central Bank in
Colombia -a sort of Colombian Allan Greenspan- has written that the
Constitutional Court when deciding about economic issues should have the
advise of technocrats -economists with PhD- who can analyze these issues
guaranteeing their political neutrality (Kalmanovitz, 1999).
Conclusion
Teivo Teivanen in his book on neoliberal reform in Peru shows the process
by which economics became the language of state reform in a way in which the
reform became a-political and therefore inevitable. In the Colombian
institutional reform, the discourse about redesign of institutions has become one
about globalization and the need to adapt the system to the requirements of
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globalization, open markets and a global economy. If the country wants to
succeed, it will have to adapt to these transformations in the economy and in the
law.
The language of economics did not emerge suddenly in Colombia. Since
the first wave of law and development, in which lawyers were nothing more
than just technicians trying to determine the best way to educate lawyers for
social change, economists have dominated the field of development. However,
the 1950s and 1960s model of development did not pay much attention to
institutions. It is with the revival of the state in the 1980s that the idea that
institutions matter took again the lead in the discourses about development and
it permeated the language of lawyers and social scientists.
The second wave of law and development was linked to the transition to
democracy in Latin America and the revival of institutional analysis in the social
sciences. At the same time, it was connected with the loss of European cultural
hegemony in criminal law and the transition to a model based on the American
system of justice. During Cesar Gaviria's administration (1990-1994), economists
focused on a redesign of the state, trying to adapt it to a neoliberal model of
development, one in which the state had to reduce its size and increase its
attractiveness for foreign investment. Since 1991 economists and lawyers
educated in the model of law and development began to develop a discourse in
which the idea of efficiency became central and one in which normative
statements about the CJS were losing their credentials. In different articles,
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written by economists from the University of Los Andes, the CJS was included in
a neoliberal model of development, highlighting its importance for foreign
investment in the country. As a result, the discourse about criminal law became
one about efficiency, transparency, corruption and development.
Once this discourse was constructed, lawyers -particularly those from the
Universidad Externado- lost their ability to utter meaningful statements about
the CJS and therefore to be relevant as policy makers in the reform to the CJS. In
the reform to the criminal justice system in Colombia, we witnessed a process
whereby lawyers either had to get involved in discussion about efficiency and
impunity, lacking the instruments to be interesting about it, or to lose their role
as policy makers and their role as central actors in the system. This is not to say
that lawyers disappeared in the CJS, they still exist as workers of the system, but
they work in a system where their ability to design it is losing importance.
The legal coloniality of power takes in that way a different shape. From
being a discourse to civilize populations, or to make them invisible if they were
not considered civilized, criminal law, as part of the legal coloniality of power,
adopted the current language of globalization, that of economics and neoliberal
governmentality.
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CHAPTER 5
HUMAN RIGHTS
,
EP1STEMIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW
Introduction
This chapter addresses the question of epistemic violence, a form of
"violence against the other produced by the inevitably dominatory systems of
knowledge which constitute that figure of the other" (Chrisman, 1994). Human
rights have traditionally been understood as universal and, therefore, as being
above local practices and local differences. After 1945, the idea of absolute state's
sovereignty came to an end and in its stead it emerged the idea of a limited
sovereign, one that had to respect some universal values contained in the 1948
Declaration of Human Rights and in the principles set up by the Nuremberg
Tribunal and other international documents.
In this chapter I analyze the state's loss of the power to define and its
replacement by the definitions made up in institutions of global governance like
the World Bank, the IMF, the United Nations, or in international criminal law
and international human rights tribunals. In order to show the current
configuration of the legal coloniality of power, I analyze some cases that the
Colombian Constitutional Court decided from 1991 to 2002. In these cases the
Court dealt with the tension between individual human rights, conceived as if
they were universal, and the rights of indigenous peoples, conceived as if they
were local. By analyzing these cases I show that human rights are part of a
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pattern of global power that constitutes subjectivities and that imposes a global
identity from the privileged site of the nation-state. 1 argue that law has been a
tool to transform the identities of subjugated peoples and to impose a white and
western conception of justice, constituting as such a form of epistemic violence.
The Sovereign's Power to Define
The nation-state's sovereignty to produce law has been affected by the
process by which the "power to define" has been passed from the national arena to
international institutions (Bourdieu, 1987). This process of internationalization
will end, with institutions like the International Criminal Court, in a process of
globalization of the law, understood in terms of a law produced from global
institutions of governance without the requirements of approval from nation-
states. The construction of a universal conception of human rights and the
coupling concept of jus cogens are steps in this direction. 47
However, this is the result of processes of globalization of the economy
and the existence of the institutions of governance. It could not have taken place
or at least not in the same manner without the special nature of the law and its
modern and universalizing character. In modern times law was understood as
41 According to this doctrine, once a human right or an international instrument is labeled as jus
cogeus it has to be enforced regardless of the will of the state in which that instrument has to be
enforced. The concept of jus cogens and its history is analyzed by Bassiouni in his analysis of the
Barcelona Traction Case, and by the Colombian Constitutional Court and its concept of "bloque
de constitucionalidad" in the decision that incorporated II Protocol of 1977 additional to the 1949
Geneva Convention. This concept will prove to be useful in the imposition of the white discourse
of human rights to indigenous communities in Colombia.
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the product of the national state. But its structure made possible its extension to
other places and it allowed the domination of non- European countries.
As in the case of modern science, modern law can be defined in terms of
rationality, calculability, predictability and control. Modern law shares with
modern subjects its placement in the boundaries of the nation state, and therefore
law has been associated to a modern sovereign, that is, one who has the power to
define good and evil within a territory (Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt, 1985; Schmitt,
1975; Klug, 2000). In this context international law is the law that nation-states
have accepted to apply in its relations to each other, that is, it is the compact of
multiple sovereigns.
With the emergence of institutions of governance and the discourse of
universality, law lost its national character and the nation-state its ability to
enforce it. This process represented the imposition of global identities from
above, because local communities were defined in abstract terms and their
identity was interpreted in the terms of the global discourse. Law and its
abstract character was a tool that proved to be useful in the universalization of
identities and the conflation of local differences. This is not a new process and it
is part of a strategy to Occidentalize subjects, that is to say, to control them
through a process of constitution of identities (Supra Ch. 2 and Chapter 3).
Law's de-territorialization implied the lost of place for the sovereign.
Crimes were not defined in national parliaments, but in meetings of the United
Nations in Vienna, New York or Rome. Schmitt has written that he who is the
sovereign defines the exception and the norm, and if we applied this concept to
the current situation we have to conclude that the nation-state is no longer the
sovereign because it defines neither the exception nor the norm,42 which comes
defined from those institutions of global governance like the Security Council of
the UN and the United Nations Secretary and the World Bank (Schmitt, 1975;
Schmitt, 1985). Law's lost of territoriality has meant the lost of sovereignty of the
nation-state. Sovereignty has become placeless but even more effective.
The discourse of human rights has been one important feature in this
process of denationalization of the law and the establishment of a new sovereign,
because they have come to shape a new conception of the law that can be applied
regardless of national sovereignty. The protection of human rights has
transformed state relations as they were after the Westphalia peace and WW11.
Through the use of a language of protection of human rights, core states have
been eager to intervene in the internal affairs of many countries but, on the
opposite side, the discourse of sovereignty has been used to not intervene in
grave crisis like the one in Rwanda, where the idea that there were genocide acts
but not a genocide served as an excuse to not intervene in that country and to
allow the genocide to happen (Power, 2005). Human Rights and Humanitarian
wars are part of the new panorama of legal global culture. According to Negri
and Hardt:
42 To Carl Schmitt sovereign is he who decides on the exception. This is a pure decision that is
not derived from any norm. Moreover, the sovereign decides the extension of the exception and
therefore the existence of the norm. He puts himself in a position outside the law to define what
the law is. Although he stands outside the normally valid legal system, he nevertheless belongs to it, for it
is he who must decide whether the constitution needs to be suspended in its entirety. Schmitt, 1985: 5
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...what stands behind this intervention is not just a permanent state of
emergency and exception, but a permanent state of emergency and
exception justified by the appeal to essential values of justice. In other
words, the right of the police is legitimated by universal values (Negri,
2001: 18).
However, law has never been applied only at the level of the nation-state
and it has not been applied without contestation. Since law was tied to the
nation state, its role was preciselv to define and constitute the identity of the
nation that is linked to that state (Melossi, 1994). Law has been used as an
instrument of the domination not only of a class over another, as in the Marxist
tradition, but also as a tool for the imperial colonization of different countries
(Fitzpatrick, 1992). Law has been the tool for the denial of national traditions
and also for the destruction of national identity through the imposition of a new
identity through the law (Engle Merry, 2000). The English nation state, for
instance, exported its law and its Englishness and extended this perception as the
epitome of the British Empire, even though those features were part of only a
nation that was not precisely homogeneous (Fitzpatrick, 1995: 17). Human
rights, through the nation-state, have created a global identity, that is, a liberal
identity that denies the particularities of local communities in order to make
them citizens or individuals.
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Globalization is then not only about the extension of capitalism all around
the world or the imposition of a neo-liberal conception of the economy to all the
countries in the world. The process of globalization could also be analyzed
through the role law plays in the construction of global identities (Derian Smith,
1999), that is to say, the way people are defined and shaped through the law
(Rivera, 2001; Sierra, 1995). Through the universal conception of human rights
the internal constitution of the states can be changed, as it was the case in South
Africa, but it can also deny and discredit national and indigenous tradition,
becoming a new way of imperial imposition of the law (Klug, 2000). Human
rights are part of a governmental power that not only disciplines but also
constitutes (Gordon et al, 1991; Hunt, 1993; Tadross, 1998).
The Nation-State and the Law
Law can be analyzed from a standpoint that highlights its racial character
and the imposition of the values of a group of people. A general conception
about the law is that it is abstract and general, and that it is the only way to be
applied in order to be equal and respectful of people's rights. According to those
conceptions about the law, the only way of respecting the differences is by
denying them under the pure form of law. However, this conception of law
proved being a tool to impose the conceptions and power of a class over another.
Through its universal character law could be imposed without showing its class
nature.
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Modern law is characterized bv its formal character and by the fact that it
is understood that there is a sole center where law is produced. Given this
centrality, law became tied to the nation-state, that is, there is a law produced by
the state to control a national community. It is this centralization of the law and
the creation of institutions in charge of administering it that determined the
transition from a feudal society, characterized by a plurality of jurisdictions and
administrations, to a modern society, characterized by a central state and a
central focus that delivers justice (Aymerich, 1998). The lived-world was
rationalized through law. By denying the interference from systems different
from the legal system, it allowed the creation of its own discourse and its own
structures (Teubner, 1983). Modern law has come from being autonomous law,
that is to say, a law characterized by its formality, to be responsive or reflexive
law, that is, a law that incorporates material elements in its regulation of society
and that it includes reflexivity to allow each system to govern itself as well. In
other words, after the crisis of the welfare state, modern law had to face the
existence of non-formal elements in its structure and the fact that many legal
decisions were taken outside the normal conducts of formal law.
The unity that characterized law after the French Revolution was found in
the modern state, that is, a state that was conceived as a nation-state in which the
nation was controlled under a central administration. The state became the
center that gave unity to the plurality that came from the old regime. This
centralization was the product of the activity of the state but also of the
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discourses about the law and the nation (Skowronek, 1982). The state as a central
idea of continental Europe was conceived as a mechanism of unity in a divided
and uneven society. Melossi in his analysis of the European state shows how the
latter found unity under Hobbes ideas about the Leviathan, that is to say, the
only way the state could stop civil war in Europe was through centralization and
the constitution of a sovereign power (Melossi, 1994).
The central feature of Hobbes' Leviathan was its monopoly of fear. As
Schmitt has put it, people surrender themselves in the hands of the state because
of fear to death. Hobbes' Leviathan was based on fear, because without a central
definition of the enemy there is only civil war. It is the state the only who
decides about friend and enemy, it has the sole authority to determine that space
of the political. This definition was made through law, and therefore the
European state became a law-making machine, through which the sovereign
decided about friend and enemy (McCormick, 1994).
Once this Leviathan was created, it monopolized not only law's
production, but also the production of symbolic violence, in a way that became
the only institution with the power to impose coercion and definitions of the
world (Benjamin, 1991). Besides the discourse of a state equals a nation, there
was a discourse of a state equals a central law, that is, the only law recognized by
the state was the law the state itself produced. This conception of the law
216
pointed at the conception of the law as the sovereign's product, that is, the
central power able to protect and therefore to oblige .43
The creation of the state was based on the determination of the boundaries
through the determination of friends and enemies. According to Carl Schmitt,
one of the key concepts to define the content of the political is the distinction
between friend and enemy as the key criteria to unite state and sovereignty with
the political. Schmitt criticizes the pluralism of institutions because it destroyed
the monopoly of the state as the sole entity able to determine the grouping in
terms of friendship and enmity. The only way to save the state was through the
definition of its friend and its enemies, and the right to competition in the state
and in the Parliament is allowed only to those parties that show ficielity to the
state. The extreme case of the political is the state of war; sovereign is he who
can declare the war. War is declared against those who are different from us,
who do not belong to our group: our enemies. In Schmitt's words:
...for Clausewitz war is the ultima ratio of the friend enemy grouping.
War has its own grammar, but politics remains its brain. Its logic can be
derived from the friend and enemy concept. Only in real combat is
revealed the most extreme consequence of the political grouping of friend
43 Hobbes conception of the sovereign is protego ergo oblige. In his analysis about sovereignty Carl
Schmitt shows that the central feature of sovereignty is the ability to command and to determine
the normal through the power of determining the exception. Cfr. Schmitt, 1985.
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and enemy. From this most extreme possibility human life derives its
specifically political tension (Schmitt, 1975: 32).
Law is then the production of the sovereign, that is, the central authority
that governs the members of the nation. The nation, as Fitzpatrick has shown, is
presented as the will of the people and by being understood as a whole it gives
law the abstract generality that is its main feature (Fitzpatrick, 1995: 17). The
centralization of the state is produced through the protection of people from
attacks coming from abroad. The European state was then constructed through
the idea of sovereignty of the nation, and in this creation law played an
important role, because through it the sovereign made all the determinations
regarding friend and enemies and especially regarding the norm and the
exception (Schmit, 1985; Negri, 2001).
The Imperialistic Character of National Law
Law has been tied to the nation-state as the central authority and as the
sovereign who determines the norm and the exception and in doing so it is
protecting people from attacks from outside the boundaries of the state. Law
belongs to the mythology of modernity and this mythology is sustained in the
experience of imperialism. This mythology is the mythology of the white
western male, and it is part of white mythology (Fitzpatrick, 1992: X). Law is
read as taking the attributes of western society, that is, this law is the modern law
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and the other are only primitive law, primitive and unreasonable ways of solving
social conflicts (Fitzpatrick, 1992: 7).
But law is not only the tool to dominate one group. The central question,
posed by Gramsci, is the discussion about why people obey the law, why they do
not rebel against the law. One approach to this understanding of the law is given
by his conception of hegemony. According to this conception, people from a
social class see law as an appealing product of the ruling class; therefore they
want to be dominated because in that way they could be part of the ruling class.
The consent given by the subaltern is given because of the prestige of the ruling
class and its position in the world of meaning production (Rivera, 2001; Gomez,
2000). However, this position has to explain why people develop a new identity
through the law. The question is not only why people do not contest the law, but
also how people have become constituted through the law in a way that avoids
contestation and guarantee respect of the law even from the oppressed.
Another approach to this question takes into account the discursive
production of reality. That is to say, people are not only controlled but they are
also produced by the discourses of those with the power of meaning production.
This approach shows that law not only acts in society but it constitutes it
(Brigham, 1998). As Fitzpatrick has pointed out, "people are subjected to law
through their own construction of belief in a myth of law's authority"
(Fitzpatrick, 1992: 11). The constitutive character of law can be used to analyze
how it was used to convey an imperial idea of the nation-state and the
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superiority of the national group wherein that law was created (Fitzpatrick, 1992;
Engle Merry, 2000; Sierra, 1995; Rivera, 2001).
Peter Fitzpatrick, from a post-colonial theory point of view, shows that the
law of western societies was exported to the colonies in order to educate those
subjects, but also in order to facilitate their domination through the use of the
instruments that made possible the domination of the poor classes in the
colonizing countries. Law's universal character legitimized its use in colonized
countries. Law not only allowed control but also construed the colonized as
inferior and in need of control by the ruling country:
This law was a prime justification and instrument of imperialism, one
which, in the assessments of the great practitioner-theorist of imperialism,
would "raise the mass of the people of Africa to a higher plane of
civilization", a gift which should "deserve the gratitude of the silent and
ignorant millions" (Fitzpatrick, 1992: 107).
The use of law presented the colonized subject as needing assistance and
protection, but also as needing correction. The colonized subject did not have the
status of a person and thereby s/he did not have any right of self-determination.
The purpose of law had then to be the negation of the culture of the colonized
subject. Fitzpatrick has shown in his study of British colonial law that law served
the purpose of eliminating the other from the picture. Through the use of the
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repugnancy clause, the British judiciary understood that the natives of the colonies
did not have a distinct project and therefore their culture could be denied in
order to allow the British government to implement its project for the colonies.
The only way the natives could be redeemed from the darkness of their primitive
state was through European intervention, and this meant European domination.
Maria Teresa Sierra and Efren Rivera Ramos studied this kind of
intervention and constitution through the law in their analysis of the American
intervention in the former Spanish colonies. Sierra analyzes how there is a
process of negotiation and hybridization between the national state and the
indigenous communities but she also shows that the national state shapes
conflicts in terms that are foreign to the communities and therefore that have to
be seen as necessarily colonizing (Sierra, 1995; Rivera, 2001). On the other hand,
Rivera Ramos shows that the Puerto Rican identity has been shaped through the
use of the insular cases, in which the United States Supreme Court created new
subjects under the dominion of the United States government. The special status
of Puerto Rico, for example, allowed the government to avoid recognition of the
rights of Puerto Ricans to a jury and to welfare. This special status made them
subjects with a reduced citizenship.
Sally Engle Merry in her analysis of Hawaii showed that western law was
used in different senses. Law was used as an expression of western customs and
therefore of civilization (Engle Merry, 2000). To do so, Hawaiians rulers traveled
to Europe to show that their constitution was like any European Constitution
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and therefore Europeans states lacked legitimacy to intervene in a European
country. Hawaiians understood very well that the colonizing process was made
for the domination of non-European countries. However, the American
government did not think alike, and took advantage of the fact that American
lawyers controlled the legal profession and the judiciary. Through this
advantage and through the devaluation of the Hawaiian culture, United States
took control of the island and several years later incorporated it as part of the
country.
Through this analysis we can see how law has been related to the nation-
state but also to the constitution of colonial identities. As Fitzpatrick has pointed
out, "the story of modern law is integral to that of the nation. In its identification
with nation, law acquires an origin and a history compatible with its own self-
presentation -its claims to encompass and combine the general and the
particular, sovereign authority and the popular, assured order and change"
(Fitzpatrick, 1995: XV). Through the connection with the nation law is presented
as general, divorced from the contamination of any particular interest.
Under the guise of the universal and the abstract, law presented itself as
the civilizing feature of the process of colonization of the "primitive peoples":
the colonizer deleted their law and their culture. The cultural features of those
peoples were presented as primitives, as lacking of the rationalizing process.
Even in contemporary descriptions of the law, European authors present
European and American law as the modern law facing a crisis of materialization
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and reflexivity, whereas the law of the indigenous communities is presented as
primitive law or as non-law at all (Teubner, 1983). In the next section I will show
how the discourse of human rights and humanitarian law are presented as
features of law in modernity and are shaped through a modern language of
rights, where there is a subject contesting the state. Rights are understood as a
victory against the state, but they will also be understood as part of the process of
materialization of modern law.
The Discourse of Human Rights as a Universal Conception of Humanity
After the French Revolution the bourgeoisie opposed an idea of natural
rights to the power of the state. The liberal discourse of modernity was
characterized by the introduction of the idea of limits to the action of the state,
that is to say, by the idea of sovereignty of individuals (Habermas, 1985), and by
the promise of a community of equals, which meant the destruction of every
communitarian tie (Barcellona, 1990). Modernity presented the individual qua
individual. In epistemology this discourse implied the appearance of a subject
without any attribute, that is, a rational subject who supposedly was
representing every individual with the ability of being rational. Kant in his
Critique of Pure Reason presented the subject as the center for every
epistemological discourse and as the center for ethical discourses. Human rights,
the rights of every human being, were the rights of rational individuals, that is to
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say, the rights of those beings that have the ability to think in terms of western
rationality (Kant, 1987).
The empty form of the law colonized the discourse of human rights. This
discourse is understood in reflexive terms, insofar as it is conceived as a set of
procedural norms that regulate processes, organizations and the distribution of
rights and competences (Teubner, 1983). This conception of human rights from
the standpoint of modern law can be analyzed as an effect of universalization or
normalization, that is, the process of social authority exercised by the dominating
culture to give efficacy to juridical coercion (Bourdieu, 1987; Zolo, 1997: 118).
Despite the fact that human rights cannot be considered universal rights,
they have been deemed universal, and this is due to its abstract form and the fact
that they are enforced from global institutions of governance. Rhonda Howard
has pointed out the lack of universality of these rights writing that the conception
of human rights is:
...a particular conception of human dignity and social justice. They are
not synonymous of human dignity, despite its appearance together in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Every society and every political
philosophy have conceptions of human dignity. Some of them, especially
those that have their roots in the vision that the nation, the people, the
community, or the family have precedence over the individual- are
radically in opposition to the idea of human rights (Howard, 1992).
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In European and American philosophy there has been a discussion of the
need of having a substantialization of rights. That is to say, from the perspective
of authors like Richard Rorty, Will Kymlicka, and Charles Taylor, the liberal
conception of rights has many flaws, especially in its pretension of universality.
These authors consider that rights are related to the community; that is to say,
they are not universal but contextual (Rorty, 1991; Rorty, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995;
Kymlicka, 1995b; Taylor, 1992). However, that interpretation assumes the idea of
the clear division of the world and the possibility of making clear distinctions
between liberal societies and the other societies, especially fundamentalist
societies. In the case of Taylor and Kymlicka they are thinking in the Canadian
case and how to fit the liberal conception of rights with the idea of sharing the
same territory with the French population of Quebec and the indigenous
communities. Since this discussion is more about how the nation-state deals
with different groups that are not part of the nation, they are of little help in
understanding the role human rights play at this time. Richard Rorty takes
liberal society as homogenous and with the possibility of being distinguished
from fundamentalist societies. However he does not take into account the
contamination of all cultures and the impossibility of making clear distinctions
between pure liberal societies and pure fundamentalist societies.
From different points of views, different scholars have discussed the idea
of universal human rights, showing that it is part of a western liberal tradition.
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therefore lacking the universality their supporters proclaim and denying other
ways of defending people's rights without denying their cultural traits (Leary,
1990). Eliza Lee, for instance, shows the limits of the universal conception of
human rights writing that
...the general limitation of the Universalist and relativist mode of thinking
is the way they treat political order as unchanging. Universalists assume
that political values must be pre-cultural, pre-political givens if they are to
have universal validity, thus overlooking the fact that any political
community is historically and culturally constituted. Cultural relativists,
ironically, while arguing against universalism end up adopting a similar
logic - taking the existing order as valid and as static and unchanging.
Cross-cultural universalism still fails to provide a framework for
understanding cultural communities as discourse communities (Lee,
1995).
Despite criticism about the concept of universal Human Rights, the 1993
Bangkok Declaration clearly expressed that human rights are universal,
objectives and non-selective and that it should be avoided any attempt of
implementing double standards of human rights. However, the Declaration
points out, those rights have to be interpreted in its context, therefore the
significance of national and regional particularities must be taken into account.
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The Colombian case and the way the Constitutional Court has decided about
indigenous rights show how states recognize those particularities and how the
core of human rights is used to impose a western world-view.
The process by which human rights are universalized is twofold. Firstly,
through the use of the institutions of governance, like the United Nations, states
are constantly monitored in order to make sure that they are complying with all
the requirements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Even though
those institutions have been useful to convey the idea of justice, as in the case of
Ireland and Argentina, they have also imposed universal ideas about human
rights that imply the denial of the indigenous idea of those rights. Secondly, the
constitutionalization of those rights, that is, their drafting in the national
constitutions as fundamental rights with the possibility of being enforced by
national tribunals.
Nikhil Azis argues that there is a hegemonic discourse in human rights
and that there is a need to provide alternatives to that discourse from the Third
World (Azis, 1999). Azis uses Falks' concepts of globalization from below and
globalization from above to show that the latter understands globalization as the
result of western experiences; therefore global culture means solely the
globalization of western culture. As part of this process of globalization from
above we find the hegemonic discourse of human rights. According to Azis,
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...human rights have become another weapon in the arsenal of western
countries in their efforts to bring recalcitrant Third World nations to heel
in "their" "New" World Order. Western nations are increasingly using
their very narrow interpretation of human rights as a yardstick with
which to judge Third World governments, and in conducting political and
economic relations with the latter (Azis, 1999: 39).
One of the main arguments against the local conceptions of human rights
is the fact that they are not secular, that is, that they convey ideas of good that are
substantial and that lack the empty form of the law. As a response to this secular
concept of rights, Pakistani scholar Ziauddin Sardar shows that secularism is
"intrinsically dominating, and that it can be just as fundamentalist and fanatical
as the religious worldviews it opposes" (As in Azis, 1999: 43). Through
secularization and universalism there is a hegemonic imposition of western
views about rights.
The hegemonic conception of human rights is conveyed through global
institutions of governance, particularly institutions like the United Nations and
the regional human rights tribunals. These institutions are in charge of
interpreting human rights from a universal point of view. In judicial cases,
which are binding for the countries in the cases of human rights Courts, those
institutions create official doctrine and determine the adequate interpretation to
apply in those cases. Through constitutionalism, those interpretations are
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incorporated in the national judicial system and therefore the hegemonic power
of human rights is conveyed in an enforcing level.
This process of constitutionalization is the result of the influence of the
German model, with the idea of the Constitutional Court, and the American
model, with the idea of judicial review and the protection of rights through
Supreme Court decisions. Heinz Klug has analyzed this process with regard to
the South African transition to democracy. To Klug, the creation of
constitutional courts
...heralded the expansion of judicial power or- as some characterized it-
the legalization of political disputes... the experience of the South African
Constitutional Court demonstrates how constitutional courts in particular
may play a highly political role providing a space in which often
irreconcilable conflicts may be temporarily if not permanently mediated,
allowing the political contestants to embrace democratic procedures and
outcomes while continuing to imagine their own particular, even if
conflicting, visions of the future (Klug, 2000: 14).
However, the central feature of the constitutionalizing process is the
legalization of rights, that is to say, the imposition of a conception of rights in the
text of the constitution. This process can be seen as a positive result from a
western point of view, since law is considered the tool for the solution of
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disputes amongst particular citizens. This incorporation implies also the
assumption of the universality of law and human rights' universal character.
Nevertheless, to Klug the globalization of human rights and of constitutionalism
is seen not in terms of imperialism or wishful harmonization but rather as a
process of hybridization, that is to say, indigenous communities have adopted
the discourse of human rights without denying their own traditions (Klug, 2000:
49). In the South African case, the globalization of human rights allowed global
institutions of governance to deal with apartheid and exercised pressure to
eliminate this crime against humanity. While the South African case is a
successful case of the transition to democracy thanks to the imposition of
pressures of the international community to eliminate apartheid and to apply
democratic principles in that society, the true is that the process has not been
extremely successful and that many of the perpetrators of crimes in that country
were not punished due to the necessity of a peaceful transition to democracy
imposed from abroad (Gibson, 2004).
Hegemony and Constitutionalism: The Colombian Case
Law has been used as part of the process of constitution of liberal
identities. During the discussions in the 1991 Constituent Assembly indigenous
rights were incorporated and they were part of the discourse of social
movements and politicians in order to get the constitutionalization of indigenous
rights. However, in the drafts that were presented it was clear that indigenous
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rights were taken into account and that they were part of the discourse of the
government not only during the debates in the Assembly, but also in the project
of constitutional reform known as "The Barco Project". In this section I want to
focus on the history of the incorporation of indigenous rights in the 1991
Constitution, and then I wish to analyze the constitutional doctrine regarding
indigenous rights in order to show that there is a process of nation building that
wants to incorporate indigenous peoples from a multicultural perspective. In
that sense I agree with Daniel Bonilla, but without the celebratory view, that the
1991 Colombian Constitution is a multicultural constitution (Bonilla, 2006).
President Barco' s (1986-1990) administration had introduced a bill to
reform the Constitution. One of the chapters of this failed reform introduced
indigenous rights in order to incorporate Covenant 169/1989 of the International
Labor Organization. The Barco Reform failed because of the problems related to
the intention of eliminating extradition of Colombians, as part of a secret deal of
Congress people with drug lord Pablo Escobar Gaviria.
Once the Constituent Assembly was created and its members elected, its
work focused on four issues: to put an end to violence; strengthen democracy; to
broaden the framework of rights and to redefine the basic structure of state
institutions (Bonilla, 2006: 121). The Assembly had three representatives for the
indigenous peoples and none representing Afro-Colombians. They were:
Francisco Rojas Birry, from the Embera Katio people; Lorenzo Muelas, for the
Guambiano people; and the Nasa indigenous person Jesus Pena Chepe, who was
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representing the indigenous guerrilla Movimiento Armado Manuel Quintin Lame
MAMQL, and who only had the right to participate in the discussions but no to
vote in them. The delegates stressed in the discussion and in their projects the
fact that they were taking part in the discussions as a result of 500 years of
resistance. They criticized governmental policies that were created to
homogenize indigenous peoples because of the government's idea that western
values were superior to indigenous peoples' values and cultural traditions. They
held that this process had been done through the use of law. According to
Muelas, “the juridical order that has ruled intercultural relations in Colombia has
served to justify for 104 years the assimilationist policies of the Colombian state,
based on the belief that western Christian civilization is superior and on the
belief of the inevitable disappearance of autoctonous populations" (Gaceta
Constitucional No. 40). From a constitutional point of view, delegate Rojas Birry
suggested that indigenous rights should be incorporated in the Constitution
because in that way Colombians would see that indigenous peoples had special
rights because of their special situation (Gaceta Constitucional No. 67).
According to Daniel Bonilla there is a tension between unity of the nation
and the diversity brought by the existence of indigenous rights (Bonilla, 2006).
Bonilla considers that the projects that were presented by the indigenous
delegates did not solve the tension that exists between the unity of the nation and
the recognition of indigenous rights and that it was the job of the Constitutional
Court to solve that tension between universalism and cultural rights. However,
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he does not take into account that this is precisely the claim of indigenous
delegates, who stressed a history of 500 years wherein they have been subjected
to policies of assimilation and homogenization, a policy that is continued by the
Constitutional Court in several of its cases. In the next section I will show how
the Constitutional Court has decided these cases and how through them it has
continued with the occidentalization of indigenous peoples.
I wish to divide my analysis by classifying the history of the Colombian
Constitutional Court in three parts. I will do this by paying attention to the
different transformations in the membership of the Court. I divided the different
terms of the Court in three. In Colombia there is not fix period for the Chief
Justice and therefore there is no possibility of identifying the different terms with
respect to the Chief Justice as it is in the United States. The periods have
overlapped but it is possible to identify three different terms:
1. The first Court had seven Justices and they were provisionally
elected. This Court became identified with Justice Ciro
Angarita's decisions, so I will refer to this Court as the Angarita
Court. The period of the Angarita Court was from 1991 to 1993.
2. The second Court had nine Justices with a period of eight years
(1993-2001) but since some of them served in the first Court,
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their term was already running. This Court has been identified
with Justice Carlos Gaviria Diaz.
3. The Third Court started after the retirement of all the Justices
that were in office in 1993 and their period goes from 2001 to
2008. The Court has been identified with Justice Manuel Jose
Cepeda, known as the mastermind behind the 1991
Constitution.
The Angarita Court and the Liberalization of Rights
The first Court had to face the difficult task of implementing the new
Constitution and of developing a sort of Constitutional pedagogy. The cases the
Court decided were brought by individuals, institutions, and NGOs that wanted
to have a clear decision about a topic that was already contained in the
Constitution but that it needed a constitutional decision. Before 1991, the role of
NGOs was limited to the role of denouncing the Colombian state before
international fora and before international courts. After 1991, a new task was set
for some NGOs, because they saw their role as one of protecting human rights
through the Courts. However they did not realize that by appealing to this path,
they were accepting the individual character of fundamental rights, mainly
because of the doctrine that the Court began to set after 1991.
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International law has had several transformations since 1945 and the
international law of human rights has become a way to limiting state's
sovereignty. Based on this idea. Constitutions have incorporated a sort of
“rights in the shadow" clause by which international law can be the law of the
nation whenever it is important to limit state sovereigntv or whenever it is
important to protect individual's rights. One of the roles of the Constitutional
Court is the analysis of the treaties celebrated by the executive branch in order to
determine if it is possible to incorporate them in the internal order.
justice Ciro Angarita Baron analyzed the constitutionality of international
law regarding Colombian Constitution. In Sentence C574/1992 he analyzed the
constitutionality of Protocol I additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
According to the Court, the four Geneva Conventions and the Additional
Protocols I and II constitute an ethical catalogue that is universal and mandatory
for all states. In a very interesting and mistaken interpretation of international
law. Justice Angarita holds that international humanitarian law is a jus cogens
norm, especially the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols I and II,
that is to say, it is customary law that has to be enforced independently from the
will of states. That means that Colombian state has to apply these norms, and
that they have a status of constitutional law. According to the Court, the
principle contained in the Constitution established an axiological system that is
international, that is, global, and Colombia cannot escape to that state of affairs.
To the Court, state's sovereignty is limited by these universal principles, and that
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is the only way to guarantee peace and the protection of an international
morality. According to the Court, article 94 of the Colombian Constitution
automatically incorporates international law, at least human rights and
international humanitarian law, into the Colombian constitutional system, and
these norms and principles make up a block with the constitution and because of
that these norms are immediately binding. By using the concept of block of
constitutionality, taken from the French tradition, the Court decided that all
international human rights law and international humanitarian law needed not
be incorporated into the legal system because they were already part of it, due to
the block they formed with the Constitution. Since human rights and
international humanitarian law were considered jus cogens, those rights were
binding for the Colombian state even if the Constituent National Assembly did
not expressly introduce them. Since they were binding, every individual living
under Colombian laws had to be bound by those norms, that is to say, every
individual had to respect human rights as defined by the global institutions of
governance. In this way, the hegemonic power of universal human rights was
imposed through the power of Colombian Constitutional Court, in other words,
those rights were redefined in terms of fundamental rights, but taking into
account the universal discourse created in the institutions of global governance.
The Angarita Court is very shy in the process of implementing
fundamental rights. However, in the few cases that it decided about indigenous
rights, it is very clear that the Court has a very liberal view of rights, that is, a
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conception that protects the individual and that has a multicultural view of the
Colombian state. We find this view in two cases that dealt with indigenous
rights and the protection of indigenous communities. In Sentence T428/1992, the
Court started to analyze the status of indigenous rights. This is a very interesting
case because the Court has been refining its concept of indigenous rights, but in
any case it has always sustained the idea that there are universal rights that have
to be respected by all Colombians, and cultural rights that belong to particular
cultures but that need to be accommodated to the idea of universal rights and
universal values. Based on the idea that there are particular rights, the Court
understood that there is a constitutional obligation to consult all the
government's decisions with the indigenous communities. In this case, the
government was trying to build a road that was going through indigenous
territories, affecting indigenous peoples' right to life. However, the Court,
despite all its multicultural rhetoric, did not deal with the idea of indigenous
rights, and in its stead it dealt with the idea of group rights, and it analyzed how
these works affected the possibility of indigenous peoples, or any other group, to
live in a place where there is a danger of a natural catastrophe. Given that the
government claimed that the road was built in the general benefit, the Court
found that in some cases minority rights were prevalent and therefore the idea of
general interest did not apply. But what is important about this case is that the
Court took for itself the idea of defending and implementing fundamental rights,
setting the bases for strategic litigation. Based on the works of Alexander
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Bickers, the Court considered that it is the best instrument to guarantee the
solution to the tension between security and justice. At the end the Court
decided in favor of the indigenous community, because in this case the general
interest that had to be taken into account was the interest of the community in
not having any works in their area without being previously consulted. In
Sentence T605/1992, the Court decided a case where fishing rights were under
discussion. The Court, following the doctrine previously established, found that
indigenous rights are prevalent vis a vis general interest, because there is an
obligation of the Colombian state to protect these communities and to guarantee
their material equality by protecting them and promoting their welfare.
In 1993 the Court had to decide one of the most important cases of the first
period. Colombia had been defined in the 1886 Constitution as a catholic state
and therefore the Catholic Church had the right to educate indigenous peoples
and to send missions to evangelize indigenous persons who were considered
savages. The Covenant between Colombia and the Vatican State, incorporated
into the Colombian legal system, was object of a lawsuit before the Constitutional
Court because it violated several articles of the 1991 Constitution. The plaintiffs
considered that this covenant violated the Constitution because it considered the
Church and the Colombian state as equal subjects with the right to educate
indigenous peoples. The plaintiffs held that the Church and its missions affect
the cultural integrity of indigenous peoples and that they should be protected
from this kind of intervention. The Court found several articles of the Covenant
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to be against the Constitution because it violated the religious autonomy of
indigenous peoples. However, the Court did not defend an argument based on
the idea of indigenous rights, but on the right of individuals to have their own
religion and to have a separation between Church and state.
What is interesting about the Angarita Court is that they were developing
the constitution and indigenous rights from the point of view of minority rights,
that is, collective rights of a group of people that where the minority in a certain
territory. Social movements had not developed an idea of strategic litigation and
therefore they were not using the Court as often as they used it during the
second and the third courts. The Court defended, in the few cases it had to
decide during this period, the idea of collective rights for the indigenous peoples,
holding that the territory, for instance, is part of their condition of indigenous
peoples' identity and part of the world-view. But despite this assertion, the
Court did not develop a doctrine of indigenous rights as indigenous peoples'
rights (Decision T188/1993; Decision T257/1993).
But there was a sudden turn in decision T380/1993, where Justice
Eduardo Cifuentes, who wrote past decisions dealing with indigenous rights in
which the Court considered indigenous rights as collective rights, held that
fundamental rights of indigenous peoples could not be confused with the
collective rights of other groups. The Court added that an indigenous
community is a collective subject and not a simple addition of individuals
sharing the same rights or interests. How was it possible for the Court to have a
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turn in its doctrine? If we see the plaintiffs in the cases the Court decided until
this case, we'll see that they did not have any kind of representation for the
indigenous peoples, and therefore when there was any kind of defense of
indigenous peoples, this was done by lawyers who did not have any link with
the indigenous communities and who understood indigenous rights as group
rights.
In the case decided with decision T380/1993, the plaintiff was the
indigenous organization of Antioquia, one of the most active social organizations
in the country. The case was brought in representation of the Embera people of
Choco, to protect the community from the exploitation of the forest by a private
company. The Court held that capitalist exploitation has some limits and that
those limits in the case of the territories of the indigenous communities are
determined by their cultural, social, and economic integrity, such as it is
commanded by article 330 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution. In decision
T405/1993 the Court considered the Resguardo as a special kind of territory and
part of the rights of the indigenous peoples. However, in this decision the Court
considered that indigenous rights are fundamental rights that cannot be absolute,
that is, they have to respect the clause contained in the constitution that gives
indigenous peoples special rights and special jurisdiction as long as they respect
universal human rights. It is interesting that this case was about the installation
of a DEA's radar. The authorities of the Resguardo sued the government because
in the territory of the Resguardo people from the American Army and the
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American Embassy were installing the radar that was going to be used in the war
on drugs. The Court considered that indigenous authorities were right in
considering that they had special rights to the territory, but the Court added that
these rights were not absolute because the government had the power to
celebrate agreements with other governments in these territories, taking into
account that it is the Colombian State and not the indigenous peoples the ones
with sovereign power in the Colombian territory.
The Gaviria Court: The Constitution of a Liberal Identity
The Angarita Court started developing a doctrine considering indigenous
peoples as collective rights. Then, thanks to the intervention of indigenous
advocacy, the Court started talking about indigenous rights as more than
collective rights. However, what seemed as a good path the Court was going to
follow was immediately changed when the Court had to deal with cases in which
the interests of the state were at stake. In these cases the Court considered that
the Colombian state was the sovereign power over all the Colombian territory,
that is, even in the territory of the indigenous Resguardos, and it considered that it
was legal to allow foreign powers, like the United States Army, to set up radars
as part of the surveillance that is useci in the war on drugs. This doctrine was
repeated in other cases where the Court defended a restrictive idea of indigenous
rights (Decisions T001-1994; T254/1994; T305/1994; T342/1994). The Gaviria
Court takes a more decisive role, using constitutional cases to definitely
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determine their understanding of human rights and in doing so the Court
constituted indigenous peoples as a global liberal identity.
In 1995, in decision Cl 04-1995, the Colombian Constitutional Court had to
decide about the constitutionality of the Covenant for the Development if the
Indigenous Peoples. According to this covenant. Indigenous Peoples are those
peoples who were living in the country before the Spanish conquest, who kept all
their own social, political and cultural institutions or part of them, and who had
a conscience of being part of an Indian community.44 This Covenant had the
purpose of incorporating ideas of development in the country and giving
indigenous communities funds to support their self-development. However, the
Covenant also substantialized the communities by accepting as indigenous only
those members of Indian communities who considered themselves Indians but
also who kept traditions unchanged. As we saw earlier, this is the western idea
about tradition, that is to say, an idea that conceives tradition as unchanged and
modernity as perpetual change. If Indian communities wanted money for
development they had to present themselves as traditional in opposition to
modern, that is, they had to forget 500 years of historical change and adopt a
frozen identity of the past. The Constitutional Court through the use of the
accion de tutela has sanctioned this conception. In decision T188/1993 the Court
established that the Colombian state was a pluralistic and multiethnic state and
that Colombia recognized as Indigenous only those communities that had ties
44 Convenio Constitutive del Fondo para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas de America
Latina y el Caribe. Madrid, 24 de julio de 1992.
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with the original communities of Colombia and kept the original traits of their
culture.
Through the creation of a static identity and through the dichotomy
traditional/ modern, the Court was opening the path for the creation of a
discourse of human rights that expressed the ethical superiority of the western
liberal conception of human rights. In a case tried by the Court in 1994 and
decided in decision T254/1994, Ananias Narvaez was expelled from his
community in El Tambo-Tolima, because he allegedly committed a crime of
robbery. Narvaez claimed that the indigenous authority violated his due process
of law and therefore he could not be expelled from the community but after a
process in which his responsibility had to be proven. The claimant held that his
fundamental rights were violated by the decision of the traditional authority.
The strategy followed by the petitioner was to treat the community's
authority as a public authority. However, in decision T254/1994 the Court
decided to treat it as an association ruled by private law. The Court, in order to
deal with the case, constructed the community as a subject of the law, that is,
despite being a community with their own conception of rights and justice, the
Court constituted the Indigenous communities as subject of the law, that is, as
being subject to the abstract and general form of the law. This strategy allowed
the intervention of the western liberal conception of human rights in the
community. Using the door openeci in its earlier decisions, the Court appealed
again to the dichotomy tradition-modernity and labeled the Indigenous
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communities as a community in the sense used by Ferdinand Tonnies, that is to
say, as a community in a stage of development that has not reached the superior
level of a liberal community in modernity. According to the Court, urbanism
makes community evolved into societies; therefore, the Indigenous communities
are not evolved and are not part of society.
In this way the Indigenous territories are places outside society and
therefore are identified as needing control and assistance from society. Since the
Court represents the view of human rights in society, those communities had to
accept the definition of their identity given by the Court. To do so, the Court
appealed to the discourse of the nation, by claiming that the Constitution
recognized plurality but also imposed unity. To recognize diversity, the Court
again used the idea of a frozen identity and it recognized autonomy only to those
peoples that kept their original traditions. However, the Court pointed out that
the original values of the community were limited by the universal conception of
human rights, that is to say, the local conception of human rights was considered
of inferior value and contingent, whereas the western liberal conception of
human rights was considered superior to the rights of the community.
Based on that discussion the Court considered that the decision of the
community had to be analyzed from the point of view of the universal
conception of human rights and especially from the construction given by the
International Labor Organization. In the decision the Court explicitly declared
that Human Rights are part of a universal code of humanity adopted by the
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community of nations, that is, by the United Nations. Given this definition, the
Court found that the decision taken by the community of El Tambo violated the
universal conception of due process of law and therefore they had to give a new
trial to Narvaez, but now applying human rights as recognized by the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Court considered that to interpret
indigenous rights, whenever there are conflicts between occidental values and
indigenous values, we have to follow these rules:
1) The more conservation of traditional customs, the more autonomy.
2) Fundamental human rights are the minimum that is mandatory for
everyone.
3) Imperative legal norms are above traditional customs, if they protect
some values that are superior to the ethnic and cultural diversity.
4) Traditional customs are above some legal norms, which the Court
labels as dispositive.
As a result, the Court considered in this case that there is a tension
between universal human rights, but taking into account that international law
gives prevalence to human rights above indigenous rights, the Court without
further analysis concluded writing that universal human rights are above
indigenous rights and that human rights are imperative in the territories of the
indigenous communities, a conception that is repeated in decision C139/1996
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when it decided about the constitutionality of law 189/1890. In this decision the
Court found that this law was in accord with the constitution, with the exception
of some articles that the Court considered unconstitutional, like the division
between civilized, semi-civilized and savages that we find in article 1 st of this
law. Based on this view of the indigenous person, that was central in the way
indigenous peoples were seen during the 19th and 20* century, the Court
considered that indigenous peoples had the right to have jurisdiction on
indigenous matters as long as the events happened in the territory of the
indigenous peoples and between members of the community, which means that
in any other case there is prevalence of the national jurisdiction (Decision
496/1996).
In another case the Court again appeals to the idea of indigenous peoples'
rights, and again this is due to indigenous advocacy, in this case with the
representation of the Ombusdman Office. In one of the most famous cases
regarding indigenous rights in Colombia, the Court recognized the idea of rights
of the indigenous peoples. In this case, Occidental Petroleum Company wanted
to exploit some fields that were within the territory of the U'wa People in the
eastern part of the Country. The Court considered that the government's
decision was made without consultation with the indigenous peoples, and
therefore that that action violated the Constitution and Covenant 169/1989 that
grants indigenous peoples the right to be consulted whenever there is a
governmental decision that affects their interests (Decision SU 039/1997).
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However, the Court did not recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples as
such, because in one decision the same year it decided that they could be
compensated for the damages they received when some works were done in
their territory without previous consultation (Decision T652/1997). That is, to
the Courts, indigenous peoples own the land, without taking into account their
worldview and the importance of the territory for their identity. For that reason,
when the U'wa people claimed that oil is the earth's blood, they claimed that no
exploitation could be made in the whole territory, and not just in the land given
to them.
The tension between universal rights and indigenous rights has been
object of constant discussion in the Court. In one case the Court had to deal with
the freedom of religion of one of the members of the community and the rights of
the indigenous people. In this case, one member of the Arwako people
professed the protestant religion and in doing so he did not follow the rules of
the indigenous authorities. The Court recognized the right of the individual to
have his own religion, but at the same time, the Court decided that the
community had the right to punish the individual for not obeying the commands
of the community (Decision SU 510/1997). As clear as this case seems, the truth
is that the Court did not take into account how the presence of Christian
missions is affecting indigenous identity, and how some religions have
demobilized indigenous peoples, due to the prohibition to march and mobilize
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that some Churches impose to the indigenous communities with whom they are
working.
In a similar case, the Court decided in favor of the individual because the
tradition was against the universal idea of human rights. This case involved the
U'wa people, where one of the members of the community gave birth to two
children and the community decided to abandon the babies because they were
born in white people's land and therefore they contaminated the community.
The indigenous tradition was that Mother Nature would take care of them, and
the community left them to die. The Court saw this as a clear case wherein the
individual's rights needed protection from the state (Decision T030/2000).
The Constitutional Court introduced a frozen identity of Indian
communities with the purpose of imposing the idea of human rights as universal
rights. In other decisions, the Court pointed out the plural character of
Colombian state but at the same time it clearly stated that the Cosmovision of
those peoples was accepted as long as it did no violate the western liberal
conception of rights. In doing so, the Court was imposing the global conception
of rights created and enforced through global institutions of governance. In the
Colombian case, human rights and constitutionalism have been tools to create
the identity of individuals qua individuals -that is in the Court's words as society-
and to deny the local conceptions of rights. Hybridization has been accepted
until certain limits and those are the core of universal human rights.
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The Cepeda Court: A Conservative Court
The Cepeda Court has dealt with few cases, but in the few this Court has
decided, they have not created new doctrine, limiting just to follow the
established doctrine. The Court has adopted a less activist stance in its review of
cases regarding indigenous peoples after 2001. This is so mainly because of the
criticism that existed against the first and the second Courts as too liberal and too
activists. The third Court started its job by differentiating itself with the other
Courts and by assuming an approach that wanted to bring about more stability
with the doctrines already established. In decisions C418/2002 and C891/2002
the Court gave the national government the power to limit indigenous rights in
cases where mining exploitation was involved. Interesting enough, the Court
considered that it was enough for the government to send the drafts of the bills
to the indigenous communities to fulfill the requirement of consultations, and it
was unnecessary to get the agreement of the indigenous communities. In one
decision about the conflict between indigenous rights and freedom of religion,
the Court followed the past doctrine established in decision SU510/1997
(Decision T1022/2001).
Conclusion
Law has been defined in abstract and universal terms. Its empty form has
been useful to impose a western conception of law and legality. Modernity has
been characterized by the creation of empty forms like subject, law, and science.
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These artifacts have been useful for the governance of communities and by the
creation of the promise of a community of equals. However, law's role was not
only the domination of workers and peasants in European countries. Law has
also been useful in the creation of the identity of colonized countries and,
therefore, of the colonizing ones. By establishing the lack of European
institutions the colonized was defined as inferior and in need of domination,
control and education. Law produced in that way subaltern identities.
The discourse of Human Rights has been a tool used to create new
identities: the individual, that is to say, the western subject. In that way the
empty form of the law has allowed better ways of governance. Through the
creation of official doctrine and the imposition of that doctrine all around the
world, with Covenants and Courts, the United Nations system has managed to
homogenize communities in the world and make all of them part of the same
discourse. Members of opposition in China, women in Africa, indigenous
communities in Colombia, are part of the same identity that has created them as
part of the past, they belong to tradition, they are the local, and they are the ones
who need to be changed. The discourse of human rights is part of this strategy of
homogenization and global governmentality. This does not mean that human
rights have not been used for the benefit of communities; it is only a reminder
that from gooci we can create many wrongs. Before Nazi Germany, scholars
discussed about the need to open the law and to give room for the values of the
Volk. After WW II, many people thought that legal positivism was the only way
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to defend the individual from the power of the state. Again in Argentina the
imposition of positivism allowed repression without changing the legal system
(Bergalli, 1984). That is to say, human rights have been used to defend oppressed
peoples, but they have also been used to negate local identities.
The nation-state has lost many of its functions, but through the discourse
of human rights it has assumed a new task, which is the re-nationalization of
law. Human rights represent the new dialectic in the law: after a process of
denationalization, the law is re-nationalized to impose the commands of the new
sovereign. In this process local identities are redefined, because in that way
global neoliberal governance will be realized in a better way. The legal
coloniality of power constitutes new identities and change old ones.
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II. HUMAN RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND LAW'S DEMOBILIZING EFFECT
CHAPTER 6
LAW AND VIOLENCE: M-19 AND THE PATH TO THE 1991 CONSTITUTION
Introduction
This chapter analyzes the relationship between law and violence. The first
part of this dissertation dealt with the process of legal production of subaltern
identities, that is, the legal coloniality of power. In the second part, Chapter 6
and Chapter 7, 1 analyze the subalterns' resistance and their use of law to frame
their claims or to achieve their political goals.
Traditional interpretations of the path that led to the 1991 Constitution are
based on theories of transition to democracy. According to these interpretations,
what happened in 1991 was a process of democratization from above, where
political elites decided to open the political system and to incorporate new actors
in the political arena. However, this account is unable to explain the role M-19
and other guerrilla forces played in the process and it is unable to account for the
importance of a new Constitution in the discourse of guerrillas since the 1980s. If
this was a simple transition to democracy, why the same elites that opened the
system are so willing to close it for alternative political forces? In this account
law is just a mechanism that reflects elites' choices. It becomes a technical
element that translates technical decisions on how to achieve democracy. Law, in
this account, is deprived of its polemical character, is stripped of its political
meaning, it becomes a pacified symbol of the elite's choices.
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I want to recover the character of law as polemos (Valencia, 1985;
Trazegnies, 1981). I want to show the importance of social struggles to open the
system and the importance of law for guerrilla movements in Colombia. In my
account, law is a space of negotiation, is part of that negotiation, and it
symbolizes the agreement between political armed forces. The shadow of war
and violence is always there. Members of M-19 did not forget the perverse
effects of the state of siege in the 1886 Constitution and voted for a limitation of
the new state of exception. War is what took these forces to the table to
negotiate; war gave them power to push some transformations. Elites' choices
were determined by the threat that the war was going to be not against the army
but against the Oligarchy (Proclama M-19, January 1988). This "critical juncture"
affected the way law was perceived. From being an instrument of war in the
hands of the state, law became a peace treaty, an agreement symbolizing the end
of the confrontation. Law is thus permeated by violence.
In the first part of this chapter I will analyze the relationship between
violence and law, paying special attention to the constitutional history of
Colombia. In Colombia there have been more than 70 wars in almost 200 years
of independent history, showing the importance of war for the development of
political relations and for the state building process (Pardo Rueda, 2004). At the
same time, there have been a similar number of peace agreements, showing the
importance of war and peace making for the development of a more open
political system in the country (Medina, 2003; Interview with Rosemberg Pabon
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Pabon. Cali, July 14th and August 22nd 2005). Each one of the constitutions of
the 19 th century was the result of a war and the cause of a new one (Valencia
Villa, 1987: 149). In Colombia there is a close connection between war and
constitutions: Constitutions are peace agreements reflecting the balance of forces
after the battle. As Antonio Navarro Wolff, former leader of M-19, said, what we
had in 1991 was not a transition to democracy but a transition to peace
(Interview with Antonio Navarro Wolff. Medellin, September 10 th 2005).
Law, Violence, and Peace: 19th Century Colombian Constitutions
Law has been defined as command and authority (Hart, 1994). It has been
seen as an instrument to bring about order in society. Based on the social
contract tradition, law has been perceived as the result of a peaceful agreement
between members of civil society and as an instrument that reflects that social
pact (Rousseau, 1947). However, in this tradition law is seen as the opposite to
violence, that is, violence is external to law, it disappears with law. This is the
tradition followed by interpreters of the 1991 Constitution, who see violence as
something preceding the law, and law as just a tool to eliminate that violence
through a new order of things (Dugas, 1993, 1997; Van Cott, 2000; Buenahora,
1995). For them, once the constitution was approved, the spectrum of war
disappeared and what was left was just peace and order.
This interpretation is based on the idea of the development of law in
modern Europe, where war -and for that matter violence- was left in the hands
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of the state and where citizens were deprived of them.45 At the interior of the
state, the latter had a monopoly of violence and for that reason law symbolized a
pacified and peaceful community. The idea of war became part of international
relations, it was accepted as a form of relating to other states, but in the inside of
the state peace and order were a given. From this point of view, law was
deprived of its polemical character; it ceased to be political (Schmitt, 1943;
Schmitt, 1980).
Machiaveli and Hobbes recognized the polemical character of law and its
violent essence. Thomas Hobbes in his book on the English state recognizes that
violence, or the fear of it, is at the base of people's obedience to law. According
to Hobbes, "there must be some coercive power, to compel men equally to the
performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater than
the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant" (Hobbes, 1962: 113). In
his analysis, Hobbes is showing that law cannot exist without violence; law has
to be understood as command but that command cannot be obeyed if people do
not fear the law. Sovereignty, to Hobbes, is the creation of an artificial man that
is in charge of having the monopoly of fear: it is preferable to fear that one man
and not all men (Schmitt, 1996). In this analysis, law is an instrument that
pacifies but at the same time an instrument that monopolizes violence and fear.
However, in Hobbes' account, war and violence are seen in their separation
45
1 based my analysis on my interpretation of violence in Schmitt, Agamben, and Benjamin To
the latter, to be defeated in war means to lose war as an object, as something we own
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between the peaceful inside and the warring outside. The monopoly of violence
in the interior of the state becomes just fear, terror of the law, and nothing else.
Following Schmitt's analysis of the political, Walter Benjamin studies the
relationship between violence and law (Hollis, 2005). In his text, Benjamin shows
violence's lawmaking and law-preserving functions. In this analysis, Benjamin
pays close attention to the question of war. War is the extreme of the political
situation, where the relationship friend-enemy is at its extreme and this is an
enmity that we pay with our lives. The political is based on this relation. In this
field, law can either be moral or political. Law is part of the political, it is part of
the struggles between friend and enemy, and it is tied to the extreme violence of
the political. Benjamin shows that after the final confrontation, violence makes
law, it creates it and it informs it. Constitutions are not agreements of the social
body but treaties between enemies that decide to end the enmity. Benjamin
writes:
Admittedly, military force is used quite ciirectly, as predatory violence,
towards its ends. Yet it is very striking that even -or rather precisely- in
primitive conditions that scarcely know the beginnings of constitutional
relations, and even in cases where the victor has established himself in
invulnerable possession, a peace ceremony is entirely necessary. Indeed
the word "peace", in the sense in which it is correlative to the word "war"
(for there is also a quite different meaning, similarly unmetaphorical and
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political, the one used by Kant in talking of "Eternal Peace") denotes this a
priori, necessary sanctioning, regardless of all other legal conditions, of
every victory. This sanction consists precisely in recognizing the new
conditions as new "law", quite regardless of whether they need de facto
any guarantee of their continuation (Benjamin, 1996: 240).
After the end of the confrontation, combatants decide to sign a peace
agreement. However, this kind of agreements is part of the laws of international
war and not of internal wars. In the European tradition the state has the
monopoly of violence in the inside and the monopoly of war in the outside.
There should be no confusion between these two levels. However this is
precisely what has happened in Colombia since the beginning of the Republic.
There is confusion between the outside of war and the inside of monopolized
violence. The state loses that monopoly; law ceases to be an instrument of peace
and in the hands of the state -as part of a tradition of authoritarianism- becomes
an instrument of war. As a result, peace treaties that were supposed to be
agreements between combatants at the international level become part of the
inside of the state. The end of violence is symbolized with the agreement
between combatants; this agreement takes the form of the Constitution.
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Constitutions and Peace Treaties
In the Colombian case, law has not been used as a simple instrument that
brings about peace. Law is the result and the symbol of some peace that has
been achieved after a bloody battle. To Gonzalo Sanchez, in his analysis of
Colombian wars, Constitutions in Colombia cannot be seen just a Navigation
charts or as documents reflecting a social contract (Sanchez, 1991). They are
peace treaties, because political actors have arrived to the point of drafting new
constitutions after fighting wars. From the wars of the 19 th century to the 1991
Constitution, Colombian constitutions have been agreements between factions in
a fight; the new 1991 Constitution is just the mirror of the political forces at play.
In the 19 th century until the reform of 1957, Colombian Constitutions were peace
treaties celebrated between the liberal and the conservative parties. From 1957 a
new war began and the 1991 Constitution mirrors the agreement with one of the
actors in combat. In this section I want to show the way the liberal and
conservative armies fought their wars and how the peace agreement ended up in
a constitutional text that was going to be the Navigation chart of the relations
between the political forces in the years to come (Valencia Villa, 1986; Valencia
Villa, 1987; Sanchez, 1991; Orozco, 1992). This is to show how war has a
lawmaking power and how this power determines the kind of rights people have
in the state and how it has become one important element in the struggle for
rights in Colombia. In a nutshell, there is no such friendly liquidation of the past,
in its stead there is violence having a lawmaking function, war precedes law and
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it is giving its shape, as Valencia Villa shows, law becomes a strategic part of
war, it can be both a tool of war and a symbol of the end of it (Valencia Villa,
1986; Valencia Villa, 1987).
From Independence to the 1886 Constitution
After the wars of independence of 1810 and 1819, Colombia became an
independent Republic that had certain structural elements, namely: the
confessional character of the state; the importance of the executive; and the
centralist character of the Republic with the recognition of some rights for
citizens, the same that were written in the Declaration translated by Antonio
Narino. After the wars of independence n 1810, creoles fought about the nature
of the Republic. There were two sides in the discussion: the centralist,
intellectually led by Antonio Narino, and the Federalist, led by Carnilo Torres.
The fights between the factions allowed Pablo Morillo to re-conquer Colombia
and it was only until 1819 that the Country was going to achieve final political
independence in the Battle of Boyaca. After Independence it was clear that the
country had to be centralist, not only as a replication of the kind of government
existing in the Colonies, but also as an instrument of defense against new
attempts by Spain to re-conquer the country.
Once the Republic was established new conflicts arose. The fact that the
Gran Colombia comprised three different territories made its administration
difficult. On the Colombian side, conflicts between Santander and Bolivar about
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the form of government led to fights and conspiracies. In September 1828 there
was an attempt to assassinate Bolivar in the presidential palace. As a result of
the disputes, Bolivar had to leave Bogota and he was heading to Europe when he
fell sick and finally died in Santa Marta on December 17th 1830. After Bolivar's
death the Gran Colombia -Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador- dissolved and
these countries started to exist as independent states. In their attempt to build
the state, the factions in power passed constitutions that tried to impose their
view of the way the Colombian state should be. It is interesting to note that
constitutionalism developed in Colombia at the same time that the laws of war
were being incorporated in the wars between the different factions of the
regional caciques. Between 1858 and 1863 Colombia had three Constitutions that
in some way or other reflected the state of the struggle. For the purposes of my
argument I want to pay attention to the Constitution of 1863, because it ended
the disputes and gave room to a period of relative peace that lasted until 1886.
Tomas Cipriano Mosquera, president of the state of Cauca, won one of the
civil wars that were fought during that time and in July 8/1861 arrived to Bogota
to become the new president of Colombia. Mosquera wanted to implant a
Liberal Republic and a federal system. In order to pass a new Constitution he
called a new Assembly where the losers and the winners of the war negotiated
the new rules of the relationships between the different factions in combat. The
National Convention finally approved the Constitution in 1863 and it included
several rights and institutions that were considered by some unfit for the
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situation of the country. Legend goes that Victor Hugo, the French novelist,
when reading it, considered it a constitution for angels (Valencia Villa, 1987: 138).
But this Constitution was passed under the shadow of new civil wars.
What is interesting about it is that the framers of the 1863 Constitution decided to
incorporate the laws of international war in the text of the Constitution. In cases
of civil war the parties in the fight applied international law, particularly the
laws and customs of war, and not the constitution. According to article 91 of the
1863 Rionegro Constitution, jus gentium is part of national legislation and its
rules are to be applied in cases of civil war. Thus, these conflicts can end through
peace agreements between the belligerents, who have the obligation of
respecting the rules and customs of war between civilized nations. This means,
that the Constitution recognized the possibility of agreements between
combatants, with a rule to be applied in the war between states to fights between
political factions. Given the confusion between the inside and the outside of the
state, these agreements took the form of a Constitution or of a constitutional
reform (Orozco, 1992: 105).
With the end of the liberal project, the Constitution of Rionegro was
attacked by conservatives, who launched a movement to restore state structures
as they existeci before 1863. This movement was known as the Regenerncion and
it was led by Rafael Nunez, leader of the conservative party, who along with
Miguel Antonio Caro drafted a new Constitution that went back to the structures
of centralism and strong presidentialism. Despite the fact that the Constitution
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was made according to the principles of the winners in the battle, article 121
established the possibility of declaring the state of siege whenever the
circumstances advised it. This Constitution was passed under the shadow of war
too, and for that reason in this article the drafters of the text decided to
incorporate the jus gentium as the limits to the actions of the state. This is, in the
Constitution it is assumed that the state of siege resembles the wars that
preceded the 1886 Constitution and that these wars reflect a lost monopoly of
war and for that reason the norms that have to be applied are not those ones of
the situation of peace -criminal law- but that one of war, namely jus gentium and
the laws and customs of war between civilized nations.
From 1886 to 1957: a new Peace Treaty between Fighting Factions
The Constitution of 1886 was reformed several times until its final demise
in 1991. Some of the reforms were the result of the president's political agenda,
like the reforms of 1936 when Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo wanted to modernize the
country through some economic reforms or like Carlos Lleras Restrepo in his
attempt to create a more bureaucratic administration. These reforms were called
the Liberal Revolution, but they were more along the lines of the social
democracy of the Weimar Constitution or the New Deni, than the liberalism that
was applied in the first liberal Republic (Valencia Villa, 1987). But I am
interested more in the 1957 constitutional reform that was the solution to the
wars of the 1950s but at the same time caused the wars of the 1960s to the 1990s.
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After Liberal hegemony (1930-1946), Mariano Ospina, running for the
conservative party, was elected president. While he was president, the liberal
candidate, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, who was known for his appeal in the masses,
was assassinated. This event launched an unprecedented violence in the country
where liberals and conservatives fought against each other for about ten years.
In the countryside liberal towns expelled conservatives and in conservative
towns liberals were expelled. Ospina's government was followed by Laureano
Gomez' government, considered to be one of the bloodiest and most
authoritarian governments in Colombian history. Due to Gomez' illness,
Roberto Urdaneta assumed power and ruled the country for about two years.
During this conservative administration the government created a secret police
and recruited its members mainly from the region of Chulavita, reason why this
police was known as the chulavitas. They were responsible for the killing of
thousands of liberals just for their membership to the liberal party. At the same
time, in the Llanos and the Coffee region of Colombia, peasants created self-
defense groups in order to protect themselves from the attacks of the
government. They were also responsible for the death of thousands of people in
Colombia based just on their political opinions. During this period more than
two hundred thousand people were killed only for their political affiliation. The
victims were mostly peasants and working class people (Guzman et al, 1963).
Laureano Gomez returned to office in 1953 only to be overthrown by
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla on June 13 th of that year. Rojas Pinilla passed a new
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constitution where some changes were made, amongst them the right to vote for
women. However, due to the repressive character of his government and the
agreements achieved in Spain by the leaders of the two parties, Rojas was
overthrown in 1957 and a military Junta replaced him until new elections were
celebrated. In the constitutional reform that a Constitutional Assembly passed,
liberals and conservatives decided to share the pie in the government and
decided to alternate the presidency, beginning with the liberal party. Thus
Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958-1962) was elected as the first president of the
National Front. This agreement was seen as a peace treaty between the two
forces that were fighting for power in Colombia. The National Front is then a
peace agreement between liberals and conservatives that kept the country in
peace for about four years, because in the same way that solved a conflict
between factions it created a new one that was going to be the cause of new wars.
The 1970 Elections and the emergence of M-19
The National Front was supposed to end in 1974. However, in 1968 with
the reform pushed by Carlos Lleras Restrepo, the sharing of positions in the
government was going to persist after the end of the alternation of the
presidency. The last president of the National Front was going to be elected in
1970 and the president had to be a conservative. However, in the 1960s new
guerrilla movements were created (FARC and ELN) following the example of the
Cuban Revolution and the widespread knowledge of the ideas of Che Guevara
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as well as the experience of La Violencia and the need to resist the attacks that
were coming from the government. The struggles during La Violencia leci to
members of liberal guerrillas to join forces with members of the communist
guerrillas fighting in the area of Sumapaz (Pizarro, 1992). In 1966, during the
Congress of the Communist party, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionanas de
Colombia FARC was born. On the elites' side, Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, son of
former president Lopez Pumarejo, created a dissident movement within the
liberal party called Movimiento Liberal Revolucionano MRL in 1960. Despite the
fact that Lopez Michelsen was a member of the Colombian elites, some of its
members believed in the revolutionary idea of opening the political system and
when Lopez decided to return to the official liberal party in 1968 they left with
disappointment and joined the guerrillas.
In 1961, Maria Eugenia Rojas and others created the Alianza Nacional
Popular ANAPO to support the ideas and achievements of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla,
who after being in exile had returned to Colombia to face justice. The unfair and
biased character of the trial led to the creation of ANAPO.46 Given the fact that
during his dictatorship he implemented some populist -and popular- policies, he
managed to get the support of some members of the popular sector. He ran for
the presidency in 1962 but he did not obtain enough votes to put the system of
the National Front in check. However, for the elections of 1970, ANAPO had
more experience and due to the divisions in the Conservative party, he was then
46 Although Rojas had been a bloody dictator, the trial pushed by the Liberal party in Congress
left many people with a bitter taste They believed that Rojas could have been tried in a more fair
way (Ayala, 1995; Ayala, 1996).
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more likely to become president in clean elections. On the 19 th of April 1970, the
elections took place and Rojas Pinilla was leading the race for more than a
hundred thousand votes (Premo, 1971; Pulgarin, 1984; Noriega, 1977; Noriega,
1998). In the radio reports Rojas was winning the elections when suddenly the
president ordered to close the stations and prohibited the radio from giving any
report that did not come directly from the government. It is not a surprise that,
some days after the election, Misael Pastrana Borrero, the candidate of the
conservative partv, was declared winner by a small margin of votes. Members of
ANAPO and the popular sector were outraged, even members of FARC and ELN
offered support to Rojas Pinilla, and they were ready to go to the Presidential
palace to claim the election for Rojas, using physical violence if that was
necessary. But, Rojas decided to avoid confrontation and recognized Misael
Pastrana as the new President. This decision disappointed many of the leaders
of ANAPO, amongst them Carlos Toledo Plata, who joined a branch of ANAPO
called ANAPO socinlistn.
Members of ANAPO followed the dictator's daughter in order to fight for
the presidency in the elections of 1974. However the radicalization of the two
branches in ANAPO led to the disappearance of the movement. During the
same years, Jaime Bateman, Rosemberg Pabon, Luis Otero, Alvaro Fayad, Ivan
Marino Ospina and others left FARC -in fact they were expelled- for
contradicting the leadership. Jaime Bateman, as others in M-19, began his
revolutionary life as a member of the Communist Youth JUCO. He soon joined
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FARC and became aide of Jacobo Arenas, one of the leaders of FARC. This is a
time where there were some struggles in the revolutionary thought in Colombia,
and Manuel Marulanda proposed amongst many things that the war be taken to
the cities because in the countryside the war that was being fought affected only
the peasants and it was not felt by the elites. Bateman believed in these words
and started to work along those lines. However, the communist party felt that he
was departing from party lines and Bateman and others were expelled from the
PC and FARC.
Bateman, Luis Otero, Rosemberg Pabon, Elvencio Ruiz, and others created
M-19 to fight for democracy and to follow ANAPO and Maria Eugenia Rojas.
Their first motto was " Con el pueblo
,
con las annas, con Maria Eugenia, al poder
"
(Letter to Maria Eugenia Rojas, May 1974). It is important to notice that by this
time, M-19 still believed in the revolution via the armed struggle and the
possibility of a socialist revolution in Colombia (Interview with Rosemberg
Pabon Pabon. Cali, July 14th and August 22nd 2005). They saw themselves as
members of the petty bourgeoisie who were trying to incorporate themselves in
the masses via ANAPO, but they did not see themselves as a Revolutionary army
(Letter to members of M-19 by the Comandancia: July 1 st 1977). Their actions at
that time were more symbolic and more along the lines of political activism than
revolution.
In 1974, M-19 had its first public appearance. That year some members of
the group stole Bolivar's sword from the museum in Bogota where it was usually
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exhibited. The sword became the symbol of this group and later was used to
express nationalist Bolivarian character of the group, following the example of
the Uruguayan guerrilla Tupamaros.47 After this act others came: the
kidnapping and assassination of Jose Raquel Mercado, an union leader accused
of betraying the movement and supporting the government; the kidnapping of
the manager of Agropesca, in order to support workers in the negotiation with
the factory; and the kidnapping and killing of Charles Bitterman, a linguist who
worked for the Summer Linguistic Institute (Villamizar, 1995; Periodic©
Mayorias 12 and Mavorias 17).48 But until that time M-19 was just a group that
had developed some symbolic actions in their struggle in the country. However,
by 1979, and due to the repressive character of Julio Cesar Turbay's
administration (1978-1982), members of the group decided to steal five thousand
arms from the barracks of the Command of the Armed Forces (known as Canton
Norte). They did so on the night of December 31 st 1979, humiliating the armed
forces and showing some power of the movement that was giving the step to
become a revolutionary army (Interviews with Rosemberg Pabon Pabon. Cali,
July 14th and August 22nd 2005 and Antonio Navarro Wolff. Medellin,
September 10th 2005; Villamizar, 1995). There was a bloody reaction, and almost
all of the members of the group and its leadership, with the exception of
47 Even the act of stealing the sword was inspired by Tupamaros. This group stole Artigas flag in
Uruguay in order to give to the movement a more nationalist content.
48 it seems that the kidnapping and assassination created some division in the group the
National leadership sent a letter to the Comandancia de Base to explain their position and clarify
some points (Letter February 6 1981).
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Bateman, were captured and taken to trial.49 During these years, M-19 did not
believe in law, mainly because of the authoritarian character of Turbay's
administration. But this was going to change in the 8 th Conference. They even
rejected the Constitutional Assembly created by Lopez Michelsen to reform the
Constitution and saw it as a way of perpetuating the state of affairs created in
1970 (Villamizar, 1995).
Law as an Instrument in the War against Guerrillas
Due to the economic transformations occurring in Latin America at the
time, there was a need to stabilize the country and pacify the popular sectors.
The general strike of 1977 showed the elites the power of the workers movement
and the possibility of losing control of the country. Once Julio Cesar Turbay
(1978-1982) took office he declared the state of siege, as all of his antecessors did
since 1958 (Gallon, 1979). One of the measures he took was passing the Estntuto
de Seguridad created along the lines of the doctrine of national security, that at the
time was accepted by South American armed forces. One of the norms of the
Statute was the prohibition of strikes and popular protests and the consideration
of strikes as terrorism. The structure of the judicial system was changed and
now political crimes were going to be tried by military tribunals and following
an expedite procedure established in this exception law. This legal situation led
49 It is now legendary the many times that Bateman was about to be captured and managed to
escape. In one of the occasions he was recognized by one of the members of the military but
Bateman reacted by saying that this always happened to him, being confused with that criminal.
Bateman's performance was so convincing that the officer let him go (Villamizar 1995, 1997).
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the leaders of the guerrillas to use a strategy of rompimiento, that is a strategy of
denunciation of the system as unfair and illegal and leave the juridical strategy to
the stage of casacion, which was decided by a Supreme Court made up of civilian
judges (Aponte, 2006).
Unsurprisingly members of guerrillas who were tried by these military
Courts were found guilty of the crimes they committed (rebellion or sedition)
and were sentenced to prison. However, the shadow of international war was
still present, because these laws did not try rebels for the crimes committed in
combat, that is to say, recognizing their condition as combatants. The trials of the
leadership of ELN and M-19 were famous and the audiences for the trial of the
latter were taking place when the Dominican Embassy was taken by a group of
members of M-19 led by Rosemberg Pabon, aka Comandante Uno, with the
purpose of showing support to political prisoners and to denounce human rights
violations committed by Turbay's government (Interview with Rosemberg Pabon
Pabon. Cali, July 14th and August 22nd 2005).
The Embassy, the Palace, and the Threat to the Oligarchy
The action in the Embassy had the purpose of advertising the situation of
human rights in Colombia and of offering support to those members who were
in prison. The demands of the movement were clear: the end of the state of
siege, amnesty for all political prisoners in Colombia, and the end of human
rights violations. At this point M-19 had an anti imperialist discourse, product of
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its nationalism, but it was going along the lines of a liberal bourgeois democracy.
In a communique of June 1980, after the end of the taking of the Embassy, the
group manifested the need of transforming democracy in Colombia. They
proposed democracy at all levels: political, economic, social, cultural, and
military. They even proposed bourgeois freedoms and some social welfare for
workers.
But it is in 1982 that the movement started to take law more seriously,
criticizing the socialist position of other groups and emphasizing the opening of
the political system via the end of the National front, more rights for people,
more participation, and rights for the indigenous peoples. In the 8 th Conference,
M-19 threw the wall down some years before the Berlin events, meaning that
they were moving from the radical left to a more democratic left along the lines
of European socialism (Interview with Otty Patino. Medellin, September 11th
2005). In the Conference, members of M-19 decided to support the idea of a
National Dialogue. It is important to remember that since 1979 Jaime Bateman
was insisting in the idea of a Sancocho National, which was referring to the need
of incorporating all political forces in the political system.50 In the same
Conference M-19 made a call to all democratic and political movements to create
a broad Movement of National Salvation (Movimiento de Salvation National). It is
not a surprise that Alvaro Gomez used this same name to call his own movement
after being kidnapped and released by M-19. This Movement was supposed to
50 Jaime Bateman was known for his expressions to describe the Colombian situation, besides the
Sancocho National he used to say that La Revolution es una rumba, to express that Revolution was
not a burden for them but a happy task.
272
demand the government to open the political system, to establish a dialogue and
to finally have peace (8 th Conference August 7th 1982). 51
M-19 began negotiations with Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) and this led
to a new peace process. Betancur decided to pass a new Amnesty law, broader
than the one passed by Turbay and it took the idea of M-19 of a national
dialogue. During the process, M-19 consulted the bases all around the country
and created campamentos in cities like Cali, Bogota and Medellin where they
discussed with the bases the reforms that were going to be proposed to the
government and the agenda for M-19 as a legal movement. 52 The dialogues
ended because of accusations on both sides of launching hostile attacks against
the other. M-19 suffered some attacks, the assassinations of two of its leaders,
Alvaro Fayad and Ivan Marino Ospina, and decided to try Belisario Betancur for
the crime of lving to the country and perpetuating the war. A group of M-19
under the command of Luis Otero and with Andres Almarales, Elvencio Ruiz,
Alfonso Jacquin (a lawyer), and others decided to take the palace of justice and
demand the presence of the president to be tried by the Supreme Court. It is
interesting the path they chose. They chose properly the only authority that
could try the President but they did not calculate the reaction of the government.
Thev were expecting negotiations as the ones they had with Turbay's
administration, but here the reaction of the army was thoughtless and launched
51 The communique is signed by the Comandancia and it says con el pueblo, con Ins nrnias, nl poder.
52 This is the base of the success of M-19 in the elections of 1991, because the candidates were
known to the public and there was an experience of working in the communities (Interview with
Fabio Cardozo, Cali, August 24 th 2005).
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an attack that lasted two days and cost more than one hundred lives, amongst
them the lives of eleven of the Justices of the Supreme Court.
As a result of the attack, the prestige of the group hit bottom and they
were seen as fighting a senseless war. In 1986, after the election of Virgilio
Barco's (1986-1990), M-19 decided to open new channels for a new peace process.
However, this was a group that was seen as defeated and lacking the legitimacy
and the support they used to have before the taking of the Palace of Justice. In an
interview given in 1986, Carlos Pizarro re-claimed the democratic character of M-
19 and claimed to be a peaceful group and not a warrior organization. In this
interview Carlos Pizarro proposed a new social pact and national dialogue,
going back to the lines set up in the 8 th Conference and the discourse of Jaime
Bateman after 1979 and the communiques of 1985 (Revista Cromos, June 17th
1986). 53 During these years M-19 insisted in the need of having a national pact
that transformed Colombian democracy and that opened the political system for
the inclusion of other groups. From this time M-19 proposed the creation of an
Admirable Congress like the one created by Bolivar at the beginning of the
Republic. In this Congress, representatives of all the political forces in the
country would discuss the shape of the new national pact, that is, they proposed
the creation of a Popular National Assembly ( Pacto National por un Gobierno de
53 In the communique signed by Navarro, Almarales, Israel Santamaria, and Vera Grabe in
February 1985, the M-19 looks for national agreement within the framework of democracy. In
this document the group proposes an opening of the political system, cabildos abiertos to discuss
with people the measure within a framework of participatory democracy, a National Referendum
to approve the measures taken and give them constitutional character and a military truce (Letter
to the members of the Commisions and Subcomissions of the National Dialogue, February 27th
1985).
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Paz. Communique of September 1987). However, there was a problem that
needed to be solved. How to force the government to re-start negotiations in
favorable conditions? That is why the M-19 let people know their proclama of
January 1988. This is an interesting document because it sets the lines of the
proposal of M-19 to the elites and it sets the bases of what later was to be the
Constitutional Assembly. In this document they declare peace to the army and
war to the elites: Vida para In Nation. Paz a las Fuerzas Armadas. Guerra a la
Oligarquia. Tenemos un solo proposito: la democracia. Un solo enemigo: la oligarquia.
Una sola bandera: la paz.54 At the same time they told the press that they were
willing to take the war against the oligarchy and they added that the country was
tired of having second-class burials and it may need 50 first-class burials. As it is
clear, and the oligarchy understood it well, this was a direct death threat against
the members of the oligarchy (Interview with Rosemberg Pabon Pabon. Cali,
July 14th and August 22nd 2005). As a result of this new agenda. Order 005 of
April 23rd 1988, signed by Carlos Pizarro, ordered Alvaro Gomez kidnapping,
but he was not be treated as a kidnapped person but as a prisoner of war.
A group of M-19 complied the order and kidnapped the leader of the
Conservative Party but this time they decided that they were not going to make
the same mistake committed in 1985. They decide not to try Gomez for any
crime and in its stead they dialogued with him and showed him the need of
opening the political system. M-19 had a proposal of 11 points, namely: to cease
54 Life for the nation. Peace to the Armed Forces. War to the oligarchy. We have one goal:
democracy. One enemy: the oligarchy. One flag: peace.
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fire; to begin a national dialogue; to discuss some reforms; to call a referendum to
know the opinion of Colombians; to include in the Assembly indigenous
organizations ONIC and peasant organization ANUC; to have what they call a
cabildo abierto to let people participate; and to start a dialogue with the armed
forces. They add that the constitution cannot be the work of some experts in
constitutional law, but it has to be the result of people's participation.
Gomez was released some months later and decided to support the
process. He even created a movement that was called Movement of National
Salvation
,
stealing Bateman's ideas. The elites understood the message, and
Barco's government called for a reform of the Constitution. The reform failed
because of the influence that Pablo Escobar was exercising against Congress,
trying to include extradition in the discussion. Barco retired his proposition and
the Constitution was not reformed. In November 2nd/1989 the government and
M-19 signed the peace agreement. In March 9/1990, Barco's administration
signed a political agreement that included a reform to the Constitution or a
Constitutional Assembly (Acuerdo Politico, March 9th 1990). However it is only
with Cesar Gaviria's administration that the peace agreement reached its final
stage: the new 1991 Constitution.
The 1991 Constitution
Virgilio Barco and Misael Pastrana signed what was known as the
Pastrana-Barco treaty in order to dismantle the National Front and establish an
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open political system. However, the the Consejo de Estndo found the Agreement
against the Constitution and, consequently, Barco decided to introduce his own
project of reform based on article 218 of the 1886 Constitution, which established
that only Congress could reform the Constitution. In January 1990, drug cartels
pressured for the inclusion of an article prohibiting the extradition of
Colombians. Due to these pressures the Barco Administration decided to retire
the bill and sank the reform. In Congress, then Minister of Government Carlos
Lemos Simmons said the following to members of Congress who wanted to
include in a referendum the prohibition of extradition for Colombians: "You
would be inviting Colombians the 21 st of January not to a referendum but to a
bloodbath. Because this is a topic that, if taken to popular consultations, it will
bring about tremendous violence, deaths, and intimidation" (As in Buenahora,
1995: 35).
There were several obstacles to reform the Constitution. On the one hand,
there was the war against Pablo Escobar and, on the other, FARC's reluctance to
surrender and to opt for a democratic transition. They had good reasons to
distrust the government. In the elections for the presidency Jaime Pardo Leal
(UP), Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa (UP), and Carlos Pizarro (M-19) were assassinated
despite the fact that they had police protection. The new political actors did not
believe in the political will of Congress to reform the Constitution and they
feared pressures like the ones exercised during the failed Barco reform. In the
elections of March 1990, students from some of Universities supported the
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inclusion of a seventh ballot, given that voters were already scheduled to cast
votes for six elective offices. However the ballot was not to be counted but it
served as a pretext to call for a Constitutional Assembly. Based on the pressure
of the student movement, Alvaro Gomez joined them and called for a
Constitutional Assembly (Orjuela, 1993; Dugas, 2001). President Barco passed
decree 927/1990 in order to ask Colombians in the presidential elections if they
supported a Constitutional Assembly. The question received 86.6% of the votes
but it did not represent the majority of the population, because the election had a
high level of apathy -or fear.
Once Cesar Gaviria took office, he decided to use the emergency powers
that he had due to the fact that the country was under state of siege since 1984.
Based on those powers, Gaviria made an agreement with the leaders of political
parties, with the exception of Pastrana -who decided to not support the process-
and set an agenda for the Constitutional Assembly. Decree 1926/1990 went to
constitutional review by the Supreme Court and they found that the decree was
constitutional with a vote of 14 to 12. However the Court found that the primary
constituent, the people, could not be limited by agreements between the parties,
and therefore the Assembly could reform and even change the Constitution.
Now it was not a matter of a constitutional but a constituent Assembly. The
Supreme Court understood the shadow of war that was always over laws in
Colombia. It saw that the new constitution was not going to be just a text; it
perceived it as a peace treaty between the factions at war. In the decision of
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October 11 111 1990, the Court wrote that law is related to peace, and that the new
Constitution could be a new instrument to finally enjoy the right to peace.
Conclusion
The path to the 1991 Constitution was not as peaceful as Dugas and Van
Cott present it. Violence, physical and symbolic, is at the base of this new
Constitution. As in the past, this new document is the result of war and
therefore it is closely related to violence in the country. It is a new peace
agreement with some of the factions that were fighting the Colombian
government at the time. However, members of M-19, like Rosemberg Pabon,
recognized that they misread the political situation in the 1980s, because they
thought that the only problem Colombia had was the closure of the political
system. They did not fail in getting their desired reforms, but their mistake was
that their analysis led to an incomplete reform.
Violence can be epistemic and it can constitute the other with a universal
idea of human rights. But social organizations can see law and violence as part
of their political agenda. However, it is necessary to take into account that M-19
was a traditional social movement, that is, one that seek to get power to
transform social structures. Given the fact that M-19 was at the time of the peace
process a liberal guerrilla, its achievements did not fall beyond the limits of the
law.
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CHAPTER 7
A TUTELAZO E1MPIO: HUMAN RIGHTS
,
LAW AND RESISTANCE
Introduction
This chapter analyzes indigenous peoples' resistance and its use of legal
artifacts to frame their claims. I will show their long history of armed and
violent resistance and its role in the process that led to the 1991 Constitution. In
this sense, the first part of this chapter is a continuation of the argument
presented in chapter 6. In the second part, I will show the localization of
indigenous struggles and how the sort of liberal legalism introduced with the
1991 Constitution has brought about the demobilization of the movement and
the need to find new strategies to resist law's constitutive power. The fact that
law proved to be useless led the indigenous movement to go back to the kind of
resistance used in the 1970s, that is, active resistance that is not illegal but that is
not within the confines of the law either. As the current leadership of ORIVAC
once said, if tuteln works -meaning constitutional law-, that is fine, if not, they
still have their arms (Interview to Flaminio, Cali January 2006). Law can then be
seen in different ways: as an instrument of domination of one class over another;
as part of social struggles; and as part of a process of constitution of identities,
amongst others.
During the Colony indigenous peoples and African slaves resisted to
Spanish domination. In the case of Africans, they escaped and created Palenques
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or free territories in several parts of Colombia, a process described by Nina de
Friedemann in her study on San Basilio de Palenque, a town in the north part of
Colombia (Friedemann, 1979). Indigenous peoples combined different strategies
to resist to the process of occidentalization that began with the conquest of the
Americas. Throughout the colony and the Republic they fought the government
and in some cases obtained important results, like law 89/1890. A combination
of armed struggle and legal fights led to the process of incorporation of
indigenous rights in the 1991 Constitution. But the way the Court decided cases
regarding indigenous rights led to the demobilization of social movements,
because this kind of legal liberalism made them consider legal strategies as the
only indigenous strategy, leaving in the power of lawyers and Courts the
movement's fate. In the following pages I want to show the history of
indigenous armed resistance, their use of law and their belief in the myth of
rights, to finally show a local strategy of indigenous resistance that combine law,
social activism, and intercultural education.
Manuel Quintin Lame and his use of Law
Nasa people have fought Colombian laws in different ways, and have
used history and law as part of their struggles. Indigenous peoples have been
forced to fight local elites who, despite indigenous peoples' clear titles and
institutions, have tried to deprive them of their lands. Since 1832 the Republic
favored the division of rcsgunrdos as part of a process of privatization of all lands
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and as part of a process of liberalization of indigenous peoples. Despite Law
89/1890, that was thought to be temporary, resgiiardos were divided and an
unjust system of exploitation of indigenous peoples was established (Espinosa,
2007: 406). As a response to the attacks from the white colonizers in the region of
Cauca, the Nasa people organized and fought the attempts of these elites. The
regime that the Republic left to indigenous peoples was one wherein they did not
have the right to vote, they did not have political representation, and the political
system was open only to white settlers as long as they were male, literate, and
had property. Political division in the country, which ended up in the “War of
the One Thousand Days", reached indigenous peoples, and they took part in
these disputes defending their interests but on the side of one of the contenders
in the battle. These indigenous guerrillas, known as Las Montoneras, had their
own leaders and they were important in the battles, especially because
indigenous soldiers were very brave when they had to follow their own leaders,
even though they did not fight that enthusiastically when they were under white
people's command (Campos, 2003).
Due to the liberalization of the lands occurred in the 19th century,
indigenous peoples were deprived of their own lands, which were given to white
landowners. When the Department of the Great Cauca was dissolved and the
Department of Valle del Cauca was created, the elites in Cauca had to look for
new ways to promote commerce and capitalism in the region. Caucan elites
faced economic expansion in the sugar cane haciendas in Valle del Cauca, coffee
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activities in Antioquia, and mining in Choco, with the resulting reduction of their
economic activities and income. Since 1904, after the end of the war, Caucan
elites imposed some restrictive measures upon the indigenous peoples inhabiting
this area: they imposed fences on the territories, they prohibited them to grow
plants in the mountains, and they started a policy of modernization of the
haciendas with the resulting effects on the labor force.
Indigenous peoples organized and chose Quintin Lame as their
representative and defender. The movement, known as La Quintinada, resisted
the system of terrajeria and defended the resguardo and the Cabildos that were
under attack by the white elites of Cauca. In his speeches, Quintin Lame asked
why the white owners based all his arbitrary measures on a piece of paper. In
Popayan, he found a friend of Gonzalo Sanchez', named Francisco de Paula
Perez, a lawyer who helped him to get a better knowledge of the law. In his
interview with this lawyer, Lame learned about the conquest, the titles given by
the King of Spain, and the Leyes de Indms. He found that the titles given by the
king made indigenous peoples slaves only because of the existence of the
Encomienda at the beginning of the colony and its sequel, the terrajeria system.
Given that the injustices committed against the Indians were based on Colombian
laws. Lame started to learn them and he useci them in his communications with
local authorities. As a result people, mocking him, started calling him Doctor
Quintinito (Castrillon, 1973: 73).
Rappaport presents La Quintinada's demands in the following way:
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1. Defense of the resguardo against attempts to divide it;
2. Consolidation of the cnbildo as a center of political authority and
organizing;
3. The reclaiming of lands usurped by landlords and the rejection of titles
not based on royal decrees;
4. Refusal by sharecroppers to pay rent;
5. A reaffirmation of indigenous cultural values and a rejection of racial
and cultural discrimination (Rappaport, 2000: 114).
An important part of Lame's organizing process was the use of law. In
1914 he moved to Bogota and sent letters to the Minister of Internal Affairs, to the
Supreme Court, and had interviews with the President of the Republic, in order
to get recognition as defender and representative of the indigenous communities.
The movement brought about alarm in Bogota's elites, who saw with concern the
resistance to the exploitation in Cauca, but also the intention of Lame to recover
the colonial titles of the Resgunrdos and to create a small republic of Indians (nna
Repiiblica Chiquita de Indios). Lame said in his meetings that they had to keep the
struggle until the government recognized and respected the titles indigenous
peoples had. The government responded arresting Lame for the crime of
rebellion, robbery, and even libel, because of the accusation he was doing against
the white elites (Castrillon, 1973).
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What is interesting about Lame's story is that he used colonial titles and
republican laws, that is, he resisted to the process of occidentalization and took
that attempt as part of his strategy to resist white settlers. They searched for
colonial legal documents, a strategy that has been followed by several
indigenous groups like the Pastos in the South of Colombia, in order to show that
indigenous peoples had legal right to the land even under the regime established
by Spanish and Colombian law (Rappaport, 2005; Espinosa, 2004).
Lame's use of law was criticized by most of his followers at the time, who
thought that this alternative was going to demobilize their movement and in any
case that it was going to legitimize republican law. Lame and indigenous
peoples used law 89/1890 as a mechanism in their struggles, as it was the case of
indigenous representatives in the National Constituent Assembly in 1991. In the
case of Nasa people, they use and defend colonial titles as part of a tradition of
resistance and historical interpretation that they pass to the coming generations
and that is part of a consciousness of political struggle wherein they militate
against both the colonial state and the republican state (Espinosa, 2007: 418).
In his writings Quintin Lame emphasized the fact that law could give
them back their lands, taken illegally by the King of Spain (Romero, 2005: 81).
Quintin Lame decided to represent other indigenous persons before judges, but
this provoked the reactions of the landowners who decided to respond with
violence and with a distorted use of law. He addressed most of his letters to the
national government, understanding that the national government had more
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power than the local government, and that the representation of the white nation
resided in Bogota and not in Cauca or Narino. In his writings he showed a good
knowledge of the law and the rituals people had to follow when communicating
with national authorities, information that he took from a book entitled The
Lawyer at home. But he also went to the National Archives in Bogota to study the
titles that gave white people the right of property over indigenous lands. In
Tierradentro (Cauca) he proved indigenous rights with the titles he found in the
archives of the town.
But his legal strategy was most of the times unsuccessful and this brought
criticism because he was seen as someone who believed too much in white
institutions. Given the failure of the legal strategy. Lame decided to pursue
another path. By the end of 1914 he and his followers decided to take their lands
back in order to distribute them equally and in that way recovering the rights
that were taken by the Caucan elites. Lame gathered 80 indigenous persons
ready to fight against the white landowners constituting in that way the first
known indigenous guerrilla in Colombia. 55 The rebellion got deeper into the
indigenous conscience and they decided to keep the fight. Landowners reacted
too and saw that indigenous peoples were organized and realized that what was
used to control them, law 89/1890, was responsible for this organization. They
suggested a reform to the law, in order to control the appointment of Caciques.
According to the Minister of Government indigenous peoples lacked the skill to
55 Las Montoneras were made up with indigenous soldiers but they did not fight just for
indigenous rights.
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rule themselves, they lacked initiative, had no capital and had not goals for their
lands, and therefore they needed white control and government.
In a text written in may 1916, entitled Luz Indigenti en Colombia and
published as an appendix by Fernando Romero (Romero, 2005), Lame writes
about indigenous rights from a legal point of view. In this text he rejects the
attitude of whites and mestizos and asked white people to respect the rule of law,
and to not impose their will with the use of force. He writes:
It is the duty of the Supreme Power to execute the laws. From this it is
possible to infer:
1. In any decision taken by the executive power, the government is
subordinated to the Legislative.
2. The Constituent Power has to set the limits to this power.
3. With the exception of judicial power, that is the duty of the Supreme
Power but not of the Executive (Lame in Romero, 2005: 459).
Regarding their right to the lands, Quintin Lame wrote about ancestral
rights that are above the laws of the republic. Against law 57/1887, that
abolished all colonial laws in the territory of the Republic, and in that sense it did
not recognize indigenous peoples' rights, Quintin Lame wrote in 1916 that their
right to the land did not finish with the passing of time, because their rights do
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not end thanks to the power of the higher force (Restrepo, 2005: 102). He rejected
legal treatment of Indians as children and, showing his socialist influence, he saw
law as a bourgeois instrument used by the white landowners to deprive
indigenous peoples of their lands. In the text El Derecho de la Raza indigena en
Colombia ante todo. El niisterio de la natnraleza ednca al salvaje indigena en el desierto
,
published by Romero (Romero, 2005), Lame criticized national laws that
commanded indigenous peoples to divide their common lands, as part of the
process of liberalization of lands and individuals. In this text, Lame appeals to
the idea of real equality and asks why the law does not command white people
to divide their own land, and it orders only indigenous peoples to do it (Lame in
Romero, 2005: 471).
Quintin Lame's struggles led to the mobilization of indigenous peoples
and the violent reaction of the white elites. In 1921 he was imprisoned but
despite being released in august 1921, his movement was finished and he
decided to travel to the south of Tolima in order to join the forces that were
struggling for indigenous rights in that region, amongst them, one of the
founders of the communist party, Jose Gonzalo Sanchez. But the disorganization
of the movement disappointed him and he then decided to travel to Bogota to
keep fighting with the use of the law (Villanueva, 2005). But after a while he
decided to return to the fight and to use the nnngas, which is the collective works
of indigenous peoples, as a form of resistance and as a way to organize the
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armed struggle. But he failed in this struggle due to the extreme violence of the
white elites (Fajardo, 1999).
In 1939 Lame finished Pensamientos del Indio que se educo dentro de Ins selvas
colombianas, his most known treatise. This text became a sort of manifesto for the
indigenous movement after Lame's death. The book, published in 1971, became
a powerful testimony and a symbol of ethnic resistance for the young indigenous
intellectuals who created the Consejo Regional Indigena del Cauca CR1C and the
Consejo Regional Indigena del Tolinia CRIT (Espinosa, 2007: 421). Lame's use of law
was part of his interpellation to western civilization. He asked about the right of
conquest of the white elites and the right indigenous peoples to have their own
culture and their lands. Lame played in a space of in-between, that is, a space
that recognized the power of law, which used it as part of the strategies in the
indigenous struggles, but that it also recognized the possibility of armed
struggle. But Lame obsession with law led to his silencing and the
demobilization of his movement and the final victory of the white elites in Cauca
and Tolima (Espinosa, 2004; Espinosa, 2007: 424).
CRIC and Indigenous Intellectuals
The history of the indigenous movement cannot be understood without
the history of popular mobilization in the 20 th century and the attempts of the
government to control social movements by creating governmental unions and
social organizations that were supposed to be at the service of the state (Uribe,
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2007). This form of corporatism, taken from the Mexican experience, proved to
be unsuccessful and on the contrary it put together various intellectuals that later
on would take part in movements like the indigenous movement in Cauca and
Tolima.
The 1960s was a time of social unrest in Colombia. After the end of
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla's dictatorship (1953-1958), Colombia entered a period a
pacted democracy, that is, a period in which the two political parties involved in
the struggles known as La Violencin decided to share power and therefore to
established a system of alternation in the presidency. This kind of democracy
did eliminate violence between the conservative and the liberal parties, but the
closing of the political system and the lack of solution to social conflicts gave way
to a new kind of conflicts and actors (Sanchez, 2007; Sanchez, 1991). The left
became more important in the popular sector, there were more processes of
organization of the movements and the example of the Cuban Revolution gave
way to new guerrilla movements like the Ejercito de Liberacidn National ELN and
the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia FARC.
Agrarian conflicts existed in Colombia at least since the beginning of the
20 th century and they led to the mobilization of peasants and indigenous peoples,
like the Quintinada in the region of Cauca and the lamismo in Tolima. But the
government tried to solve the problem without actually depriving landowners of
their lands by promoting a limited agrarian reform and by establishing a sort of
capitalism that continued the exploitation of peasants in the countryside
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(Munera, 1998). ANUC was created to organize peasants and just some years
after its creation it had more than two million members. This number is
impressive taking into account that in Colombia there were at the time some nine
million peasants.
After the beginning of the National Front, that institutionalized a pacted
democracy created by Colombian elites after the end of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla's
dictatorship, Alberto LLeras' administration (1958-1962) tried to reform the
agrarian structure by passing law 135/1961 that had as its purposes: reduction of
big and unused properties; favoring small and medium property; strengthening
familial units within peasant population; and promotion of a model of
development that took as its model American farms. Agrarian elites opposed the
law and the inefficiency of the state led to the failure of the reform. At the same
time, guerrilla movements started their fight and they had a disbelief in any kind
of institutional reform.
In order to prevent a further development of guerrillas, Carlos LLeras
Restrepo's administration (1966-1970) promoted the institutionalization of
agrarian conflicts. Lleras was following the dictates of the Alliance for Progress
and its model of development for the country. In 1967 Lleras Restrepo's
administration passed decree 755/1967, a decree that ordered public registry of
all the persons that were beneficiaries of what is called in the decree "State
Agrarian Services". This decree established the creation of local, regional and
national organizations that later on would be part of the Asocincion Nacional de
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Usuarios Cnmpesinos ANUC (Munera, 2007: 244). The government created the
juridical structure that served as the basis of the future ANUC. In 1967 it passed
Decree 2420 that created the Division of Peasant Organizations DOC that was to
be used as the mirror image of ANUC in the government. LLeras Restrepo s
reform proposed an agrarian reform in Colombia trying to balance the interests
of peasants and landowners. In order to be able to have an agrarian reform,
Lleras Restrepo knew that there was a need of a strong peasant organization.
But in the speech that he gave in the event of inauguration of ANUC he was clear
that he wanted control of the organization in order to prevent the infiltration of
communists and people who wanted to exploit their partisan interests (Munera,
1998: 246). This was the last time that Lleras Restrepo cared about ANUC or the
agrarian reform, in fact it was clear that his only interest was trying to control
peasant organizations and try to impede that they organized and joined
communist guerrillas fighting in the countryside.
Under the new government things got worse. In 1970 Misael Pastrana
took office under accusations of electoral fraud (Villamizar, 1995). The Police
denounced a plan of taking of lands and they attributed it to the communist
infiltration in ANUC. As a result of the attacks from the government, ANUC
broke up with the government and elected a new leadership that radicalized the
organization and that openly allowed the participation of the left in the
discussions.
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In order to respond to the attacks from the police and the government,
ANUC developed a plan of massive taking of lands and with that purpose they
appointed a clandestine direction. On February 21 st/ 1971 the first of several
takings of lands took place. By the end of the month more than 16000 families
participated in about 316 taking in 13 departments. The government reacted
treating these acts not as a political action that wanted the government to fulfill
its duties, but as an act planned and organized by communist guerrillas and
therefore subject to criminal prosecution. This attitude just got more
radicalization in ANUC politics and a wider gap between the government and
the peasant organization and the possibilities of participation of the popular
sector in the Colombian political system. In August 1971, the movement
gathered in Fuquene (Cundinamarca) and approved the first peasant mandate.
In this meeting the organization proposed a model of rural development based
on the work of small familial units. The document was called Tierra sin Patronos,
because they did not even want to have peasants exploiting labor force different
from their own. With the purpose of reforming the structure of the countryside
and replacing the state, they created the Consejos Ejecutivos de In Reforma Agrarin
CERA. At the beginning of 1972 there was a second wave of takings of lands in
6 departments of Colombia. The government combined a policy of military
violence against peasants and of administrative sanctions and blacklisting in
order to divide the movement and to create fights inside ANUC. Several local
organizations were pressured and they lost affiliates and therefore strength
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within the movement. Given the internal divisions already existing in the
organization, the III National Congress led to nowhere and it represented the
end of ANUC as an organization of masses (Munera, 2007: 259).
Despite the fact that ANUC did not achieve important results, it did
represent an important organization of the peasant movement. But perhaps its
most important result was the organization of indigenous intellectuals who
found a space, support to their policies, and a space of political education. As a
result of the organizing movement that was going on during the 1960s and the
1970s, indigenous peoples organized. It is important to take into account that
indigenous peoples have resisted colonization and the process of
occidentalization from the very beginning of the conquest. As Victor Daniel
Bonilla shows it, the first reaction of the Nasa people to the conqueror was one of
political and armed resistance. The strategies of resistance changed to take into
account new political situations. They recognized the fact that they were
defeated in the war, but that did not mean that their cause was. In the 16th
century they used law and legal arguments to protect their right to the land and
the community. Juan Tama, a Nasa leader, was part of the political tradition of
the Nasa people because of his struggles to keep the right to the territory, the
unity of the people, and the right to have their own government (Bonilla, 1977:
14). Tama's teachings showed that the laws of the white man could be
contradictory and because of that they could be used in defense of the rights of
the indigenous peoples. But one of Tama's teachings was that they could not
294
forget that from time to time they were going to need to resort to armed struggle,
and to acts like violent recovery of lands. Nasa people have a long story of
political mobilization and a constant balance between armed struggle and legal
fights. But when the Nasa organizations analyzed the role played by Quintin
Lame the criticism was strong for his faith in the law. The irrational faith Lame
had on the law led him to dangerous alliances that ended up in the final defeat of
the Quintinada and Lame's imprisonment (Bonilla, 1977: 29).
After Quintinada ' s failure, and the failure of the unions to organize
indigenous peoples, mainly because the unions did not recognize the specificity
of indigenous worldview, Nasa people started a new process of organization that
coincided with the guerrilla struggles and the creation of ANUC. In 1963 some
Guambiano and Nasa leaders created what they called the Sindicato del Oriente
Caucano, which properly speaking was not a union, but an organization that
vindicated their right to the land and to have an autonomous government. In
their process of organization they joined forces, which eliminated the old
disputes between Guambianos and Nasa; they found that the Cabildo as a form of
political government was important in the political organization of the
indigenous peoples; and they also found that the struggles to recover their lands
were important in the indigenous movement and the indigenous identity.
Both the Sindicato and the ANUC did not represent the interests of
indigenous peoples. The failure of these two organizations showed indigenous
peoples the need to have their own organization. With that purpose in 1971 it
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was created the Consejo Regional Indigenti del Cauca. As the leaders of the
indigenous movement stressed it, indigenous struggles are part of peasant
struggles, because of the similarities in terms of agrarian reform and
dispossessing of the land, but this does not mean that indigenous struggles do
not have their own specificity (CRIC, 1981). The CRIC was born as a result of the
organization of indigenous peoples in two assemblies that discussed their rights.
In 1971 more than 2000 indigenous persons gathered in Toribio (Cauca) to
publicly discuss about their rights. White landowners got scared because of this
organization and ordered the police to illegally arrest Gustavo Mejia, president
of the Federacion Social Agraria, who helped to organize the Assembly. The
Assembly discussed the following points:
1. Demands to the government to give back the lands that were
part of the resguardos.
2. Demands to the government to extend the agrarian reform to
give more land for the resguardos.
3. The modification of Law 89/1890 in order to recognize
indigenous peoples as citizens.
4. Participation of the indigenous leaders in the reform of this law
because they are the ones who know better about their situation.
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5. Elimination of the Division de Asuntos Indigenas of the Minister of
Internal Affairs, because of its lack of efficiency in dealing with
indigenous matters (CRIC, 1971: 11).
Indigenous intellectuals felt that the existing social organizations did not
take into account their rights and their worldview. Regarding ANUC, they saw
that the government influenced and controlled this organization. As a result,
indigenous leaders that were part of ANUC and advised by the Movement of
Popular Unity, decided to have an assembly where the indigenous worldview
and the struggle for the right to the land and to their own government were the
central issues for the discussion and the struggle. On September 6* 1971,
indigenous peoples of Cauca organized a second conference, this time in La
Susana, near the town of Tacueyo, Department of Cauca. The program that was
approved is the following:
1. Recovering the lands of the resgunrdos.
2. To have more lands for the resgunrdos.
3. To strengthen the political power of the Cnbildos, as the main
indigenous authority.
4. To stop paying the terraje.
5. To have the government know the indigenous laws and strictly enforce
them.
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6. To defend indigenous history, language, and customs.
7. To educate indigenous professors in order to have education in that
language and with a proper knowledge of the indigenous situation.
The main tool of the CRIC in its struggle to recover the land was precisely
the takings of lands. CRIC's struggle was justifies because of the struggle to
recover the land and to reestablish resguardos and cabildos in Cauca (CRIC, 1971:
14). In the first three years of the movement, they recovered more than 5000 ht of
land in contrast with the 8000 ht negotiated by INCORA in ten years of work
(CRIC, 1971: 14). During the first years of struggle of the movement they
presented two trends: one, that saw the movement as one that recognized only
the indigenous part of the claims and that was labeled as an indigenist position;
another, that is present in other social organizations that take into account only
the idea of class exploitation, and putting aside or postponing the indigenous
claims as less important. CRIC is one organization that tried to combine class
and race, since indigenous peoples are exploited as both indigenous and
peasants. Quintin Lame was criticized for his legalist view and his extreme trust
in the state, and Gonzalo Sanchez was criticized because he could not see the
importance of the indigenous struggle. The CRIC, on the contrary, wanted to
combine class struggle with indigenous struggle, given their condition as
indigenous peasants (CRIC, 1971: 69). In the document presented in III Peasant
National Congress, the indigenous secretariat of ANUC and CRIC held a
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position that set the limits of the class struggle regarding indigenous rights. In
this document, they showed that indigenous peoples are peasants, but that they
have a world view that makes them different from everybody else, for instance
their view of the land as something more than just an economic good and the
importance of culture in their everyday life. In the conclusion of this document,
written on August 31 st 1974, indigenous leaders held:
Indigenous peoples know that we constitute a small minority within the
exploited masses and that we by ourselves will not be able to achieve the
smallest conquest in our claims.
Our hope is to contribute to the process of liberation of Colombia, fighting
shoulder to shoulder with peasants, workers, and all the exploited, in
coordination with their class organizations.
In the construction of a new society we could give our own contribution,
like other national minorities that are fully contributing to the
advancement of peoples that have already began the path of their
emancipation.
When Colombians are consolidating our personality as a nation,
indigenous peoples will not be able to be absents, because based on
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persecution and sufferings we have kept the roots of an authentic and
millenary culture (CRIC, 1981: 170).
Indigenous guerrillas: Movimento Armado Manuel Quintin Lame
From the very beginning of indigenous mobilization and due to the
challenge that their protest meant for the privileges of white elites in Cauca they
were object of constant attacks by the police and paramilitary groups serving the
interest of the Caucan white elites (Toro, 1994: 39). Indigenous organizations
asked guerrilla movements for help but they promised to help in exchange of
control over the activities and ideology of the indigenous organizations. This
provoked a break up between indigenous organizations like CR1C and guerrilla
groups like FARC, ELN and M-19. As one woman part of the Quintin Lame
stated: "The Quintin Lame was born out of necessity, and it becomes clandestine.
At the beginning they had contacts with M-19 for the military training. But after
the takings of land in Tierradentro and the death of Padre Alvaro Ulcue the
movement grew stronger" (In Toro, 1994: 40).
In the 1970s, indigenous armed movements were nothing more than a
self-defense organization. They counted only with twenty people that gave
support to the communities but that could not be properly called a guerrilla
movement. When M-19 left Cauca to go to Caqueta they left the idea of creating
an indigenous guerrilla. At the beginning of the 1980s, political leader and
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Afrocolombian Luis Angel Monroy came back from Prison. 56 The constant
attacks of the army, the elites, and FARC created the need of having their own
guerrilla. The fight with FARC was the result of the attempts of this
organization to impose the ideas and political views on the indigenous
organizing process (Penaranda, 1998). As a result of military attacks by FARC,
CRIC and other indigenous leaders realized the importance of having their own
guerrilla. This problem is still present in Cauca and Valle del Cauca where
sometimes FARC commanders do not recognize the authority of indigenous
leaders and try to impose a policy of force recruitment, with the resulting
consequences on the livelihood of the indigenous communities (Interview with
William Lopez, Cali, July 13 th 2005). The Quintin Lame recruited the members
from their own communities but they were not supposed to spend more than 8
months in the group, it was a sort of minga to protect the community from the
attacks of FARC and the landowners. The organization had limited action not
only due to its lack of resources but mainly because of the goals of the
organization: not to take power but to fight an indigenous struggle that involved
the recovery of the lands for the resguardos (Toro, 1994: 51). But as former M-19
commander Otty Patino said it, the armed arm did not think and tried to act on
its own generating fights between the leadership of the CRIC and the Quintin
Lame (Interview with Otty Patino, Medellin September 11 th 2005).
56 This is one of the many interesting things about CRIC and the Quintin Lame. They were open
to political participation, and they were even open to have non-indigenous peoples in their
leadership, as in the case of Pablo Tatay, Gustavo Mejia, and Luis Angel Monroy.
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Ricardo Penaranda holds that the Movement Quintin Lame has the
following features: first, it was created from within the indigenous movement,
especially CRIC, in order to defend it from the attacks of the landowners and
their paramilitaries also known as pajnros (Birds); second, there was a close
connection between the group and the local population; third, the struggle for
the land and the community mechanisms of social control led to a process that
brought about a sort of local revolution; fourth, the initial success of the guerrilla
group created an unbalance with the indigenous movement and created the need
to dismantle the group to prevent the dismantling of the social movement; and,
fifth, the successful demobilization and the rights guaranteed were the result of
the fact that indigenous peoples comprised a mere 2% of Colombian population
(Penaranda, 1998).
The level of organization of CRIC was its most important strength because
it led to more participation from indigenous persons in Cauca, but at the same
time it was its main problem, because it made it a target of the white elites and
their pajaros. As a result of its struggles for recovering the lands, they had almost
recovered the old lands of Resgunrdos, combining the legal battle with social
mobilization and armed struggle. They have even elected an indigenous
governor in Cauca with a combination of forces with the indigenous movement,
the left, and the Afro-Colombian movement (Laurent, 2005).
Given the political importance of indigenous mobilization the government
reacted and several indigenous leaders were sent to prison. In prison they
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established close contacts with members of M-19 and it was precisely there that
the idea of creating a guerrilla became stronger. In 1981 FARC wanted to
increase political and military power in Cauca. They decided to have
revolutionary trials against those whom FARC considered deserters, and with
the intention of consolidating their power through terror. About one hundred
indigenous persons were killed and CRIC publicly denounced the attacks
coming from FARC. Members of CRIC were unwilling to publicly denounce a
leftist organization, but the lack of interest they found in the communist partv
led them to do this publicly. At the same time the tension between landowners
and indigenous peoples was increasing, and because of that CRIC leaders were
aware of the need of having a guerrilla or at least a self-defense group, to
respond to the army, to FARC, and to paramilitaries hired by the white elites of
Cauca. After father Alvaro Ulcue's assassination, the Quintin Lame gathered all
the members it could and progressively the movement began a process of
transformation into a guerrilla organization. In the taking of Santander de
Quilichao, in December 1984, the Armed Movement Manuel Quintin Lame
MAMQL was now a public guerrilla and some of its activities were done with
the cooperation of the group Ricardo Franco, a group of dissidents of FARC and
that later on was involved in one of the most tragic stories of the left in Colombia,
when Javier Delgado and Hernando Pizarro killed more than 170 members
accusing them of infiltration, without any resistance on the part of the accused.
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In 1985 Monroy was killed in Cali while negotiating some guns he wanted
to buy for the Quintin Lame. Monroy's death provoked a crisis in the
organization and the crisis got deeper when the new leadership involved the
Quintin Lame in the Batnllon America, an attempt of M-19 to create a joined
guerrilla organization made up with all the guerrilla groups fighting in
Colombia. The Quintin Lame had to send members to Valle del Cauca and had
to fight following the political direction of M-19. This made the movement lose
its close ties with the communities and lose sight of what their real purposes
were, that is, the defense of the land and the indigenous organizations. In March
1986, M-19 attacked the town of Toribio, a town with an important indigenous
presence. The fact that some of the attackers were members of the Quintin Lame
led the CRIC to react and condemn the attack and started wondering about the
need to dismantle the movement (Penaranda, 1998; Interview with Oty Patino,
9/11/2005).
In 1987 Jesus Pena Chepe became the new commander of the movement.
With him the political direction recovered command over the movement and
tried to get them out of M-19's war. The unity that M-19 proposed was falling
down until finally completely disappearing in 1989. As a result, the movement
decided to have talks with the government in order to demobilize the guerrilla
and have the benefits of the peace process with the government. Given the
attacks from the government and their success in decimating the Quintin Lame,
some of its members suggested completely dismantling the movement in silence.
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As a matter of fact, once the government recognized their importance for the
peace talks, they went back to the movement just for the ritual of demobilization.
The armed struggle of the Quintin Lame had the rejection of indigenous
organizations, not because of the armed struggle in itself, but because of the
orientation given to the armed struggle. A communique of the indigenous
authorities said that what makes and indigenous armed struggle is not the fact
that indigenous persons hold arms, but the thought that leads them, and in the
case of the Quintin Lame that thought got lost in the struggle (In Penaranda,
1998: 162).
From Arms to Politics and to the Politics of Rights
After the attacks to the Palace of Justice, there seemed to be an end to all
the peace processes existing in Colombia. In the late 1980s there was a new peace
process brought about by some of the actions of M-19. Given the progressive lost
of prestige that the Quintin Lame was having, and the problems it was causing in
the indigenous communities and the indigenous organizations, it was imperative
to demobilize the movement. Oty Patino, former commander of M-19, said that
the moment was the best for Quintin Lame because it gave them the opportunity
to do something they nevertheless had to do, and in the process they got
something in exchange for their demobilization (Interview with Oty Patino,
9/11/2005). The reasons that led to the Quintin Lame's demobilization were the
following: first, the lack of military strength, that made them vulnerable to the
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paramilitary groups organized and supported by the Army and drug lords; the
lack of control to common delinquency and the participation of some of its
members in those acts; the loss of support from social organizations, because the
movement became an obstacle to the social work being done by indigenous
organizations like CRIC; the possibility that if they did not participate in the
peace process they were going to be absorbed by groups like FARC or ELN, with
the negative consequences for the social organizations and the indigenous
communities (Penaranda, 1998: 174). It is important to take into account that at
the time of the demobilization the indigenous communities in Cauca had
recovered about 75% of the lands that historically had belonged to the Resguardo,
that is, the reasons for the existence of the movement were exhausting and what
was left was the war without any indigenous goal. However, despite the fact
that the period of military expansion of the movement coincides with the period
with most recuperation of lands, it is important to notice that indigenous
communities and CRIC were the ones who fought hard and recovered their
lands. The armed movement served as a sort of protection for the communities,
but once the white elites resorted to the army and to paramilitaries, the
protection the Quintin Lame could give was minimal. The leadership of the
Quintin Lame could not replace the actions of the communities, and for that
reason they did not participate directly in the recovery of lands. After the peace
process, guerrilla warfare became an obstacle in the state-indigenous
communities relations, and therefore the demobilization of the movement was an
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important step in the legalization of the Resguardos and the expansion of the
social movement (Medina, 2003). As a result of all these arguments, the Quintin
Lame participated in the peace process with the Barco administration (1986-1990)
and finally signed the peace agreement on may 31 st 1991 after almost three years
of negotiation, simply because the government did not pay attention to the
movement, and thought that it was unnecessary to participate in a peace process
with a group that the government thought to be weak or to not represent the
interests of the indigenous organizations.
In a letter written on August 9 th/1990, Jesus Pena Chepe complained for
the non inclusion of indigenous rights in the discussions about the creation of a
National Assembly, he held that the assembly was not taking into account an
important group in Colombia that could not be left to the mere role of witnesses
and victims of political events in the country (In Penaranda, 1998: 204). On
December 6 th/ 1990 there were elections for delegates to the National Constituent
Assembly, but it was only until may 27th/ 1991 that the Quintin Lame
decommissioned all their arms and it finally had representation, without the
right to vote, in the drafting of the 1991 Constitution.
Once in the Constituent Assembly, the three indigenous delegates
proposed the inclusion of indigenous rights and the recognition of the right to
have an autonomous government. The 1991 Constitution included several rights
for indigenous peoples but it did it within a framework that brought about a
tension between universal rights and indigenous rights. This tension did not
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have a solution in the text of the constitution but it was "solved" in a universalist
way by the Constitutional Court (Bonilla, 2006; infra Ch. 5).
The Court decided constitutional cases and social mobilization was
exchanged by legal mobilization. The strategy of taking lands or of taking
measures of force that showed the power of the movement were changed by the
strategy of having legal teams defending constitutional cases and having the
Court declare what the indigenous rights were. Public litigation became
important thanks to the action de tuteln and the action de constitncionalidad, two
legal remedies that brought about the idea that the end of any political and social
confrontation was the declaration of a right by the Constitutional Court. The
struggle for rights was changed in that way for a struggle for the law. The
performance of the Court and the fact that litigation became central in the
activities of social movements opened the door for a myth of rights similar to the
one presented in the United States bv Stuart Scheingold. He defines it in the
following way:
Legal frames of reference tunnel the vision of both activists and analysts
leading to an oversimplified approach to a complex social process -an
approach that grossly exaggerates the role that lawyers and litigation can
play in a strategy for change. The assumption is that litigation can evoke a
declaration of rights from Courts; that it can, further, be used to assure the
realization of these rights; and, finally, that realization is tantamount to
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meaningful change. The myth of rights is, in other words, premised on a
direct linking of litigation, rights, and remedies with social change
(Scheingold, 1974: 5).
Scheingold finds the myth of rights flawed because it does not take into
account that rights, remedies, and litigation depend on resources and effective
public policies. Instead of a myth of rights he proposed a politics of rights, that
is, one that recognizes the need of effective policies as a result of litigations.
Scheingold presents it in the following way: “The political approach thus
prompts us to approach rights as skeptics. Instead of thinking of judicially
asserted rights as accomplished social facts or as moral imperatives, they must be
thought of, on the one hand, as authoritatively articulated goals of public policy
and, on the other, as political resources of unknown value in the hands of those
who want to alter the course of public policy" (Scheingold, 1974: 6).
In Colombia, social movements had a change in the way they perceived
politics after the 1991 Constitution. Social mobilization, armed struggle, and a
clear distrust in the law and the state were the way social movements
understood their mobilization during the 1970s and the 1980s (Munera, 1998).
But after 1991, the Constitutional Court framed rights and the law in such a way
that became attractive for social movements. Social mobilization was replaced
bv legal mobilization. In the case of the indigenous movement, marches and the
taking of lands saw a reduction and an increase in the activities before the
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Courts, where initially they were treated as minorities and slowly as a people.
However, the Court cases did not bring about a change in the policies or a
transformation in the model of development. Quite the contrary, the recognition
of indigenous rights brought about a process of litigation that demobilized the
movements; the fight for constitutional cases became the fight par excellence. In
chapter 5, 1 showed the way Colombian Constitutional Court dealt with
indigenous rights and how there was a process of constitution of a liberal
identity that at the end demobilized the social movement (Vasco, 2002).
Constitutionalism became important in the constitution of a myth of
rights. The import of liberal constitutions did not necessarily bring a politics of
rights, but it served to introduce the myth of rights as part of the attempt of
occidentalization of subjects and of control of the movements. The effect of the
law was not universalizing the law and the protection it claimed, but its effect
was to create a juridical universe that excluded any other universe. It is not that
the indigenous peoples are in a subaltern positions, it is that they do not exist in
the imaginary created by the law and they could only exist as liberal subjects
(Clavero, 1994: 26). However, at the local level there still is taking of lands, and
the old form of resistance. What is interesting about this is that CRIC had to
leave aside the legal and national strategy because of the gap it created between
the organization and the indigenous communities. In the next section I will
show the history of a new organization and how it has dealt with the law. This
organization has learnt from CRIC both the strategy of taking lands, and the
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legal strategy, but in a combination that has as its main goal the protection of
indigenous rights.
A Tutelazo Limpio
There is a national normative framework that guarantees the right to
equality to all Colombians. Some of the articles in the constitution also
recognize the existence of indigenous peoples' right for a differential treatment,
given the fact of a different historical trajectory. In this sense the Constitutional
Court deals with the idea of the right to equality in several of its decisions,
departing from an interpretation of article 13 of the 1991 Constitution that
recognizes the right to equality and the duty of the state to promote the
conditions to make this right effectively true. The Court in decision C221/1992
introduced the idea of a judgment of rationality, that is, a principle that makes
the judge to decide taking into account the normative context in order to
guarantee that the measures taken to obtain equality do take into account
material conditions and not just the law. But in decision C058/1994 the Court
did not recognize the specificity of the indigenous peoples and the indigenous
identity. Moreover, the Court held that indigenous identity is related to the fact
that an indigenous person lives in an indigenous territory. In this case, an
indigenous person was drafted by the army, and the Court decided that every
indigenous person living outside their territory had to be treated as any other
Colombian citizen, and because of that the Army could draft him under the same
conditions as any Colombian citizen, to do otherwise would mean a violation to
the right to equal treatment before the law.
The peace process between M-19, EPL, CRT and the Quintin Lame led to a
national negotiation between the elites and several representatives of the popular
sector. There is a tension between universalism and indigenous rights that the
Court solved in favor of a universalist policy. The Court followed a logic of
occidentalization of indigenous peoples, a logic that is similar to the one
developed during the colony and during the Republic. In the accounts of the
development of constitutional doctrine regarding indigenous rights the attention
has been focused on the national level (Bonilla, 2006). But organizations like
CRIC also focused on the national level, losing sight of the importance of the
work at the local level. In this section I want to focus on the work of a local
organization and how they understood rights and struggles. This analysis will
show how local actors understand the constitution and how there is a
development of a sort of local constitution.
I want to analyze the strategies taken by the Organization Regional Indigena
del Valle del Cauca ORIVAC, an indigenous organization that exists since 1988.
ORIVAC is a new organization that is connected to the struggles for land in Valle
del Cauca. In the 1980s the National Government held that there were not
indigenous peoples in Valle del Cauca, mainly because the process of
industrialization was successful and the process of occidentalization that began
in the 15th century was finally achieved when the last resguardo in Yumbo was
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dissolved (Mejia, 1993; Mejia, 2002). But due to the struggles that CRIC began in
the 1970s, several peasants living in the towns of Florida and Pradera, in Nasa
territory in the mountains of Valle del Cauca, began a process for their right to
land and for identity. The struggles and the reaction of the white elites in Valle
del Cauca were the catalyzers of a process of organization that at the same time
led to a process of reconstitution of identity. As a result of the initial organizing
process several communities recognized their indigenous tradition and had the
First Regional Indigenous Conference of Valle del Cauca in Florida in September
1989. As a consequence of the Conference the ORIVAC was created (Document
Breve Resumen Histonco sobre la ORIVAC, n.d.; Interview with Don Jose Vicente
Garcia, 07/05/2005).
In its nineteen years of existence the ORIVAC has fought for the rights of
the indigenous communities in Valle del Cauca, that is, for the Nasa, Wounaan,
Eperara-Siapidara, and Ernbera Chaml. They have organized in these years more
than 70 indigenous communities in Valle del Cauca; they have created 14 new
Resguardos and now they count with 21. The ORIVAC has become the judicial
authority in the Resguardos and has gotten the recognition as such from the
Consejo Superior de la Judicatura, the administrative authority of the judicial
branch. Through the use of tutelas ORIVAC has managed get enough funds to
form small groups of teachers to teach the courses in the indigenous schools, one
of them in the Resguardo of Florida called IDEBIC. But law 715/2001 has become
and obstacle in the education of indigenous peoples by indigenous teachers.
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ORIVAC has fought few cases before the judges in Cali, the capitol of
Valle del Cauca, but those cases have become important because they have
managed to get social security for members of the community; and they have got
a special treatment for their house in Cali, that is considered indigenous territory
in Cali, a sort of indigenous embassy in the city (Interview with William Lopez,
Cali, 07/13/2005). The strategy of the organization was initially legalistic, in the
same vein as Quintin Lame's strategy during the Quintinada, and they used
constitutional cases to advance their claims. Under the leadership of Anibal
Bubu, now director of the school IDEBI, and Don Jose Vicente Garcia, and with
the advise of William Lopez, a white lawyer who has spent most of his life
working for the indigenous, the organization has fought to protect their right and
to make INCORA -the institute that was in charge of the Agrarian Reform- and
the city of Cali to respect it. In a case decided by a local judge in 2000, Anibal
Bubu, representing ORIVAC requested the protection of indigenous rights,
because the town of Cali was violating them. This is an interesting case because,
based on decision T380/1993, ORIVAC exercised their indigenous collective
right. They cited the decision wherein the Court held that indigenous peoples
are collective subjects that can exercise their rights, and that individual rights are
different from these collective rights. In the lawsuit the organization wrote how
it began to work in a small office in the building where the department's
administration works. But due to the pressures of the elites they had to leave
and had to appeal to international cooperation to buy a house where the
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organization could work. In their text they recognized to be a culture that does
not believe in capitalistic accumulation or in taxes. But the town of Cali wanted
to charge them the municipal taxes, arguing that in Cali they had to be
recognized as Colombian citizens and not as indigenous peoples.
ORIVAC responded to the City that indigenous peoples do not pay taxes
and have not paid taxes since the beginning of the Republic, and therefore to
make them pay municipal taxes would mean a violation of this old law.
According to ORIVAC, the organization is made up of the four indigenous
communities and all their goods have to be considered communal land, and
therefore those goods cannot be considered to be in the market. Anibal Bubu
cited in his defense of the communal property indigenous customs that
recognized the right of every indigenous community to consider the seas of their
organizations as communal property, and therefore as protected by the law
regardless of the place they are, be it rural or urban.
In this case, Anibal Bubu presented an argument that in some way treated
the indigenous communities as a nation within the Colombian nation, and the
relationship between the Colombian state and ORIVAC as a sort of international
relation. Anibal Bubu wrote:
We have a similar status of extended territoriality that it is recognized in
International Law for Embassies, which constitutes part of the national
territory of the country the Embassy represents, despite being in the
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territory of another nation... (Letter to Alcaldia de Santiago de Cali, July
9th 1999, signed by Anibal Bubu).
This argument is interesting if we take into account the decision that the
Court took regarding the right to equality, where the Court held that indigenous
peoples could only be recognized as such when they were inside indigenous
territory, denying in that way the idea of an extended territory. At the same
time, ORIVAC used Law 89/1890 in the benefit of the community. Bubu cited
article 27 Law 89/1890 that guarantees indigenous peoples tax exemptions
because they are considered by the state as pobres de solemnidad. This is the path
ORIVAC followed in its communication with the Alcaldia de Cali, and in all of
them cited Colombian laws. In one of the letters they wrote that they could not
pay the taxes not only because they had the right no to do it, but also because if
they did it, they would be in violation of the law (Letter to Alcaldia de Santiago
de Cali, December 15 th 1998, signed by Anibal Bubu).
The decision in this case was negative, because the judge considered that
they ciid not have special treatment in the city of Cali. In the response, the
members of ORIVAC stressed their condition as indigenous peoples and their
right to have differential treatment. To support their argument they cited several
cases of the Constitutional Court where the Court recognized the right
indigenous peoples have to differential treatment in order to respect their right to
equal treatment before the law. The local judge in the decision assumed that
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indigenous peoples had rights as a group and not as a people. According to the
local judge, in the city of Cali all the citizens have the obligation to pay takes,
whether they are Whites, Indians
,
or Blacks. He concluded writing that ORIVAC
had the obligation to pay takes based on the mere fact of being in Cali, because
by being outside the resgnardo indigenous peoples lose their condition and their
differential rights (Sentencia de Tutela Nro. 09. Juzgado Doce Penal Municipal
de Cali. January 28th, 2000). The decision was overruled in the appeal process
and now ORIVAC works in the house in the neighborhood of La Alameda in the
city of Cali.
During the leadership of Anibal Bubu and Jose Vicente Garcia, and with
the legal advice of Wilson Lopez, indigenous peoples in Valle del Cauca fought
for their rights using legal instruments, mainly accion de tutela. Anibal Bubu,
current director of IDEBI, was one of the most important leaders in ORIVAC, he
was educated in education but he became a leader by starting as part of the
indigenous guard. He held that he learnt to be a leader by relating to people.
One of the main concerns of ORIVAC was to change the education
indigenous peoples received. In their interviews Anibal Bubu and Don Vicente
Garcia coincided that they had received an Occidentalizing education that
negated their existence. They attended primary school in Florida, in Valle del
Cauca, and their teacher, and old woman who still teaches in the school, told
them that Indians were completely eliminated in 1492. This came as a shock to
them, because they knew they were Indians and of course they knew they and
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their families did exist in Florida. This anecdote served them to fight for
indigenous education. Since 1985 the community was thinking about the idea of
creating a school where they could have indigenous teachers and indigenous
education, all as part of the need to recover the idea of an indigenous Nasa-Paez
identity. Some of the members of the community attended school in other towns
and they were whitened and never came back to the community (Interview with
Anibal Bubu, IDEBI, Cali, July 27th 2005).
As a consequence of some military attacks in the region, members of the
organization had a talk with the commander of the Army in the area. The
commander complained that there were some members of the indigenous
communities in the guerrillas. To this accusation they responded that it was true
but it was due to the lack of schools in the area. The Army helped the
community to have a conversation with the governor of Valle del Cauca to allow
a school for the indigenous communities. But once the school was approved
they had to resort to tutelas to defend their right to have education and especially
to have indigenous education (Interview with Anibal Bubu, IDEBI, Cali, July 27th
2005). The first problem was related to the funds reserved for the school. Since
the school was created on December 22nd 2003, the necessary resources to pay for
the teachers were not allocated in the budget and the school was not going to
work because of lack of money to hire and pay teachers. 57 The indigenous
community had to threaten with judicial actions and even to take the building of
the Gobernacion del Valle to protest against this violation of their rights. They
57 This strategy was not new and ORIVAC had already won a tutela in 1996 (Decision T717/1996).
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threatened with ponerse de runna la gobernacion, that is to do all kind of actions to
be heard, and curious enough it was this threat that made the governor to
allocate the necessary resources for the school (Interview with Anibal Bubu,
IDEBI, Cali, July 27th 2005).
After that fight, the governor and the secretary of education put all sort of
obstacles in order to prevent the school to start working. One of these obstacles
was related to the requirements to be an indigenous teacher and to be the
principal of the school. Anibal Bubu was appointed by the Cabildo to be the
principal, because of his leadership and experience. But the secretary of
education thought that he did not fulfill all the requirements and call for an
appointment based on merits, liberal merits. As a result the secretary of
education had three candidates, all of them white people with no knowledge of
indigenous communities and no ties at all with them. ORIVAC fought this
decision, and finally it got the secretary and the ministry of education of
Colombia to recognize that indigenous peoples had the right to organize their
own schools as part of their autonomous government (Anibal Bubu, IDEBI, Cali,
July 27th 2005).
The use of the accion de tutela became important to fight for the rights of
the indigenous peoples. As William Lopez and Don Jose Vicente Garcia said in
their interviews, their right were advanced with the use of tutela
,
but this was not
enough because sometimes they had to resort to other actions, that involved
showing the government the strength and the power indigenous peoples have to
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mobilize when necessary (Interviews with Don Jose Vicente Garcia. OR1VAC.
July 5 th 2005 and William Lopez Tovar, July 13 th 2005). But the events that
coincided with the new leadership have led indigenous peoples to have a
different take regarding indigenous rights and the use of the law. With regard to
the use of the areas near Pradera and Florida as part of the zona de despeje to have
talks for the humanitarian agreement to get the liberation of all the kidnapped
people in Colombia, they felt that they were not taken into account and that it is
necessary to consult with them if they want to use these territories for the
agreement. They will defend their culture and their land, and to protect their
leaders from assassination. They have worked with the cabddos in order to
strengthen the communities and to have that power to resist the attempts to take
their lands (Interview with Flaminio. Cali, January 2006).
With regard to the recent law that tried to regulate the use of forests and
water, ORIVAC joined all the organizations to fight it, because it did not take
into account their interests and it was trying to give away their lands to
multinational corporations. In 2007 the law was declared against constitution.
Regarding the use of the law the new leadership recognizes the need to fight
with the law, they are aware that it is not easy and that it is the result of legal and
political struggles. Some of the conquests of the organization are the result of
these legal struggles. When they lose the cases in Cali, they appeal and those
cases are usually won in the Constitutional Court.
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The recovery of lands in Valle del Cauca was done via tutela, unlike the
path followed by CRIC in Cauca. As William Lopez put it in his interview, the
rights mobilization of indigenous peoples in Valle del Cauca was done a tutelazo
limpio, that is the use of the law as their main instrument in the struggles.
However, if law does not work, it is clear, based on their actions that they are
ready to resort to other ways of mobilization that show their strength and protect
their rights.
Conclusion
Indigenous peoples have used different forms of resistance to the different
attempts to change their identities and take their lands. Their mobilization has
taken different forms. Law and legal artifacts have been important in indigenous
mobilization. In some of the first examples of social mobilization, led by Quintin
Lame, law and legal titles were central to defend or recover indigenous land.
However, by doing so. Lame entered in a very dangerous field, because he ended
up legitimizing Colonial and Republican law, that is, he ended up recognizing
white people's legal institutions.
But indigenous mobilization had different strategies to defend and claim
their rights. They used legal arguments, but they also appealed to other forms of
resistance, like peaceful marches and armed resistance. Armed resistance proved
to bring about more problems than solutions and made indigenous activists ran
the risk of privileging armed violence over active social mobilization. But the
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alternative, brought by the guerrilla group Quintin Lame's demobilization,
caused the demobilization of the movement and confusion between legal
activism and social activism. From 1991 to 2000, indigenous peoples fought their
cases legally, and they disconnected their leadership with the bases and reduced
their struggles to being simply actions of litigation in a Court of Law. Local
organizations learnt from CRIC's mistakes and they combined legal and a-legal
means of resistance. In the fight they discovered their own identity, and law
became just one tool amongst the many that they could use to protect their
rights.
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CONCLUSION: BEYOND THE LEGAL COLONIALITY OF POWER
Introduction
The legal coloniality of power is a pattern of global power that, through
the use of law and other legal artifacts, constitutes spaces and subjectivities as a
strategy of control. Modernity has been traditionally defined as the victory of
reason over nature. The modern being is seen as a man that dominates nature
and that has his reason as his main instrument. The philosophical discourse of
modernity is thus presented as the progressive march of reason all over the
world (Habermas, 1985; Heidegger, 1977). Following that discourse, law has
been presented as the instrument that the state uses to control and to bring about
peace in an anarchic, violent, and reasonless civil society. Law is then seen as
order, reason, and as an instrument of civilization.
But modernity is presented without taking into account its darker side,
that is to say, colonialism and the colonial difference (Mignolo, 1995). A study on
the role law plays in the constitution of subaltern identities contributes to the
literature by adding the colonial dimension, and by showing the connections
between modernity and colonialism, and between a world-system analysis and
an analysis of neoliberal governmentality.
The Producion of Subaltern Subjectrivities
Colombian history has traditionally been presented as one of moral
progress, that is, one wherein crwllos fought against colonialism and then one
where subalterns were given equal access to the nation as the result of a sort of
moral progress, as the accounts of Bonilla, Dugas, and Van Cott show (Infra
Chapter 1; Chapter 5). In the official history of the Colombian struggle for
independence, criollos are presented as the sole fighters, hiding the importance of
indigenous peoples for or against independence (Rappaport, 1994), or the
centrality of Afrodescendants in the independence of Cartagena and the fact that
creoles were on the Spanish side in that city (Munera, 1998 and Munera, 2005).
Traditional accounts invisibilize the participation of these groups in the process
of nation building in Colombia. Indigenous peoples were incorporated into the
nation as peasants and Afrodescendants were incorporated as workers, in a
process in which they were liberated from slavery many years before the official
act of liberation in order to have more control over them (Cassiani, in AAVV,
2003).
In the process of nation-building the role law plays is missed, and the
reference is made in terms of modernity and progress, using a discourse of
civilization to erase legal traditions existing in Colombia before the Spanish
presence. The process 1 presented in this dissertation was not easy and without
resistance, but it is important to keep in mind that some sort of elites' unitv is
visible in the law, and that this unity can be seen in the way subalterns are
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depicted and controlled via criminal law. This dissertation showed that there
has been a change in strategy from the use of Spanish christening of Indians
during the colony to the use of criminal law to create a barbarian and to make the
Indian invisible and to the use constitutional law to constitute a liberal subject.
Law became in that way an instrument for the production of subaltern
subjectivities.
Law and the Production of Subjectivities
In this dissertation I have shown the role law plays in the production of
identities, especially occidental and liberal identities. After analyzing the way
the colonial encounter took place in Colombia and how law and legal arguments
were used to justify the Spanish presence in the Americas, I focused on the way
law has been part of the process of occidentalization and incorporation of
Colombia, and in particular of indigenous peoples, into the capitalist modern
world-system. Using Stuart Scheingold's ideas, I showed the limits of the myth
of rights and introduced his view of what he labels as the politics of rights. In
his analysis Scheingold shows the importance of taking into account that law by
itself is unable to bring about social change, and that to do so it is necessary to
have a political understanding of law and to have resources and public policies
that can be able to produce the social change that is involved in the rhetoric of
the politics of rights (Scheingold, 1973).
However, as John Brigham shows, law is intertwined with the political
identity of social movements. As he writes, “liberal legal and political theory
typically downplays the power of the law to constitute social relations, including
identity, movement politics, and categories of scholarship...when political
activists fail to note the power of conventional legal forms, they cannot
understand the power of law to shape their interests" (Brigham, 1996: IX).
Brigham pays attention to the two dimensions that the politics of rights have: the
formal one, which assumes that law is central in the way social life is organized,
and the realist approach, which takes into account the role politics play in the use
of the law. But he adds a third dimension, that is, the constitutive character of
the law. Unlike Scheingold, Brigham does not see law as independent from its
use. From a Wittgensteinean approach, he sees law as language and its meaning
as dependent upon its use. But, following Foucault, he also views law as
constitutive, that is, as being constituted and as constituting those who use and
constitute the law: "Law and legal forms constitute social relations and political
practice by delineating possible movement action and determining movement
practice" (Brigham, 1996: X). In his analysis, law is not a sort of entelequia that is
beyond the understanding of the human mind. On the contrary, law is analyzed
in its everyday use by social movements and in its role in shaping those
movements' interests.
In my study I departed from this idea that there is something beyond the
politics of rights. I have analyzed the colonial origins of Colombian law and the
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way it is presented as peacemaking and as the way to order society. In the
analysis of indigenous rights I used a postcolonial / decolonial approach, that is,
one that treated law as constitutive and I showed why and how that constitutive
process took place. In my analysis I followed the discursive strategies that we
find in the law. Unlike positivists, who believe that law is command and that it
has some metaphysical structure, I believe that law is related to politics, but that
is also a discourse that has constitutive power. By analyzing law, I contribute to
postcolonial and decolonial by bringing the state back in order to see how the
colonial encounter takes place at the institutional and the everyday life level
(Dube, 2003; Dube, 2003b; Dube, 2003c). In my account I have not done a history
from below, but rather I have analyzed the strategies the elites in power follow to
sustain that power and to produce hegemony in the political system. But I also
showed that the hegemony process could not just be seen from a local or national
perspective, because elites' interests are mediated by national and local concerns,
but at the same time they are shaped by the way elites perceive the position of
the nation-state in the world-system. I am aware that the story I tell takes into
account documents produced by the elites, but that is because I am trying to
understand the process of subalternization of subjects in Colombia, focusing on
the process of the indigenous peoples. I do not pay the same attention to the way
women and other subaltern groups have been constituted as such. That is part of
another research. In this dissertation I just wanted to draw the lines for further
research.
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Law as language became central in the process of constitution of subaltern
identities, but it became important in the process of resistance as well, as the
cases of indigenous intellectual and activist Manuel Quintin Lame and
indigenous organization CRIC show. But the limits of law are shown in the
process followed by CRIC and the guerrilla movement Movimiento Armado
Manuel Quintin Lame MAMQL. Law, as Angel Rama has shown (Rama, 2004), is
part of the lettered city; and the lettered man is the central actor in the nation-
building process. Lawyers became prophets of the law and they became part of
the lettered city, a process already analyzed by Victor Uribe Uran and Malcolm
Deas (Uribe Uran, 1992; Deas, 2006). Quintin Lame understood this process very
well and the cultural capital associated to the status of the law. His use of the
law and the book he used to “become" a lawyer are evidence of this
understanding, but also of law's limits in bringing about social change.
Law framed indigenous peoples' political claims, and with that frame they
were able to make their demands to the Colombian government. They used
strategic litigation in order to obtain from the Courts the recognition of their
rights. By appealing to law, social movements, and in particular the indigenous
movement, forgot other ways of mobilization. The struggle for rights became a
struggle for the law. Law framed social movements, but the frame within which
the cases were decided included indigenous peoples as excluded, or as Maria
Emma Wills has shown for women's rights, law promoted inclusion without
representation (Wills, 2007).
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Beyond the Permitted Indian58
Charles R. Hale and Rosamel Millaman in their analysis of the politics of
identity in Guatemala used Silvia Rivera Cusicanquy's concept of the permitted
Indian (el indio permitido), in order to explain neoliberal multiculturalism and the
way indigenous peoples' resistance is responded from the state. Hale presents it
in the following way: "The core of neoliberalism's cultural project is not radical
individualism, but the creation of subjects who govern themselves in accordance
with the logic of globalized capital. The pluralism implicit in this principle -
subjects can be individuals, communities or ethnic groups- cuts against the grain
of mestizo nationalism, and defuses the once-powerful distinction between the
forward-looking mestizo and the backward Indian. Governance now takes place
instead through the distinction -to echo a World Bank dictum- between good
ethnicity, which builds social capital, and "dysfunctional" ethnicity, which
incites conflict" (Hale, 2004: 18).
This dissertation has shown that the idea of the indio permitido is not new
in the Americas, and on the contrary forms part of the logic of incorporation of
the Americas and its population into the modern/ capitalist/ colonial world-
system. From the discussion about the nature of the Indian to the inclusion of
indigenous rights in the 1991 Constitution, there is a process of construction of
subaltern identities, identities that are permitted because they do not represent a
real challenge to the elites' idea of the nation and of citizenship. In that sense,
they are included/ excluded, that is, they are allowed to participate in the
58 I owe this reference to Prof. Sonia Alvarez.
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political system as long as they do not challenge the economic and social
configuration of the nation. The 1991 Constitution introduced the idea of
cultural rights and indigenous rights, but the Constitutional Court solved the
tension between universalism and contextualism by privileging a universal idea
of human rights, constituting the field wherein indigenous peoples would be
permitted. The tension between class and ethnicity simply fell into oblivion.
My study has shown the long history of the constitution of what can be
labeled as the permitted subaltern, and that I called in the text the legal
coloniality of power. Neoliberal multiculturalism, as the one introduced in the
1991 Constitution, demobilizes social movements because it presents its rights as
legal rights, that is, as rights that can only be recognized in a Court of law. Old
forms of resistance, like the taking of lands, guerrilla warfare, active social
mobilization, are part of the other that has to be excluded, that is, those are
actions of the non-permitted Indian. A liberal politics of recognition does not
mean liberation, but only recognition that indigenous peoples exist as a group
and that they need to be included in the imagined community. But recognition is
not social equality or the elimination of colonial structures and colonial
mentalities. The legal coloniality of power hides the fact that indigenous peoples
are part of the poorest sectors of Colombian society, and that simple legal cases
will not make the trick to eliminate more than five centuries of wanton
production of subalternity. As Milton Fisk has held, “the cultural view of
recognition stays within the bounds of neoliberalism. The cultural view keeps
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recognition and respect for some who have very little from leading to a violation
of the freedom of yet others who have much. It does this by refusing to call for a
redistribution of the assets of those who have much. Put in structural terms, the
cultural view does not challenge the market. However, the social view of
recognition does not counter pose recognition and equality; instead, it makes
equality a vital part of recognition" (Fisk, 2005: 27).
However, this dissertation does not end with an idea of indigenous
peoples and indigenous struggles as part of neoliberal strategies of
governmentality. The first part of my research has shown that there is a logic
that began with colonization and that constitutes subalternities, as a form of
epistemic violence. Though the 1990s were for indigenous peoples a decade of
demobilization, and in a way a success in terms of neoliberal multiculturalism,
after ten years of the 1991 Constitution indigenous peoples have realized the
need of appealing to other forms of mobilization besides legal mobilization
before the Courts. As McNeish writes, in his analysis of indigenous mobilization
in Guatemala and Bolivia, "[r]ather than appearing as passive victims of those
who come to steal their natural resources, marginalized sectors have been
confronting perceived threats in an active and innovative manner" (McNeish,
2008: 48).
The new ways of mobilization that indigenous organizations like ORIVAC
use, and the fact that violence is denounced but that it could also be used, shows
the indigenous will of becoming the non-permitted Indian if that is the only way
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to materialize their rights and to obtain real social equality. ORIVAC and other
local indigenous organizations go beyond the permitted Indian, and in that sense,
they go beyond the legal coloniality of power. To say it in the indigenous
peoples' own words:
...no caben planteamientos de acciones indigenistas que no busquen la
ruptura radical de la situacion actual: liquidacion de las relaciones
coloniales externas e internas, quebrantamiento del sistema clasista de
explotacion y de dominacion etnica, desplazamiento del poder economico
y politico de una minoria oligarquica a las masas mayoritarias, creacion de
un estado verdaderamente multietnico en el cual cada etnia tenga derecho
a la autogestion y a la libre eleccion de alternativas sociales y culturales
(CRIC, 1981:135).
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